Opinion: The Return of Great Powers - From the Battle of Penghu to the 21st Century Drone Battlefield

Risks to Taiwan under the Return of Great Powers - From Sims' 'Four Strong' Theory to the Era Trap of Military Unification War British historian Brendan Simms (Brendan Simms) in 'The Return of the Great Powers' (The Return of the Great Powers) points out that the 'historical peace holiday' that has been taken for granted by many people for more than thirty years after the end of the Cold War has ended. Globalization has not ended power politics, and democracy and freedom have not made geopolitical competition disappear; on the contrary, the world is returning to an era of great power competition, military strength, and national power determining international order. The reality of 'might makes right' is once again surfacing. However, the return of great power competition does not mean that today's great powers can simply copy past imperial war models. If one ignores the fundamental changes in national power composition, military technology, international alliances, and global economic interdependence, and merely infers future wars based on historical memory, one often falls into the trap of erroneous historical analogy. The Chinese Communist Party's film 'The Battle of Penghu' is scheduled to be released at the end of July this year. It was completed in 2024, but the release date has been changed several times. This 2.3 billion Taiwan dollar propaganda film 'The Battle of Penghu,' which is highly publicized with 'Unification of Taiwan, Irresistible Momentum' as its main theme, attempts to use the history of Kangxi Emperor sending Shi Lang to capture Taiwan and force the Ming Dynasty to surrender in 1683 as a historical reference for today's military invasion of Taiwan. Beijing's subtext is simple: as long as outlying bases are captured and the main force of the defending army is severely damaged, Taiwan's defensive capabilities and will to resist can be quickly collapsed. However, can the current situation in the Taiwan Strait really replicate the Penghu model of 'one battle to conquer the world' from more than 300 years ago? From the analytical framework of 'The Return of the Great Powers,' the answer is negative. The Battle of Penghu in 1683 was a decisive battle in the era of imperial expansion; a conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the 21st century may become a long-term war of attrition that affects the rise and fall of great powers and changes the international order. If Beijing chooses to resolve the Taiwan issue by force in the future, it will face not the isolated Ming Dynasty regime, but a strategic gamble involving the fate of the nation and the endurance of the regime. I. The Return of Great Powers - The New World Order Under Sims' Prophecy Brendan Simms points out in his book that international politics are returning to an era where power determines order. In Simms' realist analysis, a true 'great power' is not simply distinguished by economic scale, but must simultaneously meet four stringent hard standards: Resources: Possessing sufficient population, resources, industry, technology, and military capabilities to influence global situations. Global Reach: Possessing substantial power to shape international order, define spheres of influence, and set rules. Reputation: Enjoying international recognition and diplomatic respect, making other powers unable to ignore its status. Resilience: The most core point - the ability to recover national power and rise again after suffering major strategic setbacks. The great powers Simms refers to are not simply the countries with the largest economies, but countries with long-term historical continuity, strategic autonomy, and the ability to shape international order. Therefore, he particularly focuses on the United States, China, Russia, and Britain, which have a global strategic tradition. Simms' book title is 'The Return of the Great Powers' (plural Powers = great powers), emphasizing the rise of China and Russia and the return of the world to a multipolar system like the 19th century. United States: Possessing the strongest economy and military power in the world, military bases around the world, the dollar financial system, global intelligence and diplomatic networks, and the most complete alliance system, it is the only truly globally capable great power today. Even with domestic political polarization, the United States demonstrates high institutional resilience and self-repair capabilities. China: Possessing the world's second-largest economy, a massive military force and nuclear capabilities, and more importantly, controlling important links in the global supply chain and key mineral resources such as lithium, it has global influence in technological revolution and green energy transformation, and thus has already achieved global great power status. Britain: Although the empire has ended, it still maintains global deployment capabilities. Britain maintains overseas bases (such as Gibraltar, Cyprus, the Falkland Islands, and the Port of Duqm in Oman), possesses nuclear weapons, a blue-water navy, a world-class diplomatic system, intelligence capabilities (such as the Five Eyes Alliance), and historical accumulated international reputation, and is therefore still a global great power, not just a European strong power. Russia: Although its economic scale is limited, it possesses one of the world's largest nuclear arsenals, a massive military force, and a sphere of influence over the former Soviet space. Although its influence in the Middle East and Africa has declined in recent years, it still possesses global nuclear deterrence, cyber attacks, information warfare, and diplomatic influence capabilities, and thus still meets the qualifications of a great power. Why are other 'candidate countries' excluded? The author, through comparison, explains why some common competitors did not make the cut: Germany and Japan: Their greatest shortcoming is not in objective strength (economic strength), but in subjective will (overcoming historical baggage and willingness to take on military responsibility) and actual action (building independent global projection force, nuclear deterrence, and strategic autonomy). In the era of hard power return of great power competition, they are more like important pillars of the American system, rather than independent players at the big table. France: The most complex situation - possessing independent nuclear weapons and global presence, but has ceded key sovereignty such as borders and currency to the EU, and historical examples of collapse (such as 1940) show that its resilience is lower than that of Britain. The EU: It is neither a single sovereign state nor a loose alliance, but is in an awkward middle ground. In recent years, there have been discussions on 'strategic autonomy,' European defense funds, and calls for rearmament (stimulated by the Russia-Ukraine war and the rise of Trump), but it is still very far from forming a unified great power - political will, constitutional structure, and member state differences are huge obstacles. India: Possessing nuclear weapons and economic scale, but its military influence is mainly limited to the region, and lacks historically verified resilience (internal conflicts and poverty issues). Simms' point indeed touches on what the 'four R's' overlooked: 'What a great power represents is not just brute force. Its greatness is not only manifested in the military but also in culture and ideology.' In short, a country's values are crucial. All countries, no matter how bad their behavior is, hold a positive vision of themselves. Putin sees Russia as a bastion of traditional Christianity and family values, contrasting sharply with the atheistic and decadent West. Britain and other Western countries maintain the vision of a free international order. China believes it is experiencing a 'century of humiliation' after its revival. The United States, although listed among the Western powers, after Trump's return to the presidential seat, Simms expresses uncertainty about the current position of the United States. Is the current position of the United States really uncertain? In reality, the United States has not 'returned' to being a great power because the United States never left. In the thirty years after the end of the Cold War, no matter how the international rules changed, the United States was the only, self-aware 'global order super-supervisor.' Even if China and Russia are now issuing challenges, Trump's social media rhetoric may seem to arbitrarily abolish the values held by the United States since its founding, but in action, it is still maintaining and wielding the 'unique' superpower status of the United States. Liberal institutionalists often say that the post-Cold War era established a 'rules-based international order.' But do rules really self-execute? In reality, the thirty-plus years of historical peace holiday after the Cold War was maintained by the United States using its power and will to punish those who do not follow the rules. For example, the 1991 Gulf War that drove Saddam out of Kuwait relied on American military force; now the West's support for Ukraine against Putin is not based on the abstract 'not allowing the use of force to change borders' clause, but on opposing strength. The United States is still the 'unique' force that supports the entire international order. It is China that is truly returning to great power status: 'China's rise is not a newly emerged phenomenon, but the restoration of a historical norm in the region for thousands of years.' - Brendan Simms Simms emphasizes that Beijing's view of national revival is essentially a 'restoration of historical status' - returning to its long-held core dominant position in East Asian history. This key insight reveals that: It is precisely because the CCP regards strength as a 'return' rather than 'newly emerged expansion' that makes Beijing's insistence on unification far exceed the simple territorial integrity, but is elevated to the inevitable logic of civilizational revival. This endows the Taiwan issue with high 'strategic urgency' and 'symbolism of national fate.' II. The Paradox of the Trump Effect - America's Alliance System Has Become Even Stronger If one only observes from media headlines, Trump's second term's repeated pressure on NATO and Asian allies seems to be eroding the post-war order led by the United States. However, if one analyzes from the logic of realism, one will discover a strange 'Trump Effect Paradox': Trump's extreme pressure on allies forces allies to increase defense spending, but at the same time also increases the uncertainty of allies' commitment to the United States. Trump's greatest geopolitical legacy is not how much the U.S. military has increased its forces, but that America's allies have become stronger: NATO: Generally increase defense budgets to GDP of