The Executive Yuan's approval of the High-Speed Rail (HSR) extension to Yilan and the broader island-wide HSR network signals that election season is approaching. The NT$352.1 billion allocated to the HSR Yilan extension is widely expected to be a wasteful 'splash in the water.' Meanwhile, the island-wide HSR network vision, while idealistic, faces stark realities.
On Thursday, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) presented the progress of the 'Four 90-Minute Island-Wide Efficient Rail Network' initiative at the Executive Yuan's cabinet meeting. The 'Four 90 Minutes' refer to four key projects: HSR extension to Yilan, HSR extension to Pingtung, double-tracking and electrification of the Hualien-Taitung railway, and improvements and double-tracking of bottleneck sections on the Southern Link Line. The ultimate goal is to construct an efficient island-wide railway network. The cabinet formally approved the HSR Yilan extension project, while the other projects were instructed to be 'actively promoted' by the MOTC.
The sudden unveiling of multiple high-cost transportation projects immediately suggests to experienced observers: elections are coming. Major public infrastructure projects have long been seen as 'election windfalls,' especially for the ruling party, which holds exclusive decision-making and announcement power. Announcing and approving such projects before elections serves to boost the electoral prospects of party members.
This practice has persisted from the Lee Teng-hui era of the KMT to the DPP's governance. During Lee's time, the Nangang-Yilan Highway project was announced before elections with little planning, aiming to 'reclaim Yilan.' Under President Chen Shui-bian, the most notorious examples were the two 'political airports' in Pingtung and Hengchun. Under the DPP administrations of Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Qing-te, HSR extension plans to Pingtung and Yilan repeatedly resurface before elections. The recent approval of the NT$352.1 billion Yilan extension project fuels speculation that it is intended to 'secure Yilan' ahead of elections.
The primary goal of the HSR Yilan extension is to improve transportation efficiency between Taipei and Yilan and reduce travel time—a goal that is valid. However, the project has long been controversial, with opposition coming from highly qualified former DPP officials, such as former Minister of Transportation Hochen Tan and former Minister without Portfolio Jing-Sen Zhang. While detailed analysis may be complex, the core objections are simple: excessive cost and lack of benefits.
The total budget for the HSR Yilan extension approved by the Executive Yuan is NT$352.1 billion, but this is merely a 'base cost.' Historical precedent shows that major public projects often exceed initial budgets due to unforeseen demands during planning, construction, and implementation. The original budget for this project six years ago was only NT$99.5 billion.
Moreover, when factoring in operational costs estimated by the Control Yuan and the NT$30 billion in lost Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) ticket revenue over 30 years (an invisible cost) cited by the TRA Industry Union, the true final cost could exceed NT$600 billion, as estimated by opponents, or at minimum increase by several hundred billion more.
Given such massive investment, what benefits can be expected? Officials repeatedly emphasize that the journey from Nangang to Yilan will take only about 20 minutes, compared to 48–56 minutes by conventional TRA Tzu-Chiang trains or the Nangang-Yilan Direct Railway. This appears beneficial at first glance.
However, what officials 'downplay' is the actual number of beneficiaries—i.e., real demand. This figure is unimpressive, as the transportation bottleneck between Taipei and Yilan stems primarily from holiday tourism demand (e.g., holiday traffic jams on the Nangang-Yilan Highway and difficulty securing train tickets), not daily commuting or routine travel. This means the HSR will mostly sit idle on weekdays, running fewer trains, and only see higher demand during holidays.
Given insufficient ridership to support operations, ticket revenue from this route will not only fail to recover construction costs but may not even cover operational expenses. This is evident from the official 'self-sufficiency rate' of only 6–7%. Past experience shows that official figures are often overly optimistic, beautified, or outright 'politically inflated.' In reality, ticket revenue may not even sustain cash flow.
Will the Nangang-Yilan HSR solve the holiday congestion on the Nangang-Yilan Highway? The answer is no. Many tourists traveling to Yilan and Hualien still prefer driving for flexibility. Thus, official estimates suggest the HSR will reduce holiday passenger car traffic on the Nangang-Yilan Highway by only about 15%. This reduction alleviates but does not resolve congestion, and the cost paid is extremely high.
Politicians may push public projects for political or electoral gains—this has always happened and will continue. But there is a red line: projects that are absurdly unrealistic and lack fundamental justification must not be advanced. Deceiving local communities for elections is one thing, but seriously investing vast sums will inevitably lead to problems.
The two 'political airports' in Pingtung and Hengchun under the Chen administration serve as a classic example. Senior officials first painted a beautiful vision of '1.5 hours from Taipei to Kenting's seaside,' claiming it would boost tourism at Kenting National Park, solve holiday congestion on the Pingtung-Erhua Highway, and provide convenient transport. Consequently, the MOTC's evaluation naturally concluded the project had 'positive benefits' and was 'feasible under government policy, economic benefits, social needs, and practical conditions.'
The result was a disaster. Actual passenger volume fell below 20% of projections, facility utilization was less than 10%, and after external changes, it dropped below 1%. Ultimately, operations ceased, and the airports became legendary 'mosquito airports.' The HSR extensions to Yilan and Pingtung are highly likely to fall into the same category—projects 'born for politics,' lacking fundamental support and violating cost-benefit principles.
Other projects, such as the HSR extension to Pingtung and the entire 'Island-Wide Efficient Rail Network,' also face doubts over insufficient demand, high costs, and excessive political considerations. The DPP government's continued support for such projects will inevitably weaken Taiwan's economic and fiscal strength, diverting budgets and resources from areas of real need. Is this the outcome the DPP truly desires?
FACT BOX
- Source: PR Times
- Category: News