Chang Hsien-yi's Defection vs. Hau Pei-tsun's Affection for the Nuclear Research Institute: Excerpt from 'Taiwan's Nuclear Bomb' (5)

Among Director Liu Kuang-chi's two deputies, the ones with genuine professional expertise were Dr. Chou Jen-chang, a German PhD, and Dr. Chang Hsien-yi, an American PhD. Both were highly specialized, yet neither was properly utilized. Beyond personality differences in daily interactions, the main reason likely lies in Liu Kuang-chi’s awareness that his own expertise fell short of theirs. When discussions turned technical, many of his decisions appeared unjustifiable. For a research institution grounded in expertise, this in itself was problematic. Chang Hsien-yi, being younger, lacked tact in speech, speaking bluntly and often offending others. As a superior, if one intends to employ such talent, one must possess tolerance. Moreover, research institutions should encourage open debate, where sharp remarks are inevitable and should not be immediately deemed disrespectful. However, due to this neglect, Chang failed to discipline himself, and his work attitude gradually became lax. He became obsessed with golf, giving others grounds to accuse him of neglecting his duties. In fact, Chang Hsien-yi was no unknown figure among the young talents at Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) in its early years. Upon joining CSIST, he was highly appreciated by President Tang Chun-pi. Chang, confident in his abilities, was skilled at Go and bridge; he participated in every competition and often partnered with President Tang and other superiors, earning their favor. Chang was initially sent only for an internship at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, USA. Like many overseas colleagues, he took night classes at the University of Tennessee. During World War II, Oak Ridge Laboratory was one of the key sites for the U.S. atomic bomb 'Manhattan Project,' where nuclear materials were produced. The knowledge Chang acquired during his internship enabled him to frequently discuss the history of U.S. nuclear weapons development with President Tang upon returning to Taiwan. Due to Tang’s recognition, Chang was selected again to study in the U.S., eventually earning his doctorate from the same university. Was Chang Hsien-yi ever recruited by the U.S. CIA in his early years? This question remains unconfirmed. However, the CIA’s recruitment of our overseas students has never been a secret. At CSIST, it was not uncommon for returning colleagues to openly admit having been approached. Many reported the contact truthfully and still retained trust, with their research work largely unaffected. The CIA commonly approached students under the guise of employees from American companies, often arranged through professors or classmates. Once familiar, they would express hopes that the student could gather commercial intelligence after returning home to aid business expansion. Compensation could be per-task or long-term subsidies. Often, before the individual even decided, subsidy payments had already arrived. In earlier times, whether on government scholarships or self-funded, overseas students mostly lived in hardship; some with weak willpower accepted the money. They comforted themselves with an 'Ah Q' mentality: 'Whether or not I provide information is up to me; I can choose what to share, as long as I don’t betray my country—what harm is there?' If the person responded positively, the CIA would further arrange training, turning them into peripheral intelligence agents. Such formally recruited individuals often received more concrete promises, such as immediate immigration options for themselves or relatives, future job security, and better financial compensation. In reality, daily operations were not as dramatic as in movies—simply maintaining regular employment, staying in position, gathering relevant information, and passing necessary data through pre-arranged channels to contacts. Scientists frequently traveled abroad for conferences, making information exchange convenient; otherwise, contacts were mostly CIA officers stationed in the country. The requested information wasn’t always highly classified. Maintaining regular contact and keeping the informant hooked on incentives was the long-term strategy. Sadly, once the first step was taken, there was often no turning back, and they became pawns at others’ mercy. During Chang’s studies abroad, according to roommates, he liked part-time jobs, hoping to save more money. This was not unusual—many overseas students did the same. However, if he had indeed been contacted or recruited, he clearly did not voluntarily 'confess' upon returning. The deputy directors at the Nuclear Research Institute naturally knew that Director Liu was pushing a nuclear weapons program. Though implementation was mostly handled by his close aides, the deputies occasionally attended relevant meetings and thus had some awareness of the situation. Ironically, during one such secret meeting, Liu declared, 'The loyalty of everyone here is absolutely trustworthy; if external infiltration or information leaks still occur, I alone will take responsibility.' His words were firm, and the atmosphere turned solemn. Little did he know, his statement would become a grim prophecy. Nuclear Secrets and Internal Struggles General Hau Pei-tsun served concurrently as Chief of Staff and President of Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, but his primary role as Chief of Staff was extremely demanding. Gradually, Vice Admiral Yeh Chang-tung, Deputy Chief of Staff, began representing Hau at CSIST with increasing frequency. To gain deeper insight while avoiding interference from Acting President Huang Hsiao-tsung’s formal administrative system, Yeh used other military activities to create alternative channels of operation. Acting President Huang was deeply committed to his core projects; as long as these were undisturbed, he didn’t overly concern himself with other issues. Additionally, having long traveled abroad seeking resources, he couldn’t possibly manage everything. On the other hand, CSIST naturally prioritized military needs, and coordination with user units was difficult without relying on the military’s hierarchical system. Huang was content to focus only on outcomes, not processes. Under this arrangement, Vice Admiral Yeh’s influence within CSIST gradually expanded. At the Nuclear Research Institute, through Liu Kuang-chi’s lobbying for Yeh and Hau’s support, after Huang had led CSIST for four and a half years, he had nearly lost control over the Nuclear Research Institute. Huang clearly understood Hau’s special affection for the Nuclear Research Institute. Combined with the nominal supervisory role of 'supporting the Atomic Energy Council,' which was skillfully manipulated, CSIST simply abandoned any intention of reallocating resources from the Nuclear Research Institute. Did Acting President Huang know about the Nuclear Research Institute’s suspicious activities? With so many people whispering in his ear, he couldn’t have been completely unaware. Yet, he never acknowledged knowing about the newly built hot cell at the institute, nor did he publicly question what the institute was actually doing. On the surface, all was calm, but beneath, turmoil brewed. However, the key issue wasn’t whether Huang asked, but whether he could 'pretend not to know.' Huang remained a U.S. citizen. Past experience showed that any U.S. citizen invited to visit CSIST would, upon returning home, likely be summoned by the State Department or CIA for questioning. Then, with a U.S. citizen directly leading CSIST, wouldn’t the situation be even more direct? The conventional weapons developed by CSIST, including the IDF fighter jet, were mostly conducted under U.S. support. Nominally independent development, but without technology transfer, component supply, and tacit approval, success would have been impossible. Under these circumstances, would the U.S. government not monitor the Nuclear Research Institute’s activities through Huang? The answer is almost self-evident. So how did Huang respond? How could he assure the U.S. that 'everything was fine'? He probably dared not make light promises. If he said 'there is a problem,' he might lack concrete evidence. The most likely scenario was that he reported truthfully: the Nuclear Research Institute was highly valued by Hau Pei-tsun, and its activities warranted attention. Such a report, seemingly neutral, was in fact highly damaging.