Li Qizhe's Perspective: The Decline of Hegemony Begins with the Heart - Decoding the Reversal of Global Favorability Between the US and China

The Pew Research Center released its latest global attitude survey on July 15, recording a historic turning point: in the 36 countries and regions surveyed, the majority of respondents rated China higher than the United States. The survey was conducted from February 8, 2026, to May 13, 2026, and interviewed 42,151 adults. Among them, 25 survey regions had a higher favorability towards China than the United States, 5 were roughly equal, and only Israel, Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines, and Poland were significantly more pro-American. A single poll cannot prove that hegemony has shifted, and cross-national samples cannot be equated with a 'global referendum.' However, the direction presented by Pew's long-term tracking still has watershed significance: in 2025, the United States had a better image than China in most surveyed countries; a year later, this relative advantage had reversed. This is not the completion of China replacing the United States, but a warning that the world is beginning to recalculate the attractiveness, credibility, and order role of the two powers. What the data says: Beijing's rise, more Washington's loss Looking closely at the 20 countries with comparable data from 2023 to 2026, the dynamics of the reversal are clear. In 2023, the median percentage of respondents with a positive view of the United States was 58%, while China's was only 32%. By 2026, China had risen to 46%, while the United States had fallen to 36%. In other words, the United States' original 26 percentage point lead had turned into a 10 percentage point deficit in three years. China's image has indeed improved, with an increase of 14 percentage points, while the United States has decreased by 22 percentage points. Therefore, the main driving force behind this crossover is not just Beijing's increased diplomatic and economic attractiveness, but more so the rapid erosion of Washington's own image. Canada is the most symbolic. In 2023, 57% of Canadians had a favorable view of the United States, while only 14% had a favorable view of China. In 2026, China rose to 44%, while the United States fell to 33%. Canada not only shares a long border with the United States but also has a highly integrated economic, security, and intelligence system with it. When such a core neighbor experiences such a dramatic relative shift in just three years, it reflects not just ordinary policy dissatisfaction, but a re-evaluation of the United States' role and intentions. Leader evaluations also show a similar structure. In 23 of the 36 surveyed regions, more respondents had confidence in Xi Jinping's handling of international affairs than in Trump. The gaps in Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all reached double digits. However, this is not a decisive victory for Xi Jinping's personal charm: his highest trust rating in the surveyed countries is only 37% in the United Kingdom. More accurately, this is a competition of 'who is less rejected,' and the US president is losing it. The invisible balance sheet of hegemony In international relations, hegemony has always relied on two books. The first is the visible hard power ledger: military bases, aircraft carrier battle groups, the dollar system, technology platforms, and financial sanctions capabilities. The second is what Nye (Joseph Nye) calls the soft power ledger: institutional attractiveness, value legitimacy, policy credibility, and whether other countries are willing to believe that the order provided by the hegemon is not just serving its own interests. Hard power determines whether a country can force others to comply, while soft power determines whether it needs to frequently use coercion. The true advantage of a mature hegemony is not just having a larger military, but being able to make allies believe that the common order is worth maintaining, making neutral countries willing to free-ride, and making opponents estimate the cost of political isolation before challenging. When this voluntary following decreases, the hegemon must use more money, threats, tariffs, and military force to obtain cooperation that could originally be obtained through trust. Decline is therefore not necessarily first reflected in military spending, gross domestic product, or the number of ships, but may first appear in the continuously rising cost of maintaining the same order. The Pew survey is like a report on the depletion of assets in this invisible ledger. In 2026, the median of the 36 countries was only 35% who believed that the United States helps global peace and stability; only 32% believed that the United States considers the interests of other countries when formulating foreign policy. The proportion of Canadians who believe the United States is a reliable partner has dropped from 83% in 2022 to 35%. The proportion of Germans who believe the United States will consider the interests of other countries has also dropped from 60% in 2023 to 23%. In 17 middle-income countries, respondents generally believe that the United States interferes more often in the affairs of other countries and ignores local interests more often. This does not mean that China's diplomatic behavior has no power politics or dependency risks, but it shows that the Global South is increasingly inclined to assess the role of major powers based on infrastructure, trade, financing, and development outcomes, rather than the Western-preferred democracy-authoritarianism dichotomy. The United States still has one important advantage: more respondents believe that the US government respects people's individual freedoms. But this advantage is also narrowing. The median of the 36 countries is only 39% who believe the United States respects individual freedoms, while 56% hold the opposite view; in 13 countries with comparable data from 2021, 12 countries saw a double-digit decline. Sweden dropped from 61% to 27%, and Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, South Korea, and Spain also saw declines of at least 25 percentage points. When the narrative of the 'beacon of freedom' is even beginning to be doubted by allies, the United States is losing not just its general national image, but one of the most important sources of legitimacy for the post-war order. From public goods hegemony to transactional hegemony This loss of points is not abstract anti-American sentiment, but has a clear policy background. The survey period covered the Trump administration's expansion of tariffs, reduction of foreign aid, demands for territory and security from allies, and international controversies sparked by US military action in Iran. Another Pew report from the same period shows that Trump's handling of issues such as tariffs, Iran, Gaza, Greenland, and the Russia-Ukraine war generally received negative evaluations. Behind these policies is a consistent logic: alliances are a transaction, security is a service, market access is a chip, and international public goods should be paid for by the beneficiaries. From a corporate negotiation perspective, this strategy may force individual countries to increase military spending, invest in the United States, or accept new trade conditions; but from the perspective of hegemonic governance, it is consuming the United States' most valuable institutional assets. Public goods-type hegemony requires leaders to at least demonstrate a certain degree of self-restraint, making other countries believe that rules will not be changed arbitrarily according to the leader's emotions. Transactional hegemony, on the other hand, re-prices every commitment: today's allies may be tomorrow's competitors, existing agreements can be overturned for the sake of negotiation, and security guarantees may be linked to arms purchases, investment, or political submission. It may increase short-term rent, but it will reduce long-term credit; and once credit is discounted in international politics, allies will hedge, neutral countries will diversify their dependencies, and opponents will find it easier to gain influence at a lower cost. China's relative score in this competition partly comes from this contrast. Beijing does not need to make the world recognize its political system, but only to make more countries believe that cooperating with China at least has economic predictability and will not be completely rewritten every few months due to the political needs of the leader. This attractiveness may not be value-based, but it can be functional; it may not be enough to establish Chinese hegemony, but it is enough to erode American hegemony. The limits of the reversal: geography is still the most honest poll However, interpreting this report as 'the world has already tilted towards Beijing' is also a mistake. At least four limitations must be made clear. First, China's lead is not universally equivalent to absolute majority support. In countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, China's favorability is higher than that of the United States, but it does not necessarily exceed half; some gaps are only a few percentage points. This is more like the United States' evaluation is declining faster, rather than China having achieved solid political recognition. Second, geographical distance deeply shapes public opinion. Among the six countries that are still clearly pro-American, there are Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and India, four Indo-Pacific countries. Japan's favorability towards China is only 11%, while towards the United States it is 50%; India is 23% for China and 45% for the United States; South Korea is 28% for China and 45% for the United States; the Philippines is 40% for China and 56% for the United States. The closer a country is to China and the more directly it competes with China in terms of territory, security, or strategic competition, the less likely it is to turn economic interests into political trust. Third, favorability does not equal strategic followership. Countries can welcome China's investment, trade, and technology, and at the same time require the United States to provide security guarantees; they can criticize US interference but still regard the dollar, Silicon Valley, universities, and military alliances as irreplaceable institutional assets. Most countries in the world pursue not 'choosing sides,' but using US-China competition to expand their own bargaining space. Fourth, China's institutional attractiveness still has a clear upper limit. Pew data shows that among the 37 surveyed countries, only 11 have approximately half or more who believe that the Chinese government respects people's freedoms; in North America, almost all European countries, as well as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, approximately three-quarters or more believe that the Chinese government does not respect these freedoms, and Xi Jinping has not gained the trust of the majority in most high-income democratic countries. What China currently gains is mainly the relative recognition of its development capabilities, policy stability, and economic cooperation, rather than the universal legitimization of its political system. Therefore, the more precise meaning of this reversal is not that the 'Chinese model has defeated the American model,' but that the United States can no longer automatically gain a more favorable international evaluation than China based on its existing reputation. Three insights for Taiwan