Not Jiang Wan-an or Lu Hsiu-yen! Scholar Breaks Down Green Camp's 3-Pronged Strategy: Lai Qingde's Universal $10,000 Payout Puts 'Him' Under Greatest Pressure

With three months remaining until the 2026 county and city mayoral elections, the upcoming November nine-in-one elections are not only President Lai Qingde’s first major political test since taking office but are also seen as a prelude to the 2028 presidential election. Lai’s recent announcement of a universal $10,000 cash payout for all citizens next year has reignited political debate.

On the 19th, Niu Tse-hsun, a professor in the Department of Advertising at Chinese Culture University, posted on Facebook analyzing how Lai’s policy places pressure on the Kuomintang (KMT) during budget deliberations, particularly increasing the burden on Legislative Yuan President Han Kuo-yu. Niu also provided an in-depth analysis of the strategic maneuvers expected from both the Blue and Green camps between 2026 and 2028.

Will Lu Hsiu-yen run in the 2028 presidential election? Why is Chiang Wan-an intensifying attacks on the Green camp?

Niu argues that the current Blue camp strategy centers on the 'Lu-Chiang alliance' between Taichung Mayor Lu Hsiu-yen and Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an, which also serves to position Lu for a potential 2028 presidential bid. Given the linkage between the 2026 and 2028 elections, the Green camp’s strategy is clearly defined as 'surround Lu, attack Jiang, pressure Han.'

Regarding 'surrounding Lu,' Niu notes that with Lu having openly signaled her presidential ambitions, President Lai recently criticized her governance during a campaign appearance for DPP candidates in Taichung. Lai highlighted food safety issues and the non-construction of the Taichung MRT Blue Line, intensifying scrutiny. Additionally, DPP Taichung councilors have questioned Lu on conflicts of interest and campaign poster controversies, making the 'surround Lu' posture increasingly evident.

On 'attacking Jiang,' Niu explains that Chiang Wan-an has recently taken an aggressive stance against the Green camp, acting as a 'breakaway rider' to enable Lu, the 'sprint finisher,' to execute her strategy. However, because Chiang’s political strength is formidable, the Green camp is now launching a three-tiered offensive:

First tier: Green councilors leading attacks in the city council Second tier: Green Taipei mayoral candidate Shen Po-yang and Minister without Portfolio Chen Shih-chung Third tier: Direct intervention by Lai Qingde himself (who recently criticized flooding in Neihu)

As for 'pressuring Han,' Niu points out that Lai’s announcement of the universal $10,000 payout places immense pressure on the KMT legislative caucus during the review of the 2025 Central Government General Budget. If the budget passes its third reading before year-end, the cash disbursement could occur before Lunar New Year. With NT$235.7 billion allocated for the payout, the KMT cannot afford to simply delete or freeze funds as they did this year. Delaying the payout would force the Blue camp to bear full political responsibility, leaving Han Kuo-yu under tremendous strain.

Niu also recalls that the recently passed 2024 Central Government General Budget was secured only after Han’s dramatic outburst. However, neither Lai nor Premier Cho Jung-tai immediately expressed gratitude, leaving some KMT supporters dissatisfied with Han. Furthermore, Cho continues to resist via the 'non-co-signing' tactic, leaving Han with a sense of 'devotion met with cold indifference.'

With the budget now tied to the $10,000 payout and possibly a 'Lunar New Year disbursement' deadline, Han will need to work even harder to defuse the situation—a scenario clearly engineered by the Green camp. In conclusion, Niu emphasizes that the Green camp’s 'surround Lu, attack Jiang, pressure Han' strategy is clear and coherent, and the Blue camp now faces a severe challenge in finding a way to break through.