Opinion: Zero payment is not zero cost, nor is it a battle to protect intermediary interests—Please answer directly who will bear the cost for Taiwan's SMEs

Recently, Mr. Wu Kuo-Tung wrote an article criticizing my opposition to the government's promotion of 'zero payment' for migrant workers, even using terms like 'private profit crisis' and 'intermediary interest protection war' to interpret my questions about industry costs and policy coordination as intermediaries fearing loss of profits. Since Mr. Wu uses such strong language, I must also respond clearly: this statement not only does not answer my question, but also deliberately replaces concepts and shifts focus. I have never said that migrant workers should suffer from unreasonable charges; nor have I opposed the international community's goal of preventing forced labor and debt bondage. The question I have raised has always been only one: the so-called 'migrant worker zero payment' does not mean that the recruitment process no longer incurs costs, but rather who will pay for the costs that were originally borne by migrant workers. The answer is very clear: not the government, not American brands, nor the advocacy groups that propose the slogan, but Taiwanese employers, especially those with the weakest capacity to bear the burden, SMEs. Will intermediary profits really disappear because of zero payment? Mr. Wu portrays my position as intermediaries opposing reform to protect their own interests, but this logic does not hold at all. In fact, many large electronics manufacturers and international brand supply chains in Taiwan have already implemented migrant worker zero payment in accordance with RBA standards. RBA requires that workers should not pay recruitment fees to employers or recruitment agencies; if workers have paid, the relevant fees should also be refunded. However, under this system, intermediary companies still handle recruitment, documents, entry, settlement, and subsequent services, with the costs now paid by companies. The intermediary industry has not disappeared, and reasonable service compensation will not vanish into thin air. Therefore, what zero payment truly changes is not whether intermediary companies provide services, but who pays the money. Since the costs still exist in the end, distorting this policy debate into 'intermediaries unwilling to lose profits' is merely avoiding the real issue: how much additional cost do employers bear? What impact assessments has the government conducted? Can SMEs afford it? Taiwan is not every company called TSMC Currently adopting RBA standards are mostly international brands, large electronics manufacturers, and their core supply chains. These companies have higher capital scales, stronger bargaining power, and are more likely to reflect new costs in orders, quotations, or supply chain management fees. However, the vast majority of companies in Taiwan are not international giants but SMEs. Many traditional industries and contract manufacturers have gross margins of only 3%, 4%, or even lower. For large enterprises, an increase of tens of thousands of yuan in recruitment costs for each migrant worker may just be a management fee; for SMEs employing dozens or hundreds of migrant workers, it could be an additional burden of hundreds of thousands of yuan, directly eating into their already meager profits. This is not that enterprises are unwilling to protect migrant workers, but that the government cannot assume that all enterprises have the same financial capacity. Demanding that all SMEs in Taiwan follow the example of TSMC's capacity is not fair reform, but a policy of 'let them eat meat.' When enterprises are already struggling with pressures from exchange rates, electricity prices, wages, land, environmental protection, carbon fees, and international competition, if the government further shifts all cross-border recruitment costs to employers, it may not be the sole cause of any enterprise's closure, but it could be the last straw that breaks the camel's back for SMEs. My point has never been that 'a certain factory collapsed because of zero payment,' but rather: when enterprises are already struggling, why does the government continue to increase fixed costs in the absence of grading, buffering, and supporting measures? Different reasons do not mean that pressure does not exist; not being the sole cause of death does not mean it is not a fatal blow. Comparing Japan and Korea cannot be done by only picking the part we want to see. The International Labour Organization indeed advocates that workers should not directly or indirectly bear recruitment fees and related costs; RBA also includes zero payment in global supply chain standards. But these are principles of fair recruitment and supply chain governance, not that all countries have implemented them in exactly the same way for all industries and all employers. To compare, we should compare the total cost of employers hiring migrant workers, not just one of the fees. In addition to wages, overtime pay, insurance, health checks, living care, administrative management, and dormitory management, Taiwanese manufacturing employers are also required by law to pay the employment stabilization fee monthly. Depending on different core allocation methods and ratios, the employment stabilization fee for each migrant worker in the manufacturing industry may start from a few thousand yuan per month, and the rate is even higher when the quota increases. This is a continuous, monthly legal burden on employers. The food and accommodation part is not something that can be completely offset by a sentence 'can be charged to migrant workers.' The Ministry of Labor stipulates that food and accommodation must be reasonably agreed upon in advance by both labor and management, but in reality, employers still have to provide dormitories, meals, water, electricity, equipment, management personnel, and living care. The amount that can be agreed to be deducted is often not the same as the employer's actual expenditure. So I have to ask back: Do Japan and Korea adopt the same employment stabilization fee system as Taiwan? Do they also require employers to bear the same level of responsibility for dormitories, meals, and living management? Why, when introducing international systems, does the government only introduce the parts that increase employer costs, but not bring in the supporting measures, subsidies, public recruitment mechanisms, and cost-sharing methods of other countries at the same time? Institutions cannot be learned only halfway, and even less can the strictest regulations of all countries be piled up on Taiwanese employers. This is an international obligation or a policy choice? More importantly, we should ask: whose policy advocacy is the Taiwanese government promoting zero payment today? The Ministry of Labor has publicly stated that the migrant worker policy commitments related to the Taiwan-US equal trade agreement involve the prevention of forced labor, currently targeting the manufacturing and fishing industries, and not including home care workers. This shows that the current policy pressure is indeed closely related to Taiwan-US trade negotiations, international supply chains, and forced labor standards. In that case, the government should clarify things: What level of requirements does the US side demand of Taiwan? Is it to prevent migrant workers from bearing unreasonable fees, or to require Taiwanese employers to bear all cross-border recruitment costs? Is it only applicable to high-risk supply chains exporting to the US, or should it be extended to all SMEs in the manufacturing industry? How is the scope of fees defined? Are passports, physical examinations, training, transportation, documents, intermediary, and service fees all included? How much should the governments of exporting countries, overseas intermediaries, international brands, the Taiwanese government, and domestic employers each bear? If these questions have no answers, but the government first shouts 'zero payment,' it is making a political declaration first and then letting enterprises bear the consequences. I support preventing migrant workers from being exploited due to high debt, and I also support the government's investigation of unreasonable charges. However, protecting migrant workers cannot have only one path, and cannot shift all costs to Taiwanese employers. A truly responsible plan should at least include government and international brands sharing the burden, transparency of recruitment fees in exporting countries, public recruitment mechanisms, fee caps, recovery of illegal fees, enterprise size classification, transition periods, and SME subsidies. International brands, since they require the supply chain to comply with zero payment, cannot suppress procurement prices on the one hand and require Taiwanese contract manufacturers to bear all costs on the other; the government, since it accepts relevant commitments for the sake of international trade interests, cannot reap the negotiation results for itself but leave all compliance costs to enterprises. Who sets the standards should also bear the costs together; who gains trade benefits should not shift all the price to the weakest SMEs. Please answer the questions, do not attack identity. I have been engaged in employment service work for 35 years. Precisely because I have long stood at the forefront of the intersection of migrant workers, employers, intermediaries, and government systems, I am more aware of how any policy slogan is ultimately implemented and by whom the consequences are borne. Does it mean a conflict of interest if someone familiar with the system raises questions? Does it mean that someone who does not understand industry costs is more qualified to comment on policies? Mr. Wu can support zero payment and criticize my views, but please do not replace policy debate with 'intermediary interests.' Please directly answer the following questions: After zero payment, who will pay all the fees? Has the government estimated the complete new cost for each migrant worker? Has it distinguished the bearing capacity of large enterprises and SMEs? Why should Taiwanese employers, who already bear the employment stabilization fee, food, and living management costs, bear all cross-border recruitment fees alone? Why do international brands, the US market, the government, and migrant worker exporting countries not share the burden? Zero payment is not zero cost, and slogans will not make the bill disappear. Shifting costs from migrant workers may be a policy choice; but dumping all the bills on Taiwanese SMEs is certainly not the only choice. Do not make intermediaries the target, and do not make SMEs the sacrifice. When enterprises are pushed towards closure by one cost after another, what is lost is not only the employer's business, but also the jobs of domestic workers, government taxes, and Taiwan's overall industrial competitiveness. This is the real reason for my warning.