Summer Chen Column: The Rise of the 'Justice Demon' After Ma Ying-jeou's Final Acquittal in the 'Three Media Case'

Taiwan's Supreme Court yesterday rejected the prosecution's appeal, bringing finality to the 'Three Media Case' after two decades of litigation, confirming the acquittal of former President Ma Ying-jeou and others. While this 'long-standing case' stirred little in the legal community, only Prosecutor Chen Hung-ta of the High Prosecutors Office issued a statement: 'Prosecutors are not historical清算ers, nor agents of political justice, but gatekeepers of statutory elements and evidence rules.' Chen's words, though noble, rang hollow, as prosecutors continue to act under political directives.

Aside from Ma Ying-jeou, no one truly understands the extent of harm two decades of legal battle can inflict on an individual. Ma himself may now be unable to articulate the depth of that damage.

The 'Three Media Case' is a critical case for examining whether justice is impartial, whether the core of law lies in judicial professionalism or political considerations, and for testing the 'conscience' and 'wisdom' of political figures. It also stands as a landmark case illustrating the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) corruption of the judiciary.

First, the 'Three Media Case' originated from the Kuomintang (KMT) selling its party-owned enterprises—China Television (CTV), China Film (CF), and China Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)—two decades ago. The KMT sought to divest its media assets due to the DPP's long-standing demand since the 'Tangwai' era: 'Party, government, and military exit media.' This principle was codified in 2003 under the 'Three Broadcasting Laws,' strictly prohibiting government, political parties, or public or party officials from directly or indirectly investing in, operating, or controlling private broadcasting and television enterprises. In 2005, then-KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou legally disposed of the party's media holdings. However, in 2006, DPP Chairperson Yu Shyi-kun and the 'eternal (Legislative Yuan) Chief Whip' Ko Wen-je were sued by the High Prosecutors Office's 'Anti-Corruption Center.' The case was later taken over by the Special Investigation Division and concluded in 2014 with 'no illegal conduct found.'

Twenty years ago, Yu and Ko accused Ma and others of 'selling the three media assets at a low price, damaging national property.' At that time, there was no 'Transitional Justice Commission' or '不当 Party Assets Committee.' The KMT had already been legally registered as a political organization during former President Lee Teng-hui's era. The law prohibiting political parties from operating or investing in for-profit businesses would not be fully enacted until 2017. The 'Three Broadcasting Laws' had banned party involvement in media 12 years earlier than the Party Act. From today's perspective, the DPP's 'Party, government, and military exit media' clause, enacted during its first administration, was a just move against authoritarian parties. Yet two decades later, most media outlets now bear DPP influence, with the party even helping media find investors and arrange personnel. The KMT's 'legal sale' of the three media companies has not only become a political joke but has also turned into a judicial sacrificial lamb. If the three media assets had fallen into DPP-friendly hands as desired, would this judicial drama have unfolded?

Acquittal finalized—Who is accountable for the failed re-investigation? Who is responsible for the public disclosure of the investigation?

Second, the KMT is not a 'government' but a civilian organization. How can there be 'damage to national property'? Even if the sale was 'undervalued,' it harmed KMT's interests, not 'national property.' At the time, Ma Ying-jeou urgently sought to sell the three media assets to comply with the 'Three Broadcasting Laws.' Under DPP rule, finding buyers was difficult, making it nearly impossible for the KMT to sell at a high price. Given that even a 'low sale' triggered prosecution, who would dare to sell high? Crucially, the KMT did not consider the sale 'undervalued' nor believe its property was seized or interests harmed—unlike Ko Wen-je, who was accused of breach of trust in the Formosa Television shares case for actually taking funds from a subsidiary of All People's Telecommunications (acquitted). This is precisely why the 'Three Media Case' concluded with 'no illegal conduct found.'

Third, Yu and Ko's accusation of 'damaging national property' reflects the DPP's initial priority upon first taking power: 'settling accounts with KMT party assets.' In their view, all KMT assets were either seized from the people or inherited from Japanese colonial times, necessitating settlement. In 2016, upon regaining power, the DPP pushed through the '不当 Party Assets Act' and 'Transitional Justice Act' in the Legislative Yuan, retroactively labeling all KMT-owned enterprises, including the three media companies, as '不当 party assets.' Using new laws to settle past affairs, the already concluded 'Three Media Case' was 'reopened for investigation' in 2017. The Special Investigation Division, which had closed the case, was likely disbanded because its investigation into former President Chen Shui-bian's family scandals had deeply alarmed the DPP. President Tsai Ing-wen's first act in office was to abolish the Special Investigation Division. The 'Three Media Case' was transferred back to Taipei District Prosecutors Office, tragically without any new evidence.

The key issue is that no prosecutors questioned the legal impropriety of using new laws to overturn past decisions and pursue past actors. Moreover, like the later Ko Wen-je Jinghua City case, the 'party-prosecution-media' triad regularly 'disclosed' investigation details, transaction recordings, and even threatened to confiscate 'criminal proceeds,' yet no one questioned the violation of investigation confidentiality. After 20 years, no one has been held accountable for violating 'investigation non-disclosure,' for reopening the investigation without new evidence, or for the final acquittal. The Ministry of Justice still proudly touts the '90% conviction rate of prosecutors' as an achievement.

Hsing Tai-chao rose to the pinnacle of the prosecutorial system, yet brought prosecutors to their lowest point in public esteem.

After reopening the investigation, the Taipei District Prosecutors Office indicted Ma Ying-jeou and others in 2018, just one year later. For the eight years from indictment to final acquittal, attending court became Ma's daily routine. The prosecutor who led the indictment, Hsing Tai-chao, rose from Taipei Chief Prosecutor to High Court Prosecutor, and eventually to Prosecutor General, retiring just before the final acquittal—safely stepping down without ever having to explain whether he was 'following orders'—presidential orders, or his own political sycophancy. Hsing reached the peak of prosecutorial power, yet dragged the social status and credibility of prosecutors to their lowest point.

Chen Hung-ta stated: 'The Three Media Case reminds the prosecutorial system that in major political cases lacking direct evidence strong enough to overcome reasonable doubt, even with support from “certain media,” prosecutors may still be severely challenged in court.' This directly exposes 'media subservience' as a standard feature of politically motivated prosecutions. Yet, his courage failed to reverse the decline of the prosecutorial system. Chen added, 'An acquittal does not mean the Three Media transaction is free of public suspicion,' but once in criminal proceedings, the focus must return to 'evidence-based judgment' and 'elimination of reasonable doubt.' 'Prosecutors cannot substitute transitional justice for criminal elements, nor use political perception to fill evidentiary gaps.' In plain terms, supporting or criticizing the Three Media Case based on political sentiment is the job of pundits; prosecutors and judges must rely on 'evidence,' not 'public opinion.'

Chen was being polite. Borrowing the words of Judge Lin Meng-huang of the High Court, who recently 'admonished' prosecutors, investigating cases requires not only 'doubt leads to leniency' but even 'innocent until proven guilty.' This applies not only to a 75-yuan embezzlement case but also to the Three Media Case. Chen said, 'Prosecutors are not historical清算ers, nor agents of political justice, but gatekeepers of statutory elements and evidence rules.' Prosecutors still holding numerous 'political cases' should ask themselves: Do they still remember what 'statutory elements' and 'evidence rules' are? Prosecutors cannot be 'agents of political justice,' but they are highly likely to become self-righteous 'justice demons.'