Taiwan's 'Demographic Dividend' to End in 2 Years! 2030 Working-Age Population to Decline by 1.08 Million, 3 Key Impacts on General Employees

Taiwan's low birthrate and aging population have been discussed for many years, but the real impact on the general public may be closer than expected. According to the latest official 'Republic of China Population Projections (2024-2070)' released by the National Development Council, the proportion of Taiwan's working-age population (15-64) is expected to drop below two-thirds in 2028, marking the end of the nearly 40-year 'demographic dividend.' By 2030, the working-age population will be approximately 15.09 million, a decrease of about 1.08 million from 16.17 million in 2024.

However, the 'end of the demographic dividend' does not mean that Taiwan will suddenly have no workers starting in 2028, nor does it necessarily mean the economy will decline. The real change is that the proportion of the population that can be engaged in production and work is decreasing, while the proportion of children and elderly who need to be supported is increasing.

For the average salaried worker, this massive population structural change will likely manifest in three key areas: companies will find it increasingly difficult to hire, the average age in the workplace will rise, and the burden of elderly care in families and society will increase.

What is the 'demographic dividend'? Why is Taiwan's only lasting 2 more years?

The 'demographic dividend' is not a government subsidy or cash payment, but rather a population structure advantage. The National Development Council defines the 'working-age population' as those aged 15-64. When the working-age population accounts for more than two-thirds (approximately 66.7%) of the total population, it indicates that a society has a relatively sufficient population that can be engaged in production, with lower support burdens, and is therefore considered to be in a 'demographic dividend' period.

It is important to note that the 'working-age population' is defined by age and does not equal the actual employed population. Students, family caregivers, or others not in the labor market may also be included. The National Development Council's population projections are based on statistics of nationals with registered households and do not include foreigners who are in Taiwan for work or study and have not yet obtained household registration.

According to the 2024 version of the National Development Council's projections, Taiwan's working-age population peaked in 2015 and has been declining since. In 2024, it is approximately 16.17 million, in 2030 it will drop to 15.09 million, in 2040 it will be 13.17 million, and by 2070 it will be only about 6.97 million. More importantly, the proportion of the working-age population is expected to drop below two-thirds in 2028, making 2028 a key milestone for the end of Taiwan's demographic dividend.

1. Companies in Taiwan will find it harder to hire, and the same group of people may have to bear more work

One of the most direct impacts of the end of the demographic dividend is the gradual decrease in the number of people entering the workforce. This does not mean that all companies will definitely face labor shortages in the future, nor can all current labor shortages be attributed to the low birthrate. Wages, working conditions, industry conditions, technological needs, and talent supply-demand mismatches will all affect whether companies can find people.

However, population structure provides a long-term direction: the pool of domestic working-age population that enterprises can recruit is shrinking. In fact, the Ministry of Labor's 'Job Vacancy Survey' as of March 2026 shows that the industrial and service sectors have a total of 289,000 job vacancies, with a job vacancy rate of 3.3%. The average external recruitment time for full-time jobs is approximately 3.1 months. However, the Ministry of Labor also reminds that 'job vacancies' do not completely equal 'labor shortages' and must be judged in conjunction with recruitment time, personnel turnover, and other indicators.

Looking at the population structure in 2030, the problems facing enterprises will become more apparent. According to the National Development Council's projections, in 2024, the population aged 15-24 is approximately 2.27 million, and those aged 25-44 are approximately 6.67 million, totaling 8.94 million. By 2030, these numbers will decrease to 2.04 million and 5.80 million, respectively, totaling only 7.84 million. In other words, the working-age population under 45 may decrease by approximately 1.10 million in six years.

Therefore, in the future, in addition to raising wages to attract talent, enterprises may accelerate the introduction of automation, AI, and work process restructuring, or increase the labor participation of middle-aged and older workers, women, and foreign talent. The National Development Council also listed 'expanding the labor participation of middle-aged and older workers and women,' 'attracting global talent,' and using AI to reduce industrial labor demand as important response directions to population changes.

For salaried workers, what is truly worth noting in the future may not just be 'whether labor shortages will lead to higher wages,' but how much of your work can be made more efficient by technology, whether the company can find new people, and whether the work that is short-staffed will be redistributed to existing employees.

2. Taiwan's workforce is getting 'older,' and continuing to work at 55 or 60 will become more common

Another aspect of the decrease in the working population is the rapid aging of the workplace itself. According to the National Development Council's data, in 2024, among the population aged 15-64, those aged 45-64 are approximately 7.24 million, accounting for 44.8%. In 2030, this age group will still be approximately 7.24 million, but due to the rapid decrease in the young population, the proportion will increase to 48%. In other words, by 2030, almost every two working-age people will have one person aged 45-64. This also means that the career model of 'preparing to leave the workplace around the age of 60 and naturally being succeeded by young people' may become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Policies have already begun to adjust in this direction. The Ministry of Labor's 'Mid-Age and Elderly Employment Promotion Plan' for 2026-2028 provides measures for stable employment of those aged 45-54, re-employment or continued employment of those aged 55-64, and continued employment of those aged 65 and above. In 2026, it will also continue to encourage companies to re-employ employees who have reached the age of 65. Under the current system, workers and employers can also negotiate to postpone the retirement age, and companies can re-employ workers aged 65 and above according to regulations after retirement.

Therefore, for current 30- and 40-year-old salaried workers, future career planning may no longer be just 'working until what age to retire,' but how to make their skills still have market value at the age of 50, 60, or even older.

3. The elderly population will increase by 1.07 million, and the burden of 'elderly care' will surface faster than the low birthrate

The most challenging aspect of the end of the demographic dividend is not just that 'the number of workers is decreasing,' but that the elderly population is increasing rapidly on the other end. According to the National Development Council's projections, in 2024, Taiwan's population aged 65 and above is approximately 4.49 million, which will increase to approximately 5.56 million by 2030, an increase of approximately 1.07 million in just six years. During the same period, the working-age population will decrease from 16.17 million to 15.09 million.

Therefore, in 2024, there were approximately 3.6 working-age people for every 1 elderly person; by 2030, this will decrease to approximately 2.7 working-age people for every 1 elderly person. The total dependency ratio will also increase from 44.7 in 2024 to 52 in 2030, meaning that for every 100 working-age people, the number of dependent young and elderly people will increase from approximately 45 to 52.

This number cannot be directly understood as 'every 2.7 salaried workers really have to support 1 elderly person,' because actual support involves employment rates, family finances, pensions, insurance, and government systems. However, for general families, the direction represented by the population structure is very clear: in the future, more and more middle-aged salaried workers may need to handle their own work, children's expenses, parental care, and their own retirement preparations at the same time. For the government, this is also the case. The National Development Council has pointed out that changes in population structure may lead to a decrease in the taxable population and an increase in social welfare expenditures, so maintaining the stability of finance, medical care, long-term care, and pension systems will become important policy issues in the future. This does not mean that taxes will definitely increase, pensions will definitely decrease, or health insurance premiums will definitely increase; but the structural pressure of 'decreasing working population and increasing people who need medical care and care' is indeed forming.

The end of the demographic dividend does not mean that Taiwan's economy will definitely worsen. The demographic dividend is just one of the conditions for economic development, and a decrease in population does not necessarily mean that GDP, wages, or living standards will necessarily decline. If the productivity of each worker increases, companies create more value through AI and automation, the labor participation rates of women and middle-aged and older workers increase, or more foreign professional and technical talent is attracted, these factors may partially offset the impact of the decrease in the working-age population. What needs to be noted is not 'what sudden disaster will happen in 2028,' but that from 2028 onwards, Taiwan's population structure will cross an important threshold. From companies not being able to find new people, 45-year-olds and above becoming the mainstay of the workplace, to more and more families facing both work and care pressures, population changes will not only exist in the National Development Council's statistical charts but will gradually appear in every company, every family, and every person's career planning.

Data sources: National Development Council 'Republic of China Population Projections (2024-2070),' National Development Council Population Projection Query System, Ministry of Labor 'Job Vacancy Survey,' Ministry of Labor Mid-Age and Elderly Employment Related Data.

Note: This article quotes the 2024-2070 population projections that are still the official latest version as of August 24, 2026. The National Development Council has announced that it will release the new population, birth, and death projection results at 3:00 PM on August 28, 2026, at which time some numbers and the demographic dividend time point may be updated.