How to Fight When the Internet Is Cut? Expert Reveals the Real Challenge of Urban Resilience Exercises: Instant Collapse of ICT Capabilities

The upcoming 'Urban Resilience Exercise' and 'Han Kuang 42 Exercise' in August will, for the first time, include mobile network throttling to simulate wartime internet outages. This announcement has sparked widespread discussion. However, Zhou Yuping, advisory committee member of a Taiwan think tank, points out that the real challenge during wartime is not merely the inconvenience of 'not being able to use smartphones,' but the harsh reality of 'information and communication capabilities collapsing instantly.'

The 2026 Urban Resilience Exercise will be more fully integrated with the Han Kuang Exercise, extending from one day last year to two days. It will adopt civil-military shared scenarios and, for the first time, verify cross-county coordination. The exercise will drill medical underground operations, evacuation and withdrawal, medical evacuation, joint transportation, and drone resupply, strengthening societal defense resilience.

Regarding network outages, Zhou Yuping notes that civilian internet disruption tests societal resilience. However, for military units determining national survival, the critical test lies in whether the armed forces can maintain continuous combat capability under extreme conditions of losing civilian communications and even facing full electromagnetic blockade. The greatest value of the exercise is not proving that units have no problems, but proactively exposing, verifying, and correcting problems during peacetime, preventing peacetime conveniences from masking fatal wartime weaknesses.

Zhou Yuping: The Enemy Will First Launch Electromagnetic and Information Offensives

Zhou Yuping states that reviewing recent regional conflicts and modern high-intensity warfare, the enemy will inevitably launch invisible electromagnetic and information offensives before kinetic strikes. Through high-intensity electronic warfare (EW) jamming, cyber operations, GPS signal loss, base station destruction, physical fiber optic cuts, and satellite communication suppression or jamming, the battlefield's electromagnetic environment will become extremely hostile.

The reality of modern warfare repeatedly tells the world that what military units first lose on the battlefield is often not firepower, but the accustomed information superiority and communication convenience. Zhou Yuping points out that when electronic jamming, satellite navigation suppression, and communication outages occur simultaneously, communication resilience (Communications Resilience) is no longer merely a logistical support item but a core combat capability directly determining unit survival and sustained combat effectiveness. The real challenge is not the inconvenience of 'not being able to use smartphones,' but facing the harsh reality of 'information and communication capabilities collapsing instantly.'

Zhou Yuping says that under long-term peace and daily administrative pressures, smartphones and various civilian communication tools (such as LINE, location sharing, cloud databases) have quietly infiltrated the daily operations of grassroots units. Efficiency is built in peacetime, but resilience is needed on the battlefield. Smartphones, instant messaging, and location services greatly enhance daily administrative efficiency but may无形中 form dependencies on civilian communication environments. When battlefield conditions change, tools that once improved efficiency may become weaknesses undermining operational resilience.

Zhou Yuping emphasizes that a truly mature military should not be built on the assumption of 'always being able to stay connected,' but on the capability of 'knowing how to complete missions even when disconnected.' When accustomed to peacetime communication conveniences, once entering a battlefield with civilian network loss, command and control systems may suffer severe dysfunction and decision-making delays—the very soft spot most vulnerable to attack in wartime.

Zhou Yuping: The ROC Military's Communication Architecture Must Promote 'Peacetime-Wartime Decoupling' Reform

However, military network disconnection and communication resilience cannot avoid the most difficult practical issue: some of the ROC military's fixed communication infrastructure and data transmission still rely on telecom operators' fiber optics, server rooms, leased lines, or related infrastructure. How to maintain efficiency in peacetime while ensuring independent operational capability in wartime is an important issue facing military communications worldwide.

In response, Zhou Yuping states that if the enemy's first wave targets key communication nodes, exchange centers, or fiber backbone, whether military communications still possess sufficient independent operation and backup capabilities warrants repeated verification through exercises. To untangle this dependency, the ROC military's communication architecture must promote 'peacetime-wartime decoupling (Decoupling)' reform:

Promote 'civil-military separation architecture' and 'dark fiber' application: Evaluate adopting dark fiber or other civil-military separation architectures, allowing the military to independently configure encryption and optical transmission equipment and establish a 'one-click disconnect from civilian networks (Kill Switch)' mechanism. Physically cut connections during exercises to ensure military tactical networks remain unaffected if telecom operator nodes are infiltrated or destroyed.

Establish 'Tri-domain Heterogeneous Backup': Reduce single reliance on terrestrial cables by building, even in peacetime, a multi-layered automatic switching mechanism combining 'ground military fiber/wired radio—line-of-sight microwave/laser communication/drone relay—non-terrestrial satellite communication (protected GEO and LEO channels).'

Decentralize tactical nodes and implement mesh networks (MANET): At tactical levels like company, platoon, and combined arms battalion, promote field-deployable mobile wireless mesh networks. Even without base stations, nodes can automatically form multi-hop communication networks, allowing vehicles and terminals to automatically create closed, high-bandwidth data links.

Zhou Yuping emphasizes that 'peacetime-wartime decoupling' does not mean the military must completely脱离 civilian communication infrastructure, but rather must establish a military communication architecture that can quickly switch to independent operation in wartime. Sharing resources in peacetime enhances efficiency; rapidly switching to military-exclusive mode in wartime is truly resilient design that balances cost, efficiency, and operational needs.

Zhou Yuping: Military Drills Should Extend to 'No-Civilian-Communication Extreme Drills'

Zhou Yuping points out that 'no civilian communication' does not equal 'no communication.' This does not require units to abandon all communication, but deliberately excludes peacetime convenience tools like smartphones, civilian mobile networks, and commercial communication platforms, to verify whether military communication systems, backup mechanisms, and mission-type command can sustain high-intensity conflict operations. The ROC military should further extend drill focus from 'civilian network disconnection' to internal 'no-civilian-communication extreme drills.'

Zhou Yuping proposes eight recommendations:

Completely ban civilian communication: Strictly prohibit the use of smartphones, LINE, Telegram, and all other civilian mobile communications and commercial networks during drills, thoroughly cutting off 'convenience dependency' from peacetime.

Simulate GPS signal loss: In environments where satellite navigation and positioning signals are fully blocked or spoofed, test units' ability to execute mobility, positioning, and tactical planning using traditional maps, compasses, and terrain features.

Strictly enforce electromagnetic silence (EMCON): Implement radio emission control procedures at all stages, reduce electromagnetic signatures, and avoid enemy electromagnetic reconnaissance, source localization, and precision strikes.

Test military radio anti-jamming performance: Under strong electronic interference, inspect the command and control resilience of current military HF, VHF, and tactical data link radio systems.

Revive field wired communication capabilities: Reaffirm and drill rapid deployment, maintenance, and anti-jamming advantages of traditional field wired cables to ensure physical line connectivity under extreme conditions.

Restore tactical messenger (Runner) mechanisms: Test messenger personnel's route selection, information transmission efficiency, and old-style tactical survival skills under complex battlefield environments, complete communication loss, and high-threat conditions.

Verify heterogeneous communication backup switching: Unannounced simulation of primary communication means being crippled by the enemy, and test units' response time and reliability in switching to backup mechanisms like microwave, satellite, or field mesh networks (MANET).

Assess full-chain command and control adaptability: From the highest command post to the most grassroots squad, systematically examine command dissemination and situation reporting paths to ensure information flow continues even when nodes are blocked.

Additionally, Zhou Yuping mentions that when phones are off, calls cut, and superiors cannot give real-time instructions, what is tested is not just communication equipment, but the military's actual and essential command philosophy and tactical culture. The ultimate goal of no-communication drills is to verify and implement 'Mission Command.' Mission Command does not mean no command, but pre-establishing shared understanding so that units can autonomously complete missions based on the commander's intent even after losing communication.

Zhou Yuping states that the core of Mission Command lies in 'Commander's Intent' and 'Decentralized Execution.' When tactical communications are completely severed and units are isolated on the battlefield, do grassroots squad, platoon, and company leaders—or even battalion and brigade commanders—possess sufficient tactical literacy and decisiveness to autonomously assess the enemy situation and take decisive action to complete missions based on pre-established shared understanding and initial superior intent?

Zhou Yuping believes that overly convenient peacetime communication easily induces superiors to engage in 'micromanagement,' thereby depriving grassroots units of independent thinking ability. Through such no-communication drills, officers at all levels can be forced to break free from dependence on superior micromanagement, allowing units to maintain strong self-operation and combat will even in information black holes.

Zhou Yuping: Communication Resilience Should Be Listed as a Key Operational Capability Indicator

To transform no-communication drills from a single activity into a