Opinion: From 10.9GW to 27.9GW, Is Taiwan's Offshore Wind Power Mid-to-Long-Term Planning a Castle in the Air?

Amidst the stagnation of renewable energy development in Taiwan and the successive withdrawal of offshore wind power operators from the market, the government proposed the "Mid-to-Long-Term Development Plan for Taiwan's Offshore Wind Power" at the National Climate Change Response Committee meeting held on July 23. Following South Korea's announcement of a new round of mid-to-long-term offshore wind power targets, this plan aims to solidify Taiwan's position in the regional offshore wind power market. Additionally, the Ministry of Economic Affairs' Energy Bureau also announced the administrative contract template for the third phase of block development on the same day, with no significant differences from previous media reports. Overall, this report extends the target capacity of offshore wind power facilities from 10.9GW in 2030 to 18.3GW to 19.9GW in 2035, and 24.7GW to 27.9GW in 2039. The new capacity after 2031 will primarily be supported by the third-stage block development fourth phase (3-4) and fifth phase (3-5), each planning 8GW, equivalent to an annual increase of 2GW; and plans to hold the "2+1" floating wind power demonstration project by the end of 2026, with each project having a capacity of 100MW to 200MW, expected to be grid-connected between 2032 and 2033. The Ministry of Economic Affairs also explained in the meeting that the basis for this plan is the completion of a systematic sea area inventory by cross-departmental efforts, identifying sea areas with the potential to add 15GW to 18GW of capacity. Figure 1: Schedule for the Fourth and Fifth Phases of Offshore Wind Power Block Development and Floating Demonstration Period Source: Presidential Office Climate Change Committee (2026) Figure 2: Offshore Wind Power Sea Area Space Source: Presidential Office Climate Change Committee (2026) Taiwan has already accumulated approximately 5GW of offshore wind power capacity, which is indeed a significant achievement. However, if the past achievements and the planned capacity that has not yet been verified for engineering feasibility and market conditions are placed on the same upward policy curve, whether this development path can proceed smoothly or is just a mirage remains to be seen. Perhaps, from the current progress of the first and second phases of block development, we can get a glimpse of this. The tables for phases 3-1 and 3-2 reveal more information than the text. According to the data released by the National Climate Change Response Committee, although the allocation of 4.435GW has been "completed" for block development phases 3-1 and 3-2, the actual table lists only five wind farms: 3-1 phase includes Chaomiao 500MW and Haisheng 495MW; 3-2 phase includes Haiguang 800MW, Youde 700MW, and Chaomiao II 600MW, totaling 3.095GW. If Youde, whose development prospects are increasingly unclear, is excluded, the capacity that is more likely to continue is only 2.395GW. The Ministry of Economic Affairs did not explain why the listed capacity differs from the allocated 4.435GW by 1.34GW, nor did it explain how the mid-to-long-term planning for offshore wind power will address the development challenges faced by these projects through institutional adjustments. In contrast, this table reveals a more realistic situation: the government has actually confirmed that only these five projects in phases 3-1 and 3-2 will continue to be included in the subsequent capacity planning, and the government may have overestimated the possibility of Youde continuing execution. Given the current cumulative progress of the first two stages is only 5.3GW, even if the aforementioned 2.395GW is fully completed in terms of financing and construction, the total capacity in 2030 will only be 7.695GW; however, the Ministry of Economic Affairs still maintains the original target of achieving 10.9GW in 2030 in the report, which indeed raises doubts about how this estimate can be established. The third phase of block development is currently planned to be grid-connected between 2030 and 2031, but given the current progress, developers must complete the signing of administrative contracts, environmental impact assessments, detailed engineering design, signing of CPPA, financing, procurement, construction, and various permit procedures required in between. Referring to past development experience, completing grid connection by 2030 is already quite challenging; if, as market rumors suggest, only two developers participate in the bidding, how will the gap of 3.205GW to the 2030 target be filled? The administrative contract announced by the Ministry of Economic Affairs on the same day even provides a one-year flexible grid connection mechanism. Developers who meet the conditions of underwater foundation installation or partial capacity interconnection can apply for a one-year extension of the completion deadline. This arrangement indeed helps to reduce the risk of developer default, but it also reflects that the competent authority clearly knows that the current schedule is quite tight and must leave room for possible delays through flexible mechanisms. Given that the 2030 target is almost unattainable and the Ministry of Economic Affairs has not yet publicly disclosed potential sites as in previous phases of offshore wind power development, if the government still believes that setting a set of beautiful capacity numbers in the mid-to-long-term planning is sufficient to persuade foreign investors to continue investing in Taiwan, it may be overly optimistic. Sea area inventory does not represent financial and engineering feasibility. Returning to the sea area inventory completed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs through cross-departmental efforts, which identified 15GW to 18GW of new capacity that can be added. Indeed, if these sea areas are all equipped with actual development conditions, the capacity on the books can be smoothly converted into wind farms, and the policy targets for 2035 and 2039 may be mathematically feasible. However, the sea area data can only prove that after excluding some military, shipping, fishing, and environmental restrictions, there may still be space to set up wind turbines; as for water depth, offshore distance, seabed conditions, seabed cable routes, grid connection costs, and construction resources, the data itself does not provide answers. The better near-shore fixed sites in Taiwan have been gradually used in previous rounds of development, which may also be one of the reasons why only two developers have the ability to continue participating in the third phase. If future new sea areas continue to extend further offshore, whether using fixed or floating wind turbines, the closer to the center of the Taiwan Strait, the water is usually deeper, and the distance of the seabed cables will also increase. These conditions may push up the cost of green electricity, and banks will correspondingly increase the risk rating for financing. The current fixed offshore wind farms are already facing multiple pressures from seabed cables, construction ships, supply chains, financing, and CPPA prices; if future sites move further into deeper water areas, the development cost per unit will only continue to increase, and it is difficult to expect it to naturally decrease. If the policy still requires enterprises to bear the main source of revenue through power purchase agreements, the higher engineering costs will eventually be reflected in the electricity price. Whether enterprise buyers can accept it is far more decisive than how much sea area can still be allocated in the data. Releasing an "auction target" of 8GW every four years indeed helps developers establish mid-to-long-term predictability; but if the government equates the auction target directly with the achievable development capacity, it may only repeat the situation of phases 3-1 and 3-2. Currently, only the capacity and schedule have been announced, and developers cannot estimate the investment return rate of deeper and farther sites based on this, nor can they judge how much of the future 8GW has commercial feasibility. In the end, there may only be the heat of policy discussion, but it is difficult to turn it into actual investment and construction. The floating demonstration plan is like the boy who cried wolf and has been overtaken by South Korea. Finally, the Ministry of Economic Affairs has arranged the floating wind power demonstration project to be held in 2026, adopting the "2+1" principle, with each project having a capacity of 100MW to 200MW, expected to be grid-connected between 2032 and 2033. From the perspective of Taiwan's remaining sea areas, it is indeed necessary to lay out floating technology in advance; otherwise, as sites suitable for fixed wind turbines are gradually exhausted, mid-to-long-term offshore wind power will lose follow-up plans. However, this is not the first time Taiwan has declared the promotion of a floating wind power demonstration project. Taiwan originally had the opportunity to be at the forefront of the Asia-Pacific market, but now its progress has fallen behind Japan and South Korea. As of now, the government has not yet announced the feed-in tariff for the floating demonstration project, nor has it proposed other long-term revenue mechanisms to replace the FIT. In contrast, the fixed wind farms in the third phase of block development (3-3) at least have a guaranteed price of 2.29 yuan per kWh, extended sales period, and flexible grid connection and other supporting measures. Although the guaranteed price of 2.29 yuan may not be of much help to financing, the floating demonstration project with significantly higher costs and risks currently only has the auction capacity and the planned grid connection year. Floating wind power involves additional costs such as floating bodies, mooring systems, dynamic seabed cables, port improvements, towing and installation, and offshore maintenance, and requires the introduction of new technologies and the cultivation of related talents. Technology suppliers, insurance companies, and banks must obtain sufficient revenue guarantees to conduct risk assessment and pricing for the first batch of commercially scaled projects. If the government hopes that the demonstration project will simultaneously undertake the functions of technology verification and industry cultivation, the pricing mechanism must reflect the increased costs and risks of the demonstration stage. If the revenue mechanism remains opaque and still intends to follow the model of fixed block development with CPPA as the mainstay, the final result may be that everyone responds, but no one bids. Even if the auction can be launched as scheduled in 2026, from the auction procedure, signing of administrative contracts, various permit applications, port reconstruction, financing, to the final entry into actual construction, to complete the grid connection in 2032, the schedule is still very tight. Fixed wind farms usually take 5 to 7 years from pre-planning to completion and grid connection; floating wind farms, which are still in the initial stage of technology and industry development, can they be completed even faster? Past achievements are not a guarantee for the future implementation of policies. In summary, the Ministry of Economic Affairs