Opinion: Taiwan Doesn't Lack 'Encouragement' from Its Defense Minister, But Its Own Defense Strategy

Taiwan seems to have gained a new defense minister recently. His surname is Gu, and his given name is Lishi. However, given the extent to which he has been meticulously 'encouraging' Taiwan's defense affairs, calling him the 'Encouragement-Speaking Defense Minister' seems less and less harsh. On September 9, at the '2026 Taipei Security Dialogue,' Gu Lishi discussed everything from Taiwan's defense spending at 5% of GDP to asymmetric warfare, drones, defense industry, reserve forces, training periods, and even how women can become an important human resource for the military. He also suggested that Taiwan should follow the Israeli model and continue to extend the annual training period for reserve soldiers. Someone who doesn't know might think that Gu Li-xiong took the day off and the Ministry of National Defense temporarily asked AIT to fill in! It's not strange for diplomats to be concerned about Taiwan's security, and it's consistent with U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific for the U.S. to support Taiwan's self-defense capabilities. However, while military procurement can be suggested and defense budgets can be of concern, when the AIT director publicly proposes specific directions on how long Taiwanese men should receive training, how the reserve system should be organized, and whether women should increase their military participation, the problem goes beyond just 'friendly reminders.' What we should really ask is: Is Gu Lishi an American representative in Taiwan, or is he a Taiwan defense policy advisor? An even more important question is: What kind of security path does Taiwan want to take, and how much war risk is it willing to bear? Can the AIT director decide this for 23 million people? Defense is certainly aimed at avoiding war. But 'deterrence' has never been a cost-free policy choice. How much national resources to invest in the military, how to design conscription, how to mobilize society, whether to include more civilians in the wartime system, to what extent Taiwan should bear in the U.S.-China strategic competition—these are not purely military technical issues but major political choices that affect every Taiwanese family. Because those who will actually enter the trenches won't be researchers from Washington think tanks or foreign diplomats standing on the podium. They will be the children of Taiwanese people! So, whether Taiwan should accept the Israeli model, the Ukrainian model, or the Finnish model, of course, it can listen to U.S. opinions; but the final decision-making power must belong to the Taiwanese people, not to whoever holds an 'allied suggestion book' and can decide the future of this island. Notably, Gu Lishi's enthusiasm for Taiwan's defense budget over the past year has far exceeded ordinary diplomatic rhetoric. He has publicly called on the Legislative Yuan to pass the 'comprehensive' special defense budget proposed by the Executive Yuan and has expressed 'optimistic expectations' about whether the military procurement budget can pass. When talking about the drone industry, he emphasized that this not only has defense value but also enormous business opportunities. He even revealed that he had talked with the CEO of a major U.S. defense technology company, and these companies are interested in investing in Taiwan and establishing supply chains but are observing whether Taiwan will actually make purchases. This makes things even more intriguing. An American diplomat, on the one hand, tells Taiwan that its defense budget should be increased, on the other hand, urges the Legislative Yuan to pass military procurement and special defense budgets, tells Taiwan which weapons are important, that drones should be developed in large quantities, and then turns around to tell us that U.S. defense technology companies are waiting for Taiwan to place orders. Of course, this does not mean that Gu Lishi is a 'gunrunner.' His public resume shows that he is a senior American diplomat who has long been engaged in political, military, and East Asian security affairs, and there is no reliable evidence that he has ever worked for a defense company. However, precisely because of this, the problem is even more worth asking. When a diplomat's public role increasingly simultaneously serves as a security strategy advocate, defense budget lobbyist, weapons needs explainer, and U.S. defense industry investment promoter, don't Taiwanese people have the right to ask a question: Is this really about planning security for Taiwan, or is it about creating demand for U.S. strategy and the defense industry? This is not a conspiracy theory but a necessary interest check in a democratic society. The U.S. has its own national interests and huge defense industry interests. It is understandable that the U.S. wants Taiwan to increase its defense spending, purchase weapons, develop drones, and build a large reserve force to make Taiwan a more difficult military node to break through in the first island chain. The U.S. plans for the U.S., which is natural. What is truly absurd is whether the Taiwanese government has planned for Taiwan? When the U.S. talks about asymmetric warfare, we talk about asymmetric warfare; when the U.S. wants drones, we mass-produce drones; when Washington asks allies to increase defense spending, the Lai government announces that it will raise it to 5% of GDP by 2030; now Gu Lishi talks about the Israeli model, extending training periods, and female military personnel. If every answer is highly similar, then the Ministry of National Defense at least has the obligation to tell the people: Are these answers calculated by Taiwan itself, or are they multiple-choice questions provided by the U.S.? Especially, 'peace' cannot disappear from this discussion. Gu Lishi himself has publicly stated that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would have catastrophic global consequences, even surpassing the economic impact of World War II; his official argument is to avoid conflict through deterrence, not to advocate war. Precisely because of this, the issue is even more worth discussing: If the goal is truly peace, then in addition to learning how to prepare for war, should Taiwan not also have a 'war-avoidance strategy' formulated by itself? Increasing military strength is one means, but diplomacy, crisis management, cross-strait communication, and reducing misjudgments are also part of national security. It cannot be that every time we talk about peace, the answer is only to buy more weapons; every time we talk about deterrence, the conclusion is another defense budget; every time a new threat appears, the final prescription is always 'Taiwan should pay more.' However, whether Taiwan needs to move toward war, how much war risk it is willing to bear, and what methods it should use to avoid war, the final answers to these questions can only be decided by Taiwan itself. Not by Gu Lishi. Not by any U.S. official. And certainly not by any defense company waiting for orders. Gu Lishi may not have forgotten his role. He has always stood on the side of U.S. interests and is very responsible in telling Taiwan what the U.S. wants Taiwan to become. When the AIT director is increasingly like a defense minister, the real defense minister is increasingly like a policy executor; when foreign diplomats are responsible for drawing strategic blueprints, Taiwan is responsible for budgeting, buying weapons, extending training periods, and sending its own children into the military, what we may lack is not more 'encouragement words' from Washington! What we really lack is the courage of the Taiwanese government to tell allies: Thank you for your suggestions, but this is our country; how to defend it, how to avoid war, and what price the Taiwanese people are willing to pay for it, must ultimately be decided by us!