Jing Yuan-Chou's Perspective: Beijing's Approach to Taiwan – Whales Still Lurking, But Silkworms Are Already Feeding

According to a recent public opinion poll conducted in June by the Taoyuan-based National Development Education Foundation on cross-strait political negotiations, 60% of Taiwanese support political talks between the two sides. Regarding desired outcomes, roughly half favor 'maintaining the status quo,' while the other half hope 'Beijing recognizes Taiwan as a country.' This indicates that while the majority of Taiwanese society seeks to reduce tensions and restore dialogue, it does not accept Beijing's predetermined path toward unification. From Beijing's perspective of promoting unification, these figures represent an awkward and inconvenient message.

For Xi Jinping, preparing for the upcoming 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party next year is his top priority. Xi has undoubtedly begun drafting his third-term performance report to justify his reappointment, with progress on the Taiwan issue being a key component. Xi clearly understands the embarrassment surrounding his lack of tangible progress on unification. However, while he may convince party insiders and outsiders that unification is not an immediate goal, he cannot afford to let the perception take hold that the Taiwan issue has stagnated. Therefore, Beijing must create the impression that unification has not halted—that conditions are still being accumulated, and ultimate success remains possible.

In an apparent effort to bolster Xi's performance record on Taiwan, Wang Huning, at this year's Taiwan Affairs Work Conference, emphasized the need to 'firmly grasp the dominance and initiative in cross-strait relations' and continue advancing unification. Subsequently, Zhu Weidong, Director of the Taiwan Research Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, proposed the concept of 'unification without unification' (bu tong er tong), suggesting that Beijing should proactively shape a favorable situation. Zhu's remarks reflect a potential transformation in Beijing's strategic thinking toward Taiwan.

Traditionally, the 'one country, two systems' framework followed a 'unify first, govern later' logic—sovereignty transfer precedes governance. Now, the sequence is being inverted to 'govern first, unify later.' This means Beijing aims to first achieve visible, cumulative, and irreversible control through coast guard operations, legal measures, economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and cognitive warfare. By gradually acquiring partial governance, it seeks to move toward full governance, ultimately creating a unified reality.

Over the past month, several seemingly isolated incidents collectively indicate that Beijing has begun implementing this 'govern first, unify later' strategy with the 'dominance and initiative' demanded by Wang Huning. In addition to Zhu Weidong's June proposal of 'unification without unification,' Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration reported detecting 55 Chinese government vessels—including coast guard and research ships—around Taiwan's waters in June, an 83% increase from May, with activities expanding toward Taiwan's eastern waters and Pacific shipping lanes. On July 15, Papua New Guinea abruptly closed Taiwan's representative office. On July 22, Wang Yi, during talks with U.S. Secretary of State Rubio in the Philippines, reiterated demands for the U.S. to cease arms sales and official exchanges with Taiwan.

Observing these cases, Beijing's operational tactics for achieving 'govern first, unify later' can be summarized as 'loosening externally, tightening internally.' Externally, Beijing seeks to weaken international, especially U.S., security support for Taiwan. Arms sales remain a focal point in the Taiwan issue. During the Wang-Rubio talks, Rubio reaffirmed that U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains unchanged and that arms sales will continue to be reviewed under legal procedures. However, following Xi Jinping's expression of concern over Taiwan during his May meeting with Trump, Beijing has seized every opportunity to pressure the U.S. Considering the strategic intent to foster a positive atmosphere for a potential Trump-Xi meeting, this sustained pressure could influence U.S. arms sale decisions.

The closure of Taiwan's office in Papua New Guinea demonstrates that Beijing's diplomatic suppression has expanded from formal diplomatic relations to non-official levels. Beijing's efforts to erode Taiwan's international support are now following a strategy of 'severing diplomatic ties where they exist, and withdrawing representative offices where they don't.'

Internally, regarding Taiwan, Beijing's increasingly frequent coast guard and government vessel activities around Taiwan's waters reflect a strategy of 'quantitative change leading to qualitative change.' By increasing the number and frequency of vessels, Beijing normalizes their repeated presence, uses this常态化 to claim law enforcement authority, transforms enforcement claims into de facto control, and gradually tightens Taiwan's jurisdiction through incremental encroachment.

The common feature of these cases is the weakening of Taiwan's sovereignty and jurisdictional scope. All can be seen as political achievements for Xi Jinping ahead of the 21st Party Congress. Using the idiom 'whale swallowing and silkworm nibbling,' Beijing has not abandoned the possibility of rapid unification through war or blockade ('whale swallowing'), but is increasingly prioritizing the accumulation of control through gray-zone tactics ('silkworm nibbling'). In sum, Beijing's Taiwan strategy currently exhibits the distinct characteristic of 'whale swallowing not stopped, but silkworm nibbling taking precedence.'

Therefore, assessing Xi's performance on Taiwan at this stage should focus not on how many measures Beijing has taken, but on whether Taiwan and other countries are now unable or unwilling to act as they once did. Based on this, it is recommended that the government establish a 'comprehensive jurisdiction index' to holistically evaluate all gray-zone actions by Beijing, implement a traffic-light warning system, and accurately monitor the degree of erosion of Taiwan's jurisdiction at any given time to enable early response and countermeasures.

*The author is an adjunct professor in the Department of Diplomacy and International Relations at Tamkang University.