On the afternoon of January 24, 2026, China's Ministry of National Defense suddenly announced that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, CMC member and Chief of the Joint Staff Department, were under investigation for 'serious violations of discipline and law.' Following their downfall, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had only five active-duty full generals: CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin, Defense Minister Dong Jun, Central Theater Command Commander Han Shengyan, Eastern Theater Command Commander Yang Zhibin, and Yang Xuejun (former president of the Academy of Military Sciences, currently serving as an advisor to the CMC Strategic Planning Committee).
On April 8, 2026, the 'First Phase of the National Senior Military Officers Training Program' opened at the National Defense University. Xi Jinping emphasized in his speech that 'senior military officers must understand laws and regulations, know the rules, and have a sense of awe,' and stressed that 'everyone is equal before institutional rules, with no exceptions in compliance or enforcement.' On June 16, CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin presided over the closing ceremony. In reality, this 'training program' was a form of 're-education,' designed to ensure 'everyone passes.' It is highly likely that this program will continue in batches, covering all PLA officers at the division commander level and above.
On May 27, 2026, the Central Military Commission issued a document titled 'Several Measures on Strengthening the Education, Management, and Supervision of Senior Military Officers.' The document, consisting of 26 items across seven areas, includes implementing ideological rectification, deepening political re-education, establishing strict management rules, and promoting revolutionary transformation of the senior officer corps. The goal is to lead the PLA with a 'new political appearance' to advance high-quality national defense and military modernization and 'shoulder the historical mission entrusted by the Party and the people.'
On the morning of July 3, 2026, the CMC held a ceremony at the Bayi Building in Beijing to promote officers to the rank of full general. Zhang Shengmin presided over the ceremony and read out the promotion orders signed by Xi Jinping. CMC Chairman Xi Jinping attended the ceremony and presented promotion certificates to Zhang Shuguang, Secretary of the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission and Director of the Supervisory Commission, and Wang Gang, Commander of the Air Force, congratulating them. As a result, the PLA now has seven active-duty full generals: Zhang Shengmin, Dong Jun, Han Shengyan, Yang Zhibin, Zhang Shuguang, Wang Gang, and Yang Xuejun.
In fact, the investigation of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli marks a turning point in Xi Jinping's purge of high-ranking military officials. Consequently, Xi's administration decided to launch the 'National Senior Military Officers Training Program' and issue the 'Measures on Strengthening the Education, Management, and Supervision of Senior Military Officers.' This also reflects the time pressure Xi faces ahead of the 21st National Congress, forcing him to adopt a dual-track approach of 'continuous investigation' and 'promotion after passing review.'
The 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party elected 205 full members and 171 alternate members. Among them, 44 military delegates were elected as full members (29 full generals, 15 lieutenant generals), and 23 as alternate members (12 lieutenant generals, 11 major generals), totaling 67. The 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled to be held from mid-to-late October to mid-November 2027.
In 2016, Xi Jinping initiated defense and military reforms, reducing the number of full generals (theater command level) from 44 to 27. This includes two CMC vice chairmen, one defense minister, one chief of the Joint Staff Department, one director of the Political Work Department, one CMC disciplinary inspector, one commander of the Joint Operations Command Center, five theater commands (five commanders and five political commissars), four military services (four commanders and four political commissars), and the armed police (one commander and one political commissar). However, ten lieutenant general (deputy theater command level) positions were historically upgraded to full general, including deputy chiefs of the Joint Staff Department, executive deputy directors of the Political Work Department, directors and political commissars of the Equipment Development Department, director of the Logistics Support Department, secretary of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and presidents and political commissars of the National Defense University and the Academy of Military Sciences. Therefore, the PLA must maintain at least 27 active-duty full generals, with a peak of 37.
Reviewing the 20th Central Committee, 29 active-duty full generals were elected as full members. However, the PLA currently has only six active-duty full generals (excluding Yang Xuejun), far below the required number for Central Committee representation. Therefore, Xi Jinping must promote as many officers to full general before the 21st National Congress.
In 2019, the CMC General Office issued a notice titled 'On Pre-Adjusting Policies Related to the Promotion of Officers at or Above the Military Level,' officially launching reforms to the officer rank system. Before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress reviewed and promulgated the 'Regulations on the Ranks of Officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army,' the CMC, approved by Chairman Xi Jinping, issued 12 supporting regulations, including the 'Provisional Regulations on the Management of Active-Duty Officers,' all effective from January 1, 2021.
The PLA began implementing the 'one rank, one post' system. Previously, promotions followed the '4+2' principle—four years as a lieutenant general and two years in a theater command-level position—before promotion to full general. Under the new system, the theater command-level post strictly corresponds to the full general rank, with promotion occurring simultaneously upon appointment, eliminating time-based requirements. No longer will theater command-level officers wear the lieutenant general rank for extended periods.
Since 2021, PLA promotions from lieutenant general to full general no longer require four years as a lieutenant general or two years in a theater command-level post. Analysis of generals promoted by Xi Jinping from 2021 to 2026 shows that officers can be promoted to full general after just one year as a lieutenant general. Especially after implementing 'one rank, one post,' once an officer assumes a 'full general' post, the promotion ceremony is held shortly thereafter, no longer waiting for 'Army Day.' As a result, PLA promotion ceremonies have become a quarterly event. In other words, under the pressure of the 21st Congress, Xi Jinping is likely to hold a full general promotion ceremony every quarter to gradually fill the vacancies.
In summary, facing a severe shortage of lieutenant and full generals, Xi Jinping's first step is to promote 'loyal' and 'unwavering' major generals to lieutenant general, assigning them to lead daily operations in CMC organs, theater commands, and military services. The second step is to observe and evaluate these newly appointed lieutenant generals. Thus, those currently managing daily operations will enter the pool of full general candidates after one year, forming the talent base for Xi's CMC, CMC organs, military services, and theater commands for the 21st Congress. Xi's risk is not only the loyalty of those promoted but also whether they are 'strategic leaders,' 'tactical commanders,' 'administrative talents,' or even 'mediocre officers'—ultimately, all will be attributed to Xi's judgment of personnel.
Historically, among the PLA's 37 active-duty full generals, 24 were from the Army, 4 from the Navy, 4 from the Air Force, 3 from the Rocket Force, and 2 from the Armed Police. Reviewing the current leaders or acting leaders of the CMC, CMC organs, military services, and theater commands, two characteristics emerge. First, the Air Force is being heavily utilized (among the current seven full generals, three are from the Air Force, two from the Army, one from the Navy, and one from the Rocket Force). Many key positions are held by Air Force officers, many of whom are 'pilots' by background. Second, Zhang Shengmin's former subordinates are being promoted—not only within the disciplinary system but also Rocket Force officers awaiting promotion.
Table 1: List of Active-Duty PLA Senior Officers in CMC Organs, Military Services, and Theater Commands
No. Name Current Position/Rank Main Responsibilities Remarks 01. Zhang Shengmin CMC Vice Chairman Rocket Force Full General 02. Dong Jun Minister of National Defense Navy Full General 03. Zhu Chuansheng Deputy Chief of Joint Staff Department Army Lieutenant General Managing daily operations of the Joint Staff Department 04. Chen Demin Deputy Director of Political Work Department Air Force Lieutenant General Managing daily operations of the Political Work Department 05. Xiong Zhaoyuan Deputy Director of Political Work Department Navy Lieutenant General Former subordinate of Zhang Shengmin 06. Wang Chengnan Deputy Director of Political Work Department Air Force Lieutenant General 07. Zhang Shuguang Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission Army Full General Former subordinate of Zhang Shengmin 08. Zhang Fan Deputy Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission Army Lieutenant General Former subordinate of Zhang Shengmin 09. Lu Yu Deputy Secretary of CMC Discipline Inspection Commission Navy Lieutenant General 10. Yang Xuejun Advisor to CMC Strategic Planning Committee Army Full General Retired 11. Zheng Shoudong Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Command Center Army Lieutenant General 12. Dong Li Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Command Center Air Force Lieutenant General Air Force Senior Pilot 13. Yao Dangnai Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Command Center Rocket Force Lieutenant General 14. Wu Xingfeng Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Command Center Navy Lieutenant General 15. Zhang Like Minister of National Defense Mobilization Department Navy Lieutenant General Naval Aviation Senior Pilot 16. Chen Chi Minister of Logistics Support Department Air Force Lieutenant General Air Force Senior Pilot 17. Liu Di Minister of Training and Management Department Air Force Lieutenant General Air Force Senior Pilot 18. Xu Weijin Director of Science and Technology Commission Air Force Lieutenant General Air Force Pilot 19. Cai Zhijun Chief of Army Staff Army Lieutenant General Managing daily military operations of the Army 20. Zheng Yanpo Political
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- Source: PR Times
- Category: 人事