Lin Teng-yao's Perspective: The Beginning of Politicization of Civil Servants – Amendments to the Civil Service Employment Act Shake the Bureaucratic System

Over the past decade of DPP governance, restrictions on party-affiliated, political, and contract personnel without national exam qualifications being appointed to high-level administrative positions have been significantly relaxed, and the erosion of the civil service appointment and promotion system has become increasingly evident. More concerning is the review on July 15 by the Legislative Yuan’s Judiciary and Organic Committee of the draft amendment to the Civil Service Employment Act. Minister of the Examination Yuan, Shih Neng-chieh, advocates for the removal of the requirement to complete promotion training for advancement to senior (Jianren) ranks, the elimination of the master’s degree requirement for promotion to recommended (Jianren) ranks, and the return of standards for cultivating and promoting senior civil servants to the discretion of employing agencies.

While this amendment appears to address civil service personnel shortages, it may in fact mark a critical first step toward the political alignment—specifically 'green-party-ification'—of administrative officials. Its impact extends far beyond routine personnel adjustments, representing a major turning point for Taiwan’s merit-based civil service system (Merit System). Shih Neng-chieh argues that this amendment will enhance personnel flexibility and immediately fill staffing gaps.

What is truly concerning, however, is not the removal of certain qualification requirements, but the substantial delegation of authority over the training, evaluation, and promotion of senior civil servants to administrative agencies. The very purpose of a civil service system is to prevent administrative leaders from deciding promotions based on personal preference, political stance, or party affiliation. Instead, it establishes an objective, fair, and professional personnel system through open competitive examinations, qualification reviews, professional training, work experience, and impartial performance evaluations.

If the promotion of senior civil servants is entirely left to the discretion of employing agencies, suspicions of political appointments, favoritism, and party-based personnel decisions will inevitably rise. Notably, over the past decade, the boundary between administrative and political systems has gradually blurred, with an increasing number of individuals without national exam qualifications entering the administrative system. Now, with promotion standards for senior officials also placed under the control of administrative leaders, the gradual politicization and 'green-party-ification' of civil servants may become an institutionalized outcome, rather than isolated incidents.

Another worrying aspect of this amendment is the weakening of the merit principle. The draft removes the requirement of a master’s degree for promotion to recommended ranks and abolishes the mandatory promotion training for advancement to senior ranks. Supporters argue that true competence does not necessarily stem from academic credentials and that the effectiveness of promotion training is limited. However, the issue is not about blind faith in academic qualifications, but whether the government still wishes to maintain a certain level of professional threshold.

Modern public governance is increasingly complex. Senior civil servants must not only be familiar with legal frameworks but also possess skills in public policy analysis, financial management, inter-agency coordination, crisis management, and administrative leadership. Common training systems and standardized qualification requirements are essential foundations for cultivating a professional civil service culture. Yet, this amendment gradually eliminates these common standards, potentially leading to an absurd situation where 'appointments require no exams, promotions require no degrees, and advancements require no training.' Without consistency, the fairness of promotions will inevitably be questioned.

According to the latest statistics from the Taipei and New Taipei City governments, Taipei has seen a continuous rise in resignations over the past three years: 2,063 in 2024, increasing to 2,276 in 2025, with over 900 resignations already in the first five months of this year. New Taipei City has also maintained a resignation rate above 7.5% over the past three years. The mass departure of young civil servants has become a major warning sign for national governance.

Is the real cause of this resignation wave overly strict examination systems? The answer is likely the opposite. Grassroots civil servants widely report stagnant salaries, reduced incentives after pension reforms, heavy workloads, increased responsibility risks, and rank imbalances between central and local governments. Beyond this, in recent years, political factors have increasingly overshadowed professional judgment, and the principle of civil service neutrality has been eroded, gradually weakening civil servants’ sense of honor and mission.

The fundamental purpose of establishing the Examination Yuan under the Constitution of the Republic of China is not to assist the Executive Yuan in personnel appointments, but to balance the Executive Yuan’s personnel authority through an independent examination and appointment system, thereby establishing a merit-based civil service system that transcends political parties. The constitutional value of the Examination Yuan lies in safeguarding fairness, impartiality, and professionalism in national personnel appointments—not in lowering barriers to meet administrative demands. If appointment and promotion standards are repeatedly returned to administrative agencies, not only will the constitutional function of the Examination Yuan be weakened, but the design of the five-power separation of powers will gradually become symbolic.

Article 85 of the Constitution explicitly stipulates that civil servants shall be selected through open competitive examinations. Germany’s Basic Law, Article 33, Paragraph 2, also clearly states: 'Every German shall have equal access to any public office based on ability, qualification, and professional performance.' This is the shared principle of merit-based employment in modern democratic rule-of-law states.

When appointments no longer prioritize examinations, promotions no longer emphasize professionalism, and personnel decisions increasingly favor political loyalty, the administrative system risks shifting from rule-based governance to party-based governance, and from merit-based civil servants to party-aligned bureaucrats. If the Examination Yuan fails to continue fulfilling its constitutional role of checking executive power and preserving the merit-based civil service system, the civil service neutrality established over seventy years of constitutional governance will face unprecedented challenges. And the ones most deeply harmed will not only be civil servants, but the very foundation of the democratic rule-of-law state itself.

*The author is a retired professor from the Department of Law at东海 University