Governing a Great Power Like Managing a 'Gang'? Overseas Scholar: Trump's 'Transactional' Diplomacy Resembles a Gang and Is Full of Realistic Calculations

Since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to power in January last year, he has significantly impacted American domestic politics and international relations, reshaping the triangular dynamics among the U.S., China, and Taiwan. In response, a prominent overseas scholar has published a new book, offering a unique perspective by analyzing Trump's understanding of international issues through the lens of 'managing a gang.' This loyalty-focused, expertise-dismissing approach is seen as a key reason behind the current U.S. government's unpredictability.

Is Trump Actually Managing a 'Gang'?

Weng Lizhong, Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University in Texas, released his new book 'Trump's Empire: Re-globalization and the New World Order' in July. Drawing from extensive domestic and international sources, as well as his personal experience interacting with the U.S. government and Republican teams, Weng outlines changes under Trump's second-term administration. The publisher hosted a lively discussion on Saturday evening in Taipei, inviting Li Dazhong, Professor and Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, to engage with Weng on the current state of U.S. politics.

During the discussion, Weng pointed out that while outsiders often interpret Trump's governance style as 'transactional,' the issue may go deeper. Reviewing Trump's upbringing and rise in New York, along with biographies about him, reveals that as a real estate developer, Trump was accustomed to dealing with New York's mafia, particularly the Sicilian and Italian families.

Given this life experience, Weng believes Trump clearly understands from past experience that by identifying the gang leader, he can control the rank-and-file workers. In his view, Trump's management style resembles that of a gang: 'Because he thinks international politics works the same way. As long as I find that other 'bully,' I can probably handle it.' At the same time, Trump pays particular attention to the closeness or distance between himself and others.

Weng cited the appointment of the current U.S. Secretary of Defense, Hegseth, as an example. For Trump, 'loyalty above all' affects both domestic and foreign policy. 'The people he appoints have relatively shallow professional knowledge in their fields. Instead, what they want most is for Trump to achieve impressive results and clear benefits from their advice.' This mindset led the U.S. to easily crush Venezuela and assume the same could be done with Iran—only to hit a wall. 'Now it's quite troublesome and serious.'

Li Dazhong noted during the discussion that one important concept in international relations has been the liberal international order and the role of hegemony. Generally, since the end of World War II, the U.S. has played a critical role, uniquely dominating the international order as both its creator and sustainer. The U.S., as the world's most important nation, has also provided many services known as 'public goods' in international relations.

Li explained that these public goods provided by the U.S. are evident in economic, financial, and especially security domains, meaning the U.S. shoulders many responsibilities. Yet, it's commonly believed that the U.S. also gains the most benefits within this system. However, Trump, especially since the start of his second-term administration, has repeatedly challenged this existing international order: 'There's no such thing as a free lunch. Even brothers must settle accounts clearly—let alone you, who aren't even my brother.'

Li pointed out that countries now learn a lesson: what Trump cares about—what he defines as American interests—are mostly 'tangible, quantifiable data.' Other countries must 'show commitment,' and Trump evaluates whether they are 'on my side' or 'my allies.' Moreover, anything the U.S. provides comes with a price.

Weng agreed with Li's view. He said many experts believe that even under Trump, U.S. realist diplomacy remains unchanged, and Trump's approach is a typical example of 'realism.' 'But when we actually engage with it and observe Trump's behavior, we realize it's not realism—he only has reality, not ideology.'

Weng explained that Trump is 'purely realistic' and 'truly lacks any concept of ideology. His understanding of international politics doesn't stem from the academic perspectives we recognize. It's genuinely the realism of a businessman.'

Regarding the upcoming 'Trump-Xi second meeting' at the end of September, Weng analyzed that returning to the 'gang' concept, Trump, unlike the 'gentle' approach of former President Biden, treats China more like a 'gang boss sitting here drinking tea. We drink tea together, and we clearly state our terms.' Meanwhile, Beijing has noticed that Trump's bargaining chips are decreasing, so they aren't in a hurry to make decisions.

Weng explained that for Trump, the U.S. cannot lose to China, so he must secure some benefits—something that makes American voters and citizens feel that the U.S. hasn't lost and has gained advantages in negotiations with China, and that he himself can force China to make concessions. But for Beijing, the current situation is more like 'winning by waiting.'

Therefore, Weng judged that the Taiwan issue is certainly one of China's key concerns. If the 'Trump-Xi second meeting' proceeds smoothly around September 24, it's expected that Taiwan-related topics—including arms sales—will likely be included in the discussions before September 2. 'The U.S. side will temporarily pause or put them on hold, doing its best not to disrupt the atmosphere, because the U.S. really wants to meet (Xi Jinping).'