Lin Tengyao's Perspective: Does the President Have No Veto Power, Can Chen Chien-jen Step In?

Premier Chen Chien-jen has blocked the promulgation of eight laws passed by the legislature by refusing to countersign them, setting a rare record in Taiwan's constitutional history. Recently, scholars have pointed out that the countersignature system serves to check the president's power, but Chen has refuted this, claiming that such a view may "not fully understand the Constitution of the Republic of China," as the premier is appointed by the president and can be replaced if opinions differ. He also stated that since the president has no veto power, he can prevent the promulgation of inappropriate laws by refusing to countersign them. However, the problem lies here: if the president has no veto power, can the premier step in? Article 37 of the Constitution states: "The president shall promulgate laws and issue orders with the countersignature of the premier." This article is placed in the "President" chapter and regulates the countersignature system when the president exercises his powers, but it does not stipulate that the premier can refuse to countersign laws passed by the legislature in three readings, nor does it grant the premier the power to veto laws passed by the legislature. Scholars who argue that the countersignature system has the function of checking the president are not, as Chen claims, ignorant of the Constitution of the Republic of China. The Interpretation of the Constitutional Court No. 419 clearly points out from Article 37 of the countersignature, the need for the president's approval for the executive branch's reconsideration, and the need for the executive branch's resolution for emergency orders, stating: "The president and the premier have mutual checks and balances." If the justices of the Constitutional Court have already clearly stated that there is "mutual checks and balances," how can one turn around and accuse scholars who advocate the countersignature system to check the president of not understanding the Constitution? Chen also said that if the president disagrees with the premier, he can replace the premier. However, this is just a political fact under the current system that the president holds the power to appoint the premier, and it cannot be inferred that the countersignature system has no function of checking the president. Therefore, the most serious problem at present is that Chen has turned the countersignature system into a tool for the premier to veto laws passed by the legislature! If Chen believes that laws passed by the legislature are difficult to implement, Article 3 of the Additional Articles to the Constitution already provides the "reconsideration" system in writing. The executive branch may, with the approval of the president, request the legislature to reconsider; if the legislature decides by a majority of all members to maintain the original case, the article clearly states: "The premier shall immediately accept the decision." Are the four words "immediately accept" still not clear enough? If the reconsideration fails, the premier can still refuse to countersign, making it impossible to promulgate the same law, then the provision of "immediately accept" in the Additional Articles to the Constitution would not become a dead letter? Even more strangely, the reconsideration power of the executive branch, which is clearly stipulated in the Constitution, is that it can be re-voted by the legislature, and when the legislature maintains the original proposal, it is stipulated that the executive branch "shall immediately accept," but the "refusal to countersign" power, which is not clearly stipulated in the Constitution, is self-created and misused by Chen as an absolute veto power for laws that the legislature cannot vote on. Isn't this using Article 37 to hollow out Article 3 of the Additional Articles? Chen also stated that the eight cases he did not countersign have passed the ten-day deadline and are now impossible to countersign. However, Article 72 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that "the president shall promulgate laws passed by the legislature within ten days after receipt." The article imposes a constitutional obligation on the president to promulgate laws within a time limit, but it does not stipulate that laws become invalid after the deadline, nor does it stipulate that the premier loses the possibility of countersigning after ten days. If laws die permanently just by dragging past ten days, the consequences are even more unacceptable, because the president and the premier only need to deliberately delay for ten days to eliminate laws completed by the legislature in three readings. The original requirement for the president to promptly promulgate laws in Article 72 has instead become a tool for Chen to eliminate laws enacted by the legislature representing the people, then this is not interpreting the Constitution but overturning it. Article 2 of the Constitution clearly states that sovereignty belongs to the entire people; Article 62 stipulates that the legislature is the highest legislative body of the state, organized by legislators elected by the people, representing the people to exercise legislative power; Article 63 clearly stipulates that the legislature has the power to decide on bills. Premier Chen Chien-jen is not directly elected by the people, is appointed under the current system, and does not even require the approval of the legislature, so why can he create a veto power that is not clearly stipulated in the Constitution and cannot be overturned by the people's representative body? Does this conform to the regulation of sovereignty of the people? In fact, the Constitution clearly stipulates that if the executive branch believes that a law is difficult to implement, it can propose reconsideration in accordance with the law; if it believes that a law is unconstitutional, it can seek relief through constitutional procedures. But it absolutely cannot create a "refusal to countersign veto power" on its own. Chen has admitted that the president has no veto power, so the problem is very simple: Can Chen, who does not have the power that the president does not have, act on behalf of President Lai Ching-te? If so, please tell the people: Which article of the Constitution of the Republic of China has such a regulation?