The U.S.-Taiwan Nuclear Peaceful Use Agreement Is an Unequal Guarantee: Excerpt from 'Taiwan's Nuclear Bomb' (4)

It's said that fields differ as much as mountains apart. Aside from the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER) itself, few in the military truly understood nuclear technology. Director Liu Kuang-chi, aligning with conservative military factions, finally secured a stage to demonstrate his achievements to higher authorities. In reality, the Americans remained wary of INER precisely because the institute already possessed most of the equipment necessary to develop nuclear weapons—only a few critical integration technologies and procedures were missing. Once the right personnel were in place, it would only be a matter of time. Among INER’s thousand or so technical staff, over a hundred were capable and reliable. The U.S. fully understood the key points of concern; thus, every visit included not only facility inspections but also interviews with specific researchers to track their activities and recent work. Over the years, this became standard practice—even staff resignations or emigration overseas were investigated and monitored. Another critical issue was the spent nuclear fuel produced by INER’s heavy water reactor. Without this material, any weapons program would be impossible. Consequently, the U.S. continuously pressured Taiwan to send its spent fuel to the United States for storage. Once the raw material was removed, even the most determined personnel would be unable to proceed. As early as the tenure of Director Chien Chi-peng, the U.S. made continued operation of the reactor conditional on the removal of spent fuel. In fact, every batch of spent fuel stored at INER was registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). During IAEA visits, officials not only audited records but also used instruments to detect fuel tampering and applied lead seals. Any movement required prior notification and was recorded in full by closed-circuit television installed by the IAEA; the tapes could only be viewed using special equipment. Additionally, all historically procured nuclear materials were meticulously logged. Unless INER could completely evade these layers of monitoring, Director Liu’s envisioned scenario would be nearly impossible—akin to a movie plot. Theoretically, INER might have acquired small amounts of nuclear material from other countries without detection, such as South Africa, which was then isolated by the West. However, manufacturing nuclear weapons requires more than just small quantities of material—it demands industrial-scale production capacity. INER once hoped to leverage its close diplomatic ties with South Africa to use its uranium enrichment facilities to upgrade Taiwan’s nuclear materials to weapons-grade—a truly exciting idea. Yet, this too failed due to the inability to openly transfer monitored spent fuel. International Context of Taiwan’s Nuclear Ambitions Since the government relocated to Taiwan, national defense and the economy have, from the beginning, been almost entirely dependent on the United States. Even today, the massive U.S. dollar foreign exchange reserves are largely derived from substantial trade surpluses with America. Military procurement remains deeply reliant on the U.S. While this was acceptable in earlier years, even later attempts to purchase weapons from Europe often failed—U.S. influence was omnipresent. Could nuclear power plants avoid purchasing American equipment? This issue extends beyond trade balance, touching on arms sales and national security. In those days, the promotion of peaceful nuclear energy was heavily supported by the U.S., which provided personnel training and nuclear material supplies—thus embedding a strong 'American-made' character into the system. Moreover, due to Taiwan’s withdrawal from the United Nations, it could not directly sign a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA and had to rely on the U.S. through a trilateral arrangement. Without such an agreement, even nuclear power plants could not be procured. Thus, all nuclear facilities and material transactions were bound by this agreement. Western powers have long shared a consensus in open markets: non-nuclear-weapon states must comply with nuclear safeguards agreements. Yet, having left the UN, should Taiwan still be bound by such agreements? After leaving the UN, international organizations and multilateral agreements increasingly excluded Taiwan. The U.S. had neither the will nor the capacity to assist comprehensively—except in the case of the nuclear safeguards agreement. At the time, the U.S. still maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan and used the trilateral framework, leveraging its relationship with the IAEA, to ensure Taiwan remained subject to IAEA inspections. From a positive perspective, this arrangement enabled Taiwan to purchase nuclear facilities and materials on the international market. Even after the U.S. severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, this trilateral structure was preserved. In theory, Taiwan could engage in nuclear trade with any country as long as it continued to accept IAEA monitoring. In practice, however, using the existing trilateral safeguards agreement often still required prior U.S. approval. Many people in Taiwan argue that nuclear power plants should be subject to open international bidding—so why are American products always chosen? For example, in the first bidding process for the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant (later canceled), both American and German companies bid, with the U.S. ultimately winning. Why was France absent? Why was Germany included? The key lay in the applicability of the trilateral safeguards agreement. The U.S. knew French products were reliable and competitively priced, while German products, though high quality, were expensive and less competitive. Thus, the U.S. allowed Germany to use the safeguards agreement for bidding but denied France the same privilege, effectively barring France from eligibility. Beyond the U.S.-Taiwan Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, the U.S. attached secret bilateral clauses to further restrict Taiwan’s nuclear research. These explicitly prohibited any research potentially related to nuclear weapons development. The most decisive measure required Taiwan to remove all spent nuclear fuel from INER. Had the government possessed greater negotiating leverage at the time, it might not have accepted such unfavorable terms. Conversely, if the authorities had truly been determined to pursue nuclear weapons, they should have established more comprehensive covert operations within INER. In reality, most INER researchers understood that Taiwan’s openness to the U.S. was nearly complete. Clearly, decision-makers at the time made calculated trade-offs between national security, diplomacy, and practical realities. In hindsight, there is no need to harshly judge those past decisions. One must not assess the cross-strait situation of that era through today’s lens. The threat of war was not theoretical—it was real and had nearly erupted. Under such circumstances, without U.S. support, what would Taiwan’s backing be? The Chinese Communist Party has formally declared four conditions for military action against Taiwan: foreign invasion, Taiwan independence, internal unrest, and nuclear weapons development. On most Taiwan-related issues, the U.S. allows room for negotiation—except on the prohibition of nuclear weapons research, where compromise is nearly impossible. Taiwan’s government had no choice but to fully accept. Upon reflection, the unequal constraints imposed by the U.S. did serve a purpose: preventing a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait over nuclear weapons. In the early stages, Taiwan’s gradual buildup of nuclear capabilities received tacit U.S. approval; later, however, the U.S. stance shifted to outright and total opposition—likely due to concrete understandings or agreements reached between the U.S. and China. Before his death, President Chiang Ching-kuo skillfully employed the concept of 'can have but do not have.' He never publicly supported nuclear weapons development, nor did he explicitly reject INER’s related efforts. Externally, he repeatedly declared that Taiwan would not produce nuclear weapons. At the same time, he allowed repeated U.S. inspections. This strong external interference, paradoxically, fostered unity and morale among the involved personnel. Thus, researchers at INER and the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology long speculated: given Chiang’s position, he could not openly advocate nuclear weapons, but surely the actual implementers understood his deeper intentions? If so, they should boldly proceed with preparations, ready to act at a moment’s notice. This speculation remained unproven until Chiang’s passing. Yet, judging from the outcomes of his policies, this strategy did maintain a delicate balance amid constant U.S. intervention and frequent warnings from China. China has long warned that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence. Hence, government and public vigilance has largely stemmed from this threat. Yet it is puzzling that nuclear weapons development—a similarly severe warning from China—seems to have been underestimated. Is this due to insufficient political wisdom, lack of expertise, or ambition clouding judgment? *Author: Tong Chao-chin, holds a Master’s in Materials Science from the University of Rochester, New York. Former Director at the Atomic Energy Council, Executive Yuan, and Deputy Director of the Science-Based Industrial Park Administration. Recruited by Koo Liang-sung, former chairman of CTBC Financial Holding, he joined the CTBC Group, serving as Chairman of Development Bank of China, CEO of Development Financial Holding, Chairman of CTBC Bank, and Vice Chairman of CTBC Financial Holding. This article is excerpted from his new book 'Taiwan’s Nuclear Bomb: The Illusion of Nuclear Weapons and the Struggle of Humanity' (CommonWealth Publishing). Cover of 'Taiwan’s Nuclear Bomb: The Illusion of Nuclear Weapons and the Struggle of Humanity'