Hsu Chien-hung Column: Dai Li in the Eyes of the U.S. Navy—A 'Spy Chief' or an Obstacle to Chiang Ching-kuo?

Last year, while researching at the U.S. National Archives, I focused on collecting documents from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the CIA, uncovering many fascinating records related to the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS). However, we must not forget that it was not the OSS but the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO), under the U.S. Navy, that cooperated most closely with Dai Li during the war. Anyone with even a basic understanding of the history of the BIS, the Loyalty Salvation Army, and SACO would be familiar with Dai Li, the director, and Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, SACO’s deputy director.

With the help of the Loyalty Comrades Association, I had the opportunity in Taiwan to interview former BIS veterans who personally experienced SACO’s history. Many of them, including these interviewees, tend to make a common mistake when discussing Dai Li’s relationship with Americans: assuming that any American friendly to Generalissimo Chiang would naturally like Dai Li and General Miles, and anyone who disliked Chiang would automatically dislike them too.

This reflects the same error many Americans make when interpreting foreign affairs—projecting a unilaterally Chinese Nationalist perspective onto the U.S. military. In reality, the U.S. armed forces had their own service rivalries and factional struggles. Affinities between individuals were not necessarily tied to their views on the Republic of China. For example, General Albert C. Wedemeyer maintained a good relationship with Chiang, but due to Army-centric bias, he distrusted Admiral Miles, who relied on Dai Li to strengthen his own position.

The OSS’s dislike of Dai Li and Miles was not necessarily because they supported the Chinese Communists or opposed Chiang. Rather, it stemmed from their disapproval of Miles’s arrogant and independent stance on the China front. Although the OSS was established by President Roosevelt to centralize U.S. intelligence, Navy personnel like Miles, backed by Dai Li, operated autonomously in China, leaving OSS chief William J. Donovan unable to control them. This helplessness made Miles and Dai Li targets of OSS resentment.

Conversely, General Joseph W. Stilwell, who had a strained relationship with Chiang, actually maintained a decent rapport with Miles during his tenure as commander of the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. Stilwell sought to balance SACO against OSS, using one to check the other. Therefore, when evaluating this history, we cannot simply conclude that Americans who liked Chiang also liked Dai Li, or vice versa. Such binary thinking fails to uncover historical truth.

SACO’s records claim that all OSS personnel disliked or distrusted Dai Li—but this conclusion may stem from U.S. Navy bias and is not necessarily objective. (U.S. National Archives)

Almost No One in OSS Loved Dai Li

Among the documents I collected from the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) at the U.S. National Archives, three major folders specifically focus on Dai Li. One document, titled 'Responsible American and Allied Officers Who Know General Tai Li,' summarizes various U.S. and Allied officers’ attitudes toward Dai Li.

It explicitly states that all OSS personnel, including Donovan, disliked or distrusted Dai Li. In late 1943, during Donovan’s visit to Chongqing, he clashed with Dai Li over whether OSS could operate independently in China. Dai Li insisted that all American intelligence activities in China must fall under SACO’s framework, leading Donovan to conclude that Dai Li had taken the Navy’s side in the OSS-Navy rivalry.

The confrontation escalated into mutual threats, with both men threatening to kill each other’s agents. Naturally, relations between OSS and the BIS were far from amicable. OSS, feeling excluded by SACO, sought ways to bypass Miles’s surveillance and even briefly considered cooperating with the Chinese Communists. But objectively speaking, did OSS truly harbor strong personal animosity toward Dai Li? Was it genuinely pro-Communist? We cannot accept SACO’s one-sided account at face value.

For instance, Colonel Paul Helliwell (in charge of secret intelligence) and Captain Carl O. Hoffman (in charge of special operations), both listed alongside Donovan as disliking Dai Li, were certainly not friends of the Chinese Communists. After the fall of mainland China, Helliwell even managed the CIA’s acquisition of Claire Chennault’s Civil Air Transport and supported the KMT remnants in Yunnan-Burma—making him a staunch anti-Communist in the eyes of the CCP.

Thus, while OSS was indeed wary of Dai Li, their distrust was not necessarily due to his reputation as a 'secret police chief' or 'ruthless killer.' Judging from the CIA’s later Cold War collaborations with dictators and warlords, Dai Li was not the most morally controversial figure. Their suspicion stemmed more from inter-agency rivalry between the Navy and OSS, not from a lack of willingness to cooperate with Dai Li.

Photo of Wedemeyer, Miles, and Chiang. Both U.S. generals had good relations with Chiang but were at odds with each other. (U.S. National Archives)

The Army and Air Corps’ Ambivalent Stance

The U.S. Army and its predecessor, the Army Air Forces, also held complex views toward Dai Li. Generals Wedemeyer and his参谋, Brigadier General George H. Olmsted, were listed as distrusting Dai Li. Unlike OSS, however, they were described as maintaining distance due to service rivalry—indicating that SACO itself recognized internal U.S. military factionalism as the key factor shaping attitudes toward Dai Li.

Wedemeyer deeply disliked the Communists and explicitly forbade OSS from cooperating with them. Yet after replacing Stilwell, he sought to unify the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus in the China theater. SACO would continue to exist, but under OSS oversight. SACO retained responsibility for training BIS armed forces like the Loyalty Salvation Army and Sabotage Corps, while OSS expanded its equipment and training operations to Nationalist strike and advance units across various fronts.

Though he did not terminate SACO-BIS cooperation, Wedemeyer deliberately distanced himself from Dai Li to avoid validating Communist accusations that the U.S. military collaborated with a 'Chinese Gestapo.' For Wedemeyer, frontline Nationalist combat units were a higher priority than BIS intelligence networks. In contrast, Claire Chennault, head of the U.S. Army Air Forces in China, was listed among those who trusted and liked Dai Li—an unsurprising fact, given that many downed American pilots were rescued by the Loyalty Salvation Army and Sabotage Corps.

SACO provided the 14th Air Force with critical meteorological and target intelligence, greatly enhancing the operational efficiency of the 'Flying Tigers.' Miles even established the 14th Naval Air Squadron, sending agents aboard B-24s of the 308th Bombardment Group to improve the precision of Chennault’s attacks on Japanese shipping. SACO personnel accompanying the 4th Column of the Sabotage Corps repeatedly used radio to call in precision strikes by P-40s of the 5th Group of the Sino-American Composite Wing on Japanese targets in Hunan.

Chennault’s admiration and trust in Dai Li were unquestionable. Yet he was also aware that Dai Li’s 'secret police' image was highly controversial in the U.S. Thus, in his memoir published after Dai Li’s death, Chennault deliberately distanced himself from Dai Li, attributing all credit to Miles and SACO. This shows that supporting Chiang and opposing Communism were entirely separate from personally liking Dai Li—and even those who trusted Dai Li might not wish to be publicly associated with him.

Miles (center), after Dai Li’s death, visited Chiang in a suit, continuing the special friendship between the U.S. Navy and the Republic of China. (U.S. National Archives)

The U.S. Navy’s Open Embrace of Dai Li

The U.S. Navy was the only branch that fully trusted, liked, and openly embraced Dai Li—almost unanimously. The most prominent advocates were Admirals Thomas C. Kinkaid and Charles M. Cooke Jr., successive commanders of the 7th Fleet. All U.S. Navy admirals who supported Dai Li were pro-Chiang and anti-Communist, but naval service bias was the fundamental driver of their favorable stance.

Lieutenant Charles G. Dobbins of the U.S. Navy Reserve, in his article 'China’s Tai Li and the SACO Yanks,' emphasized that SACO’s meteorological intelligence significantly aided the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 58 during the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

The Republic of China Navy lacked the strength to directly participate in the Pacific theater.