Why Oppose the Yilan HSR? Chang Ching-sen Reiterates Five Arguments Against the Green Camp: Whether 400 Billion Is Worth It, the Ministry of Transportation Knows Best

The Executive Yuan recently approved the plan to extend the High-Speed Rail (HSR) to Yilan, with a total budget of NT$352.1 billion. Construction is expected to begin as early as 2029, with completion targeted for 2036. The journey from Nangang to Yilan is projected to take just 20 minutes. However, Chang Ching-sen, former政务委员 who has long advocated for the Bei-Yi Direct Railway and opposed the eastward shift of the HSR, announced on the 24th that he is leaving the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Today (26th), he posted again on Facebook, responding with five major arguments explaining why he cannot support the Yilan HSR project.

Chang noted that there are now supporters of the Yilan HSR within the Green Camp, such as media figures Chuang Feng-cha and Shao Li-chung, who have written lengthy and respectful articles discussing the issue, unlike others who resort to underhanded attacks. "Out of respect for them, I am now formally responding in public, explaining why I cannot agree with their reasons for supporting the Yilan HSR."

Chang cited Chuang Feng-cha's article as an example, pointing out that opponents are often accused of viewing the issue from a "Taipei-centric perspective," overly emphasizing economic benefits while ignoring transport equity and the needs of travelers from central and southern Taiwan. He believes these arguments deserve careful scrutiny.

Is it worth building the HSR just because travelers from central and southern Taiwan won't need to transfer in Taipei?

Chang identifies the first argument as: "Travelers from central and southern Taiwan won't need to transfer in Taipei, so the Yilan HSR is worth building." This, he says, is the most important and commonly held argument.

His response: While it may sound reasonable at first glance, official transportation assessments do not only calculate benefits for Taipei travelers. All trip patterns—including journeys from central/southern Taiwan to Yilan, from Yilan to central/southern Taiwan, and transfers by travelers from Hualien and Taitung—are included in demand models. The time cost of walking, waiting, and inconvenience during transfers can also be quantified. Therefore, the "transfer benefit" is not ignored—it has already been factored into the assessment.

The real question, Chang emphasizes, is simple: When summing up all the time saved from reduced transfers, does it justify investing 400 billion to build this HSR line? "This number has actually already been estimated by the Ministry of Transportation—they know the answer in their hearts!" While any infrastructure project brings some benefits, we cannot justify construction merely because "there is some benefit." We must answer whether the benefit justifies such a massive cost. By this standard, the Yilan HSR clearly does not measure up.

Will direct HSR service open up east-west connectivity in Taiwan?

The second argument from supporters is that "direct HSR service will open up east-west transportation in Taiwan." But Chang counters that even if the HSR extends to Yilan, not all trains will run directly. The western HSR remains the busiest mainline in the country, and not every train will extend to Yilan. Direct services will be limited, and most travelers will still need to coordinate with the timetable. The time difference between direct service and transfers may be negligible.

More importantly, the HSR ends in Yilan. Most travelers from Hualien, Taitung, Luodong, and Su'ao will still need to transfer to TRA trains. In other words, the HSR does not eliminate transfers—it merely shifts the transfer point from Taipei to Yilan. If supporters consider "needing to transfer on the direct railway" a major flaw, then by the same standard, the HSR fails to solve this problem. For travelers between eastern Taiwan and the west, transferring in Yilan may be less convenient than in Taipei.

Should transport equity ignore economic efficiency?

The third argument is that "transport equity should not be judged solely by economic efficiency." Chang agrees with half of this statement. He agrees that public infrastructure cannot be decided purely by return on investment. "However, transport equity absolutely does not mean that every region must have an HSR line."

If that logic holds, should every county have a metro system? An international airport? True transport equity means every region receives transportation services appropriate to its needs. Remote areas need buses; Yilan needs improved railways and internal public transit; Hualien and Taitung need improvements to the eastern trunk line—not turning the most expensive mode of transport into a political symbol of equality. Using expensive, ineffective investments to symbolize equity is something only an absurdly exaggerated and ridiculous country would do.

Are all opponents speaking from a Taipei perspective?

The fourth argument—that "opponents are all speaking from a Taipei perspective"—is the one Chang finds most unacceptable. He calls this an identity-based political attack used when one cannot make a rational argument, similar to online critics from Yilan who say, "You're not from Yilan, so why do you get to comment on it?" as if he, being from Taipei, is deliberately oppressing Yilan people.

Chang emphasizes that his proposal for the Bei-Yi Direct Railway is not for Taipei's benefit. The direct railway would improve the entire eastern rail system. The beneficiaries are not just travelers between Taipei and Yilan, but all TRA users in Yilan, Luodong, Hualien, and Taitung—more train frequencies, increased capacity, shorter travel times, and improved operational efficiency. It improves the entire system.

In contrast, the HSR merely adds a branch line ending in Yilan. "Which option better serves the long-term interests of eastern Taiwan? I believe the answer is not difficult. How can this be seen as a 'Taipei-centric view'?"

Does low population justify building the HSR?

The fifth argument is that "low population should not be a reason to oppose development." Chang fully agrees with this. However, it does not logically lead to "therefore, we must build the HSR."

Low population means even scarcer resources. With limited resources, we must spend money where it is most efficient, benefits the most people, and creates the greatest improvement. The real issue today is not whether to care for Yilan, but whether the same NT$350 billion should be used to improve the entire eastern rail system or just to build one HSR branch line. That is the true policy choice.

Chang: Is there a better way to use the same 400 billion?

In conclusion, Chang argues that the biggest problem with the Yilan HSR is not engineering, environmental assessment, or local interests, but the lack of a rational and responsible policy-making process. The ruling party follows an election-driven "pork barrel" political philosophy, forgetting its responsibility to the nation and future generations. Some in the Green Camp, he laments, cannot face the fact that their leaders can make mistakes, and instead try to reframe the Yilan HSR as an issue of "equality"—a visionary "90-minute island-wide rapid rail network"—to justify that their party is always right.

Whenever someone questions the cost, they are accused of "Taipei arrogance." Whenever someone discusses economic efficiency, they are accused of "not caring about rural areas." This kind of discourse does not answer the real question. Public infrastructure is not about who has more ideals or who loves their region more.

Chang emphasizes that it ultimately comes down to one fundamental question: With the same 400 billion, is there a better way to use it? Should public funds be spent on a project with little benefit? If the answer is yes, then opposing the Yilan HSR is not opposing Yilan—it is about hoping that limited public resources can generate greater public benefit. This has always been his stance, and he respectfully invites public discussion.