The Tightening Noose Over Taiwan: When Reformers Become Troublemakers: Excerpts from 'The Lee Teng-hui Era in Taiwan' (6)

Taipei was not very eager to restart high-level cross-strait talks, but the pressure from Washington was increasing. In late 1997, President Clinton wrote a private letter to President Lee Teng-hui urging the government to show maximum flexibility and seek to resume exchanges with Beijing. High-ranking officials in Washington even warned Taipei that pursuing national status at the expense of cross-strait relations was not in Taiwan's overall interest. As the media pointed out, the U.S. intended to incorporate the Taiwan issue into its flexible approach to China policy, causing Taiwan to lose autonomy in the face of pressure from the Chinese Communist Party and cross-strait struggles. The U.S.' so-called 'active participation' in the cross-strait dialogue process was, in essence, pressure and monitoring of Taiwan. Political commentators in Hong Kong, just across the sea, also noticed that after Jiang Zemin's triumphant visit to the U.S., Taiwan was at a loss for how to respond. Hu Chi-chiang, who had just returned from the U.S. to assume the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, repeatedly stated that the U.S. would not force cross-strait negotiations, but those with keen insight could see that the high-ranking officials of the government were visibly worried. There were still some pro-Taiwan individuals in Washington who spoke out in support. For example, Li Jieming, who had resigned from public office, personally appeared on a news program to defend Taipei. He cited Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1994 as an example, stating that at the time, the heads of state of these countries had all met with Lee Teng-hui, and Beijing had not reacted excessively. However, the following year when Lee Teng-hui visited the U.S., not even a janitor from a government department had contact with him, yet Beijing still recalled its ambassador to the U.S. in protest. Li Jieming asked the American audience in front of the camera: How can the U.S. swallow this arrogant attitude of the Chinese Communist Party? The old friend's timely help was still not enough to overcome the reality of international politics. In June 1998, the Clintons were invited to visit China, touring Xi'an, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guilin. Before their departure, White House officials assured the Taiwanese side that this visit would not harm Taiwan's interests. However, the high-ranking officials of the government knew better and were extremely worried that the U.S. and China would issue a fourth joint communiqué, seriously harming Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui urgently wrote a letter to Clinton, requesting that he not sign and issue any documents or statements unfavorable to the Republic of China. The government organized an inter-agency task force to respond and set up five dedicated phone lines to closely monitor every move of the U.S. president in China. On June 25th, when Clinton's entourage arrived at the first stop in Xi'an, Berger, who had by then been promoted to White House National Security Advisor, answered a question from a reporter accompanying them, stating that the U.S. government supports the One China policy but does not support Taiwan independence, one China and one Taiwan, or Taiwan's joining international organizations with sovereign states as members. Berger stated that these positions were the same as those previously publicly stated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who accompanied Clinton on his visit to China. Sensitive reporters immediately asked whether Clinton would reaffirm these positions during his meeting with Jiang Zemin. Berger replied that in his personal opinion, the president 'might do so.' When reporters asked again whether this would affect U.S. military aid to Taiwan, Berger rudely interrupted the reporter's question and quickly left. This was not a good sign for Taipei. However, unexpectedly, after Clinton flew from Xi'an to Beijing, he did not dwell much on the Taiwan issue. Moreover, he spoke highly of freedom, democracy, and human rights in his speech at Peking University. However, when the group turned to Shanghai, there was an unexpected statement. On the afternoon of June 30th, the U.S. president, during an exchange with a group of scholars at the Shanghai Library, specifically pointed to a question from Wu Xinbo, a professor of international relations at Fudan University, and then, following a note handed to him by his staff, blurted out: The U.S. does not support one China and one Taiwan or two Chinas, does not support Taiwan independence, and does not support Taiwan's joining international organizations with sovereign state membership. That evening, Clinton at a banquet hosted by the mayor of Shanghai urged the two sides of the strait to engage in dialogue to resolve differences as soon as possible and once again reiterated the 'Three Nos' he had proposed earlier, firmly believing that this policy would help provide a framework for maintaining stable prosperity among the U.S., China, and Taiwan. Later, Berger, when facing reporters' questions, further emphasized that even if the democratically elected government of Taiwan chose Taiwan independence or overwhelmingly favored it through a civilian vote, the U.S. government would still not support it. It is worth noting that the speech draft of Clinton's statement on the U.S. position towards Taiwan in Shanghai was written by Antony Blinken, a 36-year-old White House National Security Council staff member at the time. This main drafter of the U.S. government's 'Three Nos' policy towards Taiwan became the U.S. Secretary of State under President Joe Biden 23 years later. Clinton's public statement in Shanghai suddenly turned the previously ambiguous flexible space in the cross-strait policy context into a clear boundary of action. It is no wonder that Chen Xifan, the representative to the U.S. who was closely watching the live broadcast of the American Cable News Network (CNN) in Washington, upon hearing the 'Three Nos' from the mouth of the U.S. president, was suddenly taken aback, exclaiming 'Oh my God' and 'He said that!' The political circle in Taipei was filled with a sense of indignation. Zhang Xucheng, the representative of the Democratic Progressive Party in the U.S., even compared the 'Three Nos' to the historical repetition of the Munich Agreement signed by Britain and France with Nazi Germany in 1938, bitterly criticizing the U.S. for adopting appeasement towards the Chinese Communist Party and selling out democratic Taiwan. On July 8th, Tian Hongmao, who had a close relationship with Lee Teng-hui and was the director of the National Policy Research Center, expressed his protest to Richard Bush, the chairman of AIT who came to Taiwan for a briefing. He said that Clinton's speech had seriously harmed Taiwan's interests, and once the language changed, the political effect would also change. In the future, the international community would definitely recognize that the strength of the U.S. support for Taiwan had decreased, making it difficult for Taiwan to open up international survival space in the future. Moreover, Beijing would have more leeway to deal with Taiwan and force Taipei to sit at the negotiating table. Richard Bush repeatedly clarified that Clinton's speech had not deviated from the framework of the U.S.' past policy towards Taiwan, but had only repeated the wording of the questioner Wu Xinbo in a more colloquial manner. The U.S. government's position towards Taiwan had not changed at all. 1998 Before the U.S. President Clinton couple visited Shanghai. (Data photo, Xinhua News Agency) Facing the unfavorable situation, Lee Teng-hui remained calm. On July 6th, he emphasized to Richard Bush during a meeting at the Presidential Office that the U.S. president's visit to the mainland 'had not harmed the interests of the Republic of China.' However, he then reminded the other party that Taiwanese public opinion had indeed shown a strong reaction and caused a great misunderstanding of the perception of Taiwan-U.S. relations. He demanded that Washington take concrete remedial measures. First, help stabilize Taiwan's diplomatic relations with Central American countries. Lee Teng-hui referred to Central America as the U.S.' backyard, 'If the tiger comes, it wouldn't be good,' having the Republic of China help the U.S. guard the door could make the relationship better for all parties. Next, Lee Teng-hui demanded that the U.S. must support Taiwan on security issues. He revealed to Richard Bush that during Clinton's eight-day visit to China, PLA fighter jets had crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait to provoke. The Taiwanese Air Force, in order to ensure the smooth progress of the U.S. president's visit, repeatedly tolerated and carefully responded. He then proposed the hope that the U.S. side could include Taiwan in the 'Theater Missile Defense (TMD)' system to ensure Taiwan's safety. In order to make Washington understand Taiwan's situation, Lee Teng-hui proactively provided a piece of secret information, saying that he had learned through special channels that the Taiwan Strait crisis three years ago was not caused by his visit to the U.S., but by the power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party. At that time, Jiang Zemin's position was not stable, 'he could not solve or dare to do many things,' Lee Teng-hui therefore said that he actually welcomed Clinton's visit to China, to make Jiang Zemin's position more stable, because China must have a 'Gorbachev' to succeed. After hearing this, Richard Bush took the opportunity to ask Lee Teng-hui to 'help Jiang Zemin stabilize his position together with the United States,' so that he could deal with the obstruction of hardliners within the party. The best way to do this was to let the cross-strait dialogue continue. Lee immediately agreed, saying: 'We should jointly promote the peaceful transformation of the mainland, we will maintain dialogue with the mainland.' Not only was Richard Bush in Taipei repeatedly clarifying that Clinton's 'Three Nos' statement had not harmed Taiwan, but high-ranking U.S. officials in Washington who participated in decision-making also firmly believed that they had only let the U.S. president 'reaffirm' the long-standing policy position towards Taiwan. At the same time that Lee Teng-hui and Richard Bush were talking in the Presidential Office, Bed, the senior director for Asian affairs at the White House National Security Council, aware of Taiwan's anger and dissatisfaction with the 'Three Nos,' led his staff to draft a statement to defend their position. Bed first quoted the content of Lee Teng-hui's public speeches in the past few days, stating that the president himself had pointed out that Taiwan's interests would not be harmed by Clinton's visit to China. Then, he moved the goalposts and extended 'cross-strait peaceful reunification' to: 'President Lee and the Taiwanese government take the position that the Taiwanese and the People's Republic of China should ultimately be reunified.' The statement also emphasized that Clinton's 'Three Nos' was a 'balanced policy' and was 'U.S. policy' rather than a 'policy shared by the U.S. and China.' Lee Teng-hui did not want Clinton to issue a fourth communiqué or joint statement during his visit to China. The U.S. side not only agreed but also kept its promise. Clinton's visit did not negotiate Taiwan's future with Beijing.