Taiwan's Nuclear Ambitions: A Tale of Disillusionment with Nuclear Weapons and Human Struggle

At the request of my friend Zhao Qin, I was asked to write a foreword for his magnum opus, "Taiwan's Nuclear Bomb." Initially, I thought it was a light-hearted account of his career in nuclear administration, but I quickly realized that it was a detailed and precise narrative of Taiwan's struggles and valuable experiences in nuclear military applications over the past 40-50 years. While Taiwan has institutions related to nuclear energy such as Taiwan Power Company, the Department of Nuclear Engineering at National Tsing Hua University, and the Atomic Energy Council, these are primarily focused on power generation, administration, and education research. This text, however, focuses on the development of nuclear weapons, centering around the development of the Institute of Nuclear Energy at the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology and its interactions with government administrative agencies. The basic background is the close monitoring and intervention by the United States in Taiwan's nuclear weapons development. The entire text is clear and easy to read, with clear descriptions of people, times, and places. The author, who has long been involved in the field, observes deeply and calmly, but does not hesitate to express emotions. Whether praising or criticizing people or events, the author speaks frankly, and while occasionally feeling helpless in terms of the situation, maintains an active attitude, always holding a passion for the national situation. This may be a respectable quality left by the predecessors. I hereby solemnly recommend this book! A few thoughts: First, international rules on the use of nuclear weapons: The main regulations on nuclear weapons after World War II come from the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which approximately 170 countries have joined. The killing power of nuclear weapons is so great that during the Cold War, both camps were under the threat of "mutually assured destruction," hence this treaty to ensure international security. Apart from a few countries that already possess nuclear capabilities, other countries have generally promised not to seek the manufacture of nuclear weapons under this treaty, and countries that violate the promise will be subject to international sanctions. This is the legal source of the United States' monitoring and intervention in our country. Although our country has joined this treaty, after withdrawing from the United Nations, we signed a trilateral agreement with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, promising to continue to abide by this treaty. Our country's situation is relatively special. The strong confrontation between the two sides of the strait makes it difficult for domestic attitudes towards nuclear weapons to reach a consensus. Some military personnel naturally tend to secretly study and promote them in case of emergency, while academic personnel mostly aim for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The two sides' opinions are difficult to reconcile. Fortunately, Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo's wise saying of "having the ability but not manufacturing" put an end to the controversy. By around 2002, the fourth condition in Beijing's four principles for military action against Taiwan, "when the Taiwanese side manufactures nuclear weapons," disappeared. After all, the two sides of the strait are of the same ethnicity and language, and the difference in size is only a matter of territory. The saying of "mutually assured destruction" seems not to apply, and nuclear weapons are only for deterrence. In my shallow view, this is a sign of a certain relaxation of the basic relationship between the two sides, which is worth noting. Second, the impact of the United States' establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1979 on our country was enormous. Various sectors at home called for expanding external contacts and establishing cooperative relationships with substantial meaning. At that time, our country's economic development was growing steadily, and various industries had accumulated considerable momentum. The most ideal cooperative partner was the European countries, taking advantage of their considerable complementarity with us. In 1986, the French side agreed to add a science and technology group under the National Science Council within our representative office in France to strengthen interaction. I was fortunate to be selected in 1987 to be dispatched to France to serve as the group leader. Previously, in 1983, I returned to the country to serve in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before going to France to study, I had worked for five years under Mr. Zhao Ke-ming, the cultural attaché of the Ministry of Education's cultural group, participating in many educational, cultural, and academic exchanges. At that time, the National Science Council had many cooperative cases with France, such as fixed annual visits by scholars, joint research in various specialized fields of science and technology, seminars, and joint publications, including annual university professors conducting at least half a year of joint research in French laboratories, etc. In terms of practical matters, the purchase of the Lafayette patrol vessel and the Mirage fighter jet was a considerable breakthrough. In addition to this, the design and construction of the synchrotron radiation device as well as the preliminary agreement for our nuclear power plant four also sufficiently illustrate the close interaction between the two sides. Third, regarding the Atomic Energy Council: There were contacts between French and Taiwanese nuclear energy personnel during the early visits to France, which belonged to supportive work by overseas missions. After taking up the position of the science and technology group, it was a time when everyone was making extra efforts to strengthen ties with Europe. Nuclear energy is a sensitive and important project, and we made every effort. As far as I remember, Chairman Yan Zhenxing visited France three to five times, often accompanied by Director Zhao Qin. The schedule for each visit was arranged in advance, so the work of the mission during the visit was mostly supportive in nature. In other words, it was to accompany and assist, and even translation work was rarely done. The level of nuclear research in France is extremely high, and the English proficiency of the personnel involved is also excellent. The trilateral agreement mentioned earlier was formally carried out only after Director Zhao Qin first communicated with relevant personnel from the US and France and obtained their agreement. The signing of the draft agreement was also the case. Given the era background at that time, especially after the Zhang Xianyong incident, it was not easy for our side to increase the trilateral agreement with France and the International Atomic Energy Agency and expand the contact surface for our nuclear energy development, which can be called an important breakthrough. Regarding the application of nuclear energy, in my shallow view, it should not be overlooked. Science is a problem in progress. Human beings will use it because of its powerful momentum, avoid it instantly because of environmental protection, but after a while, they will pay attention to it again because of technological improvement, and may avoid it again because of certain factors. The current era is an era of energy priority. When alternative energy is insufficient, the EU has clearly defined nuclear energy as clean energy. Obviously, the power source is a necessary condition for development in the AI era. Here, I pay tribute to the nuclear energy workers.