A New 'Ghost Story' in Memory Industry: U.S. Reportedly Demands Profit Sharing from Samsung, SK Hynix AI Chips

According to sources, Rick Switzer, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), explicitly stated during a meeting last month with South Korea’s Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy, Ahn Duk-geun, that the U.S. has the right to share in the substantial profits of Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. The justification given was that massive procurement of Korean chips by U.S. companies has directly boosted the profitability of these firms.

As reported by The Korea Times on Friday (17th), this claim has not yet been officially confirmed by the U.S. government but has triggered significant concern within South Korea’s industrial and governmental circles.

South Korea’s semiconductor exports to the U.S. surged over 90% year-on-year in the first half of this year, with Korean memory giants continuing to enjoy high margins within the global AI supply chain.

A research report by CITIC Securities notes that historically, when foreign companies dominate key industries with sustained high market share or profitability, they often face political intervention from the U.S. government, accelerating a global reallocation of industrial profits.

An industry insider familiar with the matter said Switzer told Ahn that the massive U.S. corporate purchases directly drove Korean chipmakers’ profits, and thus the U.S. should also have the right to share in those gains.

The insider explained the U.S. argument as follows: if local Korean partners can receive a share of profits for their contributions, then U.S. companies should enjoy the same rights.

A senior South Korean government official also confirmed to The Korea Times that the U.S. did raise this claim, though declined to elaborate on specifics.

The Korea Times contacted USTR, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department for comment but received no response. South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy officials stated they were unaware of the matter and reiterated South Korea’s fundamental stance that “industrial matters should proceed based on commercial rationality.”

Historical Precedent: High Profits Often Trigger U.S. Political Intervention

CITIC Securities’ report cites two case studies to illustrate the U.S. government’s typical approach in such situations.

Japanese Semiconductors (1980s)

In the 1980s, Japan’s semiconductor industry rapidly rose, gradually eroding the market dominance of U.S. firms. In response, backed by U.S. industry and trade associations, the U.S. government imposed tariffs, launched Section 301 investigations, signed the U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, and even applied 100% punitive tariffs.

Subsequently, Japan’s bubble economy collapsed, further weakening its semiconductor competitiveness and leading to a reshuffling of global semiconductor market share and profits.

Notably, the market share Japan lost did not return to the U.S. Instead, with government policy support, South Korean firms emerged as the biggest beneficiaries.

Taiwan’s Panel Industry (2000s)

Taiwan became the world’s largest supplier of large-size LCD panels in 2006.

However, the same year, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an antitrust investigation over alleged price-fixing, resulting in over $800 million in fines for major Taiwanese panel makers and prison sentences for several executives.

Later, amid policy shifts, the global financial crisis, and industry cycles, the center of gravity for panel industry market share and profits gradually shifted to China.

CITIC Securities points out that both cases share a common pattern: once foreign firms are redefined by the U.S. government as “damaging domestic competitiveness,” political intervention follows, often combining trade, industrial, and antitrust tools in a coordinated manner.

The report emphasizes that to assess whether South Korea’s high memory profits could trigger U.S. intervention, it’s crucial to understand the decision-making dynamics of U.S. tech and economic policy.

It argues that current U.S. policy is still largely driven by core White House figures such as President Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Meanwhile, the influence of tech-right figures like Michael Kratsios and David Sacks in policy circles is growing, enhancing the voice of tech giants in Washington’s decision-making.

Once White House leadership reaches consensus on an issue, it is typically delegated to agencies like the Department of Commerce, USTR, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to execute through trade, industrial, or antitrust measures.

CITIC Securities further analyzes that, given robust AI demand, U.S. companies are currently more focused on securing stable memory supply than on suppressing Korean vendors’ prices or profit margins.

On the policy front, Washington tends to combine “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) with tech industrial strategy, encouraging Korean firms to expand production in the U.S. to drive manufacturing investment, job creation, and supply chain repatriation.

The report notes that while U.S. political groups, industry associations, and some consumers have begun expressing sporadic discontent over rising Korean memory prices, these voices have not yet evolved into sufficient political pressure to drive systematic government intervention.

CITIC Securities warns that as long as memory costs can be smoothly passed down the supply chain, price hikes are more likely to be seen as part of AI-driven economic expansion, limiting the momentum for political intervention.

However, if prices continue to rise and clearly squeeze U.S. corporate profits and return on investment, South Korea’s high memory profits could be redefined by the U.S. government as “damaging U.S. AI competitiveness.”

The report recommends closely monitoring two signals:

First, whether U.S. tech giants shift from securing supply to publicly opposing price increases;

Second, whether policymakers shift from ensuring supply and promoting U.S. expansion to intervening under grounds of “monopoly,” “price manipulation,” or “supply chain security.”

The analysis suggests Switzer’s remarks may be an early signal of this risk moving from latent to overt. For Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix, the battleground of U.S.-Korea semiconductor rivalry has quietly shifted from manufacturing localization to profit distribution.