WSJ: 'Insider' Leaks Official Secrets for Profit, Exposing Risks in China's Anti-Corruption Drive

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s discipline rectification campaign has punished millions, yet classified case details continue to leak online. This defiance of strict crackdowns highlights how deeply entrenched corruption and disloyalty remain within the Chinese Communist Party.

Official media report that as the CCP detains tens of thousands of officials annually, a covert underground market has quietly emerged on Chinese social media, where unidentified users hint at who will be the next to fall, in exchange for money and clicks.

Such leaks not only help suspects evade prosecution or arrest but also allow outsiders to time insider trades. This phenomenon mirrors growing concerns in the U.S. over political insiders profiting from prediction markets like Kalshi and Polymarket—essentially a Chinese counterpart.

The CCP has expressed alarm over this trend and is attempting to trace the leakers. The leakage of corruption case information has raised questions about the effectiveness of Xi’s anti-corruption efforts. Since late 2012, over 7 million people have been punished for alleged bribery, policy violations, and leaking secrets.

Xinhua News Agency’s magazine Banmian Tan recently reported that a few public officials are illegally leaking information, which is then resold through online groups, forming a hidden gray industrial chain.

The report states that some self-media accounts use tactics like “posting resumes” or homophonic code words to “preview” officials’ downfalls. Since officials’ names and resumes are typically not considered sensitive, these vague posts skirt confidentiality rules.

According to Banmian Tan, once information about an official’s downfall or transfer leaks, it spreads through chat groups on certain apps. New members must pay a fee to join, ranging from dozens to hundreds of yuan (a few to about $120).

Others attempt to earn income by increasing views. The magazine says some even exaggerate corruption details or fabricate scandals to attract traffic.

In one case, investigators found a government cadre in Guiyang, a southern city, had teamed up with six relatives to operate nine WeChat official accounts, profiting by posting “official resumes” to imply promotions or downfalls.

China’s opaque political system makes leaks about ongoing investigations highly valuable. Early warnings allow suspects and accomplices to destroy evidence, transfer illicit assets, and flee. Authorities may be forced to arrest suspects prematurely, weakening legal grounds. Party insiders can seize vacant positions early. Investors can short stocks of companies likely affected by upcoming purges.

Chinese researchers say corruption investigations may trigger market sell-offs, especially stocks of firms linked to suspects or targeted industries. In 2022, after the CCP announced an investigation into former China Merchants Bank CEO Tian Huizhu, the bank’s stock plummeted. China Merchants Bank is one of China’s largest commercial banks.

A 2021 study by Chinese scholars found that during anti-corruption probes of senior officials, listed companies in their current or former provinces face significantly higher risks of stock price crashes.

Li Ling, lecturer in Chinese politics and law at the University of Vienna, said: “Anti-corruption investigations are conducted under high secrecy. Given the central role of anti-corruption in China’s elite politics, there is persistent demand for insider information from those driven by political curiosity, commercial interests, or risk management.”

Li added, “selectively disclosing investigation information early could be a signal to potential bribe-givers,” suggesting some party members are willing to trade privileged information for personal gain. To minimize risk, leakers “only post highly suggestive content that does not clearly cross legal red lines.”

The CCP has long battled “insiders” within its anti-corruption ranks, including inspection personnel who leak investigation secrets for bribes. In 2019, the CCP restructured its top disciplinary oversight body, assigning separate teams to daily supervision, investigations, and internal trials to prevent excessive power concentration and profiteering.

Yet, the Chinese government continues to denounce “insiders” and bad actors within disciplinary enforcement teams. In 2023, over 7,800 disciplinary inspection cadres were formally punished—the highest annual total reported under Xi’s rule.

Nonetheless, Xi refuses to increase transparency or introduce more checks and balances within the bureaucracy. Some experts argue such mechanisms are essential for cleaner governance but would also weaken authoritarian control.

China’s crackdown on leaks from corruption probes is growing stricter, mirroring the U.S., where regulators are investigating alleged profiteering from insider information in the Trump administration amid rising betting on prediction markets.

After Banmian Tan’s report, other official media published articles condemning internal leaks and calling for crackdowns through enhanced censorship algorithms and harsher penalties.

Sichuan’s provincial party newspaper editorialized: “Anti-corruption must not be commercialized. The chaos of ‘speculating on corruption’ must be rectified.”

Xi’s purge campaign has solidified his authority as China’s most powerful leader in decades. Initially launched in 2012 to curb corruption upon taking power, it has become a normalized movement keeping officials loyal and vigilant. Last year, CCP disciplinary bodies punished 983,000 people—the highest annual total on record.

On social media, leaks about upcoming purges often appear in veiled forms. Some posts use names or phrases that sound like the investigated official’s name, or simply post the official’s resume.

In July 2025, a WeChat account named “Yanglan Lake Governor” posted a brief message with a photo and resume of Zhou Xianwang, former vice governor of Hubei province and ex-mayor of Wuhan, the provincial capital. Yanglan Lake is a location in Hubei. Two days later, a user named “Guangdong Zihao Ge” on the video-sharing platform Douyin posted a similar message.

The day after that Douyin post, the CCP’s top internal oversight body announced Zhou Xianwang was under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.” In January this year, the CCP expelled Zhou from the party over corruption allegations, and prosecutors filed criminal charges.

“Zihao Ge” then posted more leaks, some appearing days or even weeks before official announcements. In late November last year, the account posted a photo of Ye Hongzhuan, a retired official from Hunan province, with a teacup emoji—implying he had been “invited for tea,” a euphemism for being questioned. The official announcement came about a week later.

In March this year, “Zihao Ge” posted cryptic messages involving the names and photos of three officials, including two senior municipal officials in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, and a former party chief of the Guizhou Women’s Federation. In the following weeks, the CCP’s disciplinary bodies announced investigations into all three.

Netizens praised “Zihao Ge” for the accuracy of the leaks. As recently as July, his leak about a Guangdong official preceded the official announcement by nearly two weeks.

Yet, from the authorities’ perspective, such leaks are clear evidence of “insiders” selling secrets for profit.

The CCP’s efforts to plug these leaks have turned into a cat-and-mouse game. An investigator told Banmian Tan that authorities lack legal grounds to investigate or punish those who merely post officials’ resumes on social media. According to the report, when WeChat accounts are shut down, some operators move to short-video platforms, continuing to post suggestive content in new formats.