Beijing Watch: China's New Exit Regulations Take Effect September 15! 'Border Control' Institutionalized and Tightened, Travelers May Only Learn at Airport They Can't Depart

China's State Council recently released the 'Regulations on Exit and Entry Management,' which will officially take effect on September 15, 2026. Officially framed as aiming to 'standardize exit and entry management, protect legitimate rights and interests, and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests,' the regulation consists of only 19 articles. At first glance, it appears to be a procedural administrative supplement. However, when viewed against the backdrop of China's expanding national security legal framework and increasingly refined population mobility governance, its significance may extend far beyond a mere administrative rule.

The regulation continues the trend of gradually tightening border controls seen in recent years. It does not impose a blanket ban on ordinary citizens leaving the country, nor does it require all individuals to obtain additional pre-approval before traveling abroad. Yet, a close reading of the articles and official Q&A sessions, alongside online reactions, reveals that this 'nimble and compact' legislation consolidates existing but scattered measures into a unified legal framework—it is not an entirely new invention. Similar tightening of technology security and personnel movement has occurred in the U.S., Europe, and even Taiwan in recent years. However, China's move leaves significant room for interpretation in enforcement.

From 'Free Travel' to 'Risk Management'

One of the most notable aspects of the new rules is the establishment of an 'exit safety risk prevention system.' According to the regulation, China's foreign affairs, culture, and tourism departments will continuously issue overseas safety alerts and travel risk advisories. Chinese citizens are required to monitor official information and avoid traveling to or staying in high-risk countries and regions. Officials claim the goal is to protect the safety of Chinese citizens abroad.

Read in isolation, this is not fundamentally different from overseas travel warnings issued by many countries. However, what is truly significant is that it marks the Chinese government formally incorporating 'citizen departure' into its national security governance framework, no longer treating it purely as an individual right to travel freely.

In recent years, Chinese authorities have repeatedly emphasized the 'holistic national security concept,' expanding the definition of security from traditional defense to include finance, technology, data, food, public health, and even population movement. By codifying exit safety into administrative regulations, cross-border mobility is increasingly becoming part of state governance, rather than a mere administrative service.

For countries or regions where 'risk levels are at the highest level or where incidents severely endangering personal safety are frequent and sudden,' authorities 'shall, when necessary, advise against travel.' In press briefings, officials emphasized this is in response to problems such as fraud, illegal departure for cross-border gambling and telecom fraud, or unauthorized technology transfer, which have emerged as outbound travel by Chinese citizens has increased. Media outlets like Lianhe Zaobao have cited officials stating 'advising against travel when necessary.'

This measure immediately sparked heated debate in China. Over the weekend, discussions about this clause became a social media hotspot. Some Chinese citizens pointed out that 'advising against travel' is not legally equivalent to 'prohibiting departure.' If travelers insist on going and their documents are in order, will they still be allowed to leave? What are the criteria and procedures for determining 'highest risk'? Who holds the authority to enforce these measures? These questions remain unanswered, leaving room for potential abuse in practice.

'True and Legal' Is Key; 'Potential Harm' and Open-Ended Technology Security Clauses Spark Controversy

Another easily overlooked provision requires that all applications for exit, entry, stay, and residence must have purposes that are 'true and legal.' On the surface, this appears to be a general requirement for honesty. In practice, however, the determination of what is 'true' and 'legal' often depends on administrative discretion. In recent years, China has seen numerous cases where measures such as exit restrictions, delayed document processing, or requests for additional materials have been implemented through administrative procedures, not judicial rulings.

This ambiguity troubles many overseas Chinese. Siming, a Chinese political economist based in Australia who previously worked within the system in Shandong, said in an interview: 'Vague clauses leave Westerners with huge questions and again signal that China is beginning to tighten its borders.' However, at official press conferences explaining the regulation, Beijing has consistently claimed 'China's door is always becoming more open.'

Additionally, individuals who violate export control or technology import/export regulations and 'may endanger national industrial or technological security' may be barred from exiting by commerce or other relevant authorities. This clause has no maximum duration, review cycle, or conditions for removal. Those who engage in illegal activities abroad that harm national security and interests may also face exit restrictions upon return, lasting from six months to three years.

The word 'may' lowers the threshold from 'actual harm caused' to 'potential risk,' allowing for extremely flexible enforcement. This aligns closely with China's recent emphasis on technological self-reliance and export controls, and its impact on tech professionals and workers in specific industries may be far greater than on ordinary travelers.

Furthermore, 'engaging in activities abroad that harm national security' potentially links to the recently promoted 'Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress.' Both can label individuals as 'dissidents' for expressing views unfavorable to the Chinese Communist Party overseas. Such individuals either never return to China or avoid transiting through Chinese-controlled areas like Hong Kong, Macau, or mainland China. The specific implementation measures for these legal provisions were not detailed in official explanatory press conferences.

Article 6 stipulates that decisions to prohibit exit must, in principle, be communicated in writing with facts, reasons, basis, and avenues for redress. However, in cases involving national security or criminal investigations, notification may be withheld. This means situations where individuals 'only learn at the airport that they cannot leave' may still occur.

The former claims 'baseless border controls do not exist,' while the latter openly states that for issues 'involving national security,' whether you can leave is not up to you—the enforcement agencies decide. The standards of these agencies are controversial, and such actions are described by some in China as a new form of 'human rights persecution.'

From 'Managing People' to 'Managing Services': Electronic Data and Intermediaries as Regulatory Frontlines

Another new element is the first explicit requirement for exit and entry intermediary services to undergo registration and filing. Chinese officials say this aims to regulate the order of intermediary markets for study abroad, immigration, labor, and visa services.

However, from a systemic perspective, this indicates that the government's regulatory targets now extend beyond travelers themselves to the entire service chain, including institutions that provide information, handle procedures, and arrange cross-border services.

This governance model has become widespread in various Chinese industries in recent years, such as live streaming, education, and financial platforms: rather than outright bans, the government enhances its oversight of the entire ecosystem through registration, platform responsibility, and administrative supervision.

In China, this move is seen as having a strong deterrent effect on 'fugitive corrupt officials,' but in reality, similar 'illegal exit' activities still persist. The reporter previously found several businesses on Xiaohongshu operating under the guise of 'business consulting,' all of which subtly advertised solutions to exit restrictions. These accounts began proliferating from late last year and still exist at the time of reporting.

The reporter subsequently contacted one 'business consulting company' under the pretense of 'lifting border control.' The company quoted 80,000 RMB (excluding airfare) for a successful exit, with the location being Shenyang. Later, a reader named Mr. Li, working within the system in Jilin, told the reporter: 'The person in the photo might be an illegal broker who takes your money and then says it's impossible, and even if they refund, it's unlikely.'

(Image provided by Tian Chang)

Over the past decade, China has simultaneously promoted external openness—such as expanding visa exemptions and facilitating foreign entry—while strengthening domestic governance centered on national security and risk prevention. This creates a seemingly contradictory yet parallel governance model: attracting international flows externally while precisely managing population movement internally.

Within the context of China's coexisting 'high-level openness' and 'holistic national security concept,' the balance of exit and entry management is steadily tilting toward the latter.