Li Zhongqian Column: On the 250th Anniversary of American Independence, Discussing an Awkward Question: Will China Be the Next Global Hegemon?

As the United States sinks once again into the quagmire of war in the Middle East, how many people still remember that this year marks the important 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States of America? This should have been a moment of glory—celebrating the resilience of democracy and lighting fireworks over Philadelphia. Yet the Trump administration has turned this year’s Independence Day celebrations into a 'MAGA rally,' or even a 'Trump rally' (as Trump himself put it). An Independence-themed UFC fight event was held at the White House on Trump’s birthday. America’s 250th birthday was indeed celebrated in a uniquely unconventional way.

At this pivotal moment, as the United States casts a long shadow, Robert Kagan—a leading historian of neoconservatism and a scholar at the Brookings Institution—has engaged in deep discussions with Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor under the Biden administration, and Ryan Hass, director of the Brookings China Center, on a question that might make Trump and many Americans uncomfortable: As the 'American oak tree' that has sheltered the international order for eighty years begins to shake violently, is Beijing, ever watchful across the Pacific, ready to take over as the next global hegemon?

Kagan was the chief speechwriter for Secretary of State George Shultz during the Reagan era and served in the State Department’s policy planning office. In the 1980s, he worked in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. This Yale PhD in history later founded the neoconservative think tank 'Project for the New American Century' (PNAC, now defunct), advocating for military action against Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He argued that American-style democracy should be promoted in other countries and supported unilateral U.S. action in international affairs. Russia and China, he claimed, represent 'the greatest challenge facing liberalism today,' and American retrenchment from global affairs would empower these 'revisionist powers,' leading to greater instability and conflict.

America’s Two Faces

This influential scholar, regarded as a 'master of anti-isolationism,' recently stated bluntly in a dialogue with Biden-era national security heavyweights Jake Sullivan and John Feiner that the United States is entering an 'unprecedentedly dangerous situation.' This crisis is not merely due to declining economic data or strained military spending, but can be traced back to the classic debate between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson at the nation’s founding. Hamilton desired a strong nation capable of rivaling European powers, favoring a British-style stable order in foreign policy. Jefferson, on the other hand, represented a more radical democratic vision, sympathetic to the universal spirit of the French Revolution, but also planted the seeds of doubt about whether America should pay the price for others’ freedom.

This 'dual identity' conflict persists today. The first identity is the vision established in the Declaration of Independence—a nation based on universal values of freedom, open to all who seek liberty regardless of bloodline or religion. Kagan emphasizes that this is the moral foundation of America’s global leadership. The second identity is a nationalist ideology viewing America as a 'white Christian nation,' inclined toward inwardness and exclusion, believing the U.S. should not expend resources to protect the freedoms of distant others.

Kagan argues that the current 'Trump phenomenon' is not a sudden geopolitical accident, but the violent eruption of America’s 'anti-liberal' tradition after decades of dormancy. In Kagan’s view, America is dangerously caught in a 'dual cycle'—politically shifting toward nationalism and strategically suffering deep fatigue toward global engagement. He says this recalls the isolationist turn under President Warren Harding in the 1920s, when America briefly 'washed its hands' of global affairs, only to face a far more devastating collapse of order and upheaval.

Returning to a 19th-Century Multipolar Jungle?

As Kagan expressed in his dialogue, his pessimistic historical view is that Americans only remember the meaning of bearing global responsibility when order has completely collapsed and disaster strikes. He believes that if America decides to shed its 'world police' uniform, the international order may rapidly revert to the 19th century. This means no country will be seen as a 'guardian of order.' Kagan argues that the future international landscape will not be a bipolar U.S.-China confrontation, but a more fragmented and fluid multipolar jungle. Three regional powers or key variables in this jungle are Iran in the Middle East, Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia.

When the United States no longer provides reliable security guarantees, these middle powers will be forced to adopt more autonomous—and even highly aggressive—strategies to protect their own security, and may even seek nuclear weapons. In Kagan’s view, the current liberal order is not an inevitable result of social evolution, but an 'artificial landscape' maintained by American power. Once the manager walks away, the jungle law of 'might makes right' will rapidly reclaim every inch of ground. In such a situation, the mindset of 'sweeping one’s own doorstep' will replace 'collective defense,' and for small nations lacking a great power’s nuclear umbrella, the danger will be akin to walking naked through a wilderness surrounded by wolves.

Why China Struggles to Achieve Hegemony?

Does America’s retreat from the international stage mean Beijing will enter a golden age? Kagan’s view is that American decline may actually make China’s situation harder. In dialogue with Ryan Hass, he argues that China’s current hegemonic ambitions enjoy a massive, often overlooked 'dividend'—the 'existence of America.' This may sound paradoxical, but Kagan points out that precisely because of America’s military presence in East Asia and Europe, Japan and Germany’s militarization has been effectively restrained, thus maintaining a framework that allows China to safely pursue economic expansion.

Once America retreats its forces to the Western Hemisphere, or even back to the American continent, Beijing will face a 'reawakened Japan.' Kagan sarcastically notes that in international society, China is like an awkward uncle at a party who desperately seeks attention but is always left on read, receiving not even a shred of respect from its neighbors—this is what he calls the 'Rodney Dangerfield syndrome' (Rodney Dangerfield was a U.S. comedian who famously joked, 'I get no respect'). He also warns Beijing that Japan once dealt China a severe blow, and if Japan re-arms or even acquires nuclear weapons, Beijing won’t even be able to manage territorial disputes at its own doorstep, let alone 'run the world.'

For Beijing, the power vacuum left by America’s withdrawal from the Western Pacific may be a tempting but deadly 'poisoned chalice.' Without the U.S. as a security buffer, China will be forced into higher-intensity confrontations in its surrounding regions, greatly constraining the expansion of Beijing’s global strategy. Especially when America retracts its nuclear umbrella, forcing every nation to face nuclear deterrence alone, the temptation for miscalculation and preemptive action will increase dramatically. This undoubtedly adds uncontrollability to China’s surrounding environment as it seeks to expand its influence. Another perspective comes from the current U.S.-Iran conflict. Kagan points out that although China is highly dependent on Middle Eastern energy supplies, when the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is threatened, China behaves like a 'free rider,' unwilling and unable to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding open seas—such a 'free-riding' mentality cannot sustain a hegemonic status in a multipolar (or even nuclear-multipolar) world.

What Does Kagan Think About U.S.-Taiwan Relations?

In two discussions in July, Kagan also addressed the Taiwan issue and U.S.-Taiwan relations. He frankly states that Taiwan is not a 'vital interest' of the United States, even though the U.S. does bear a certain 'security responsibility and moral obligation.' However, this commitment is not unconditional and cannot surpass America’s fundamental national interests. The primary question for Taiwan in America’s eyes is whether the U.S. will continue to maintain the global order: if America decides to do so, Taiwan becomes a 'necessary interest' indispensable to maintaining that order; if America decides to abandon its global leadership role, Taiwan’s importance in American eyes will sharply decline.

While many argue that Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing capability alone makes it a vital U.S. interest, Kagan believes this is essentially a strategic pretext that only holds under the premise of 'maintaining the global system.' If Washington returns to the isolationism of the Harding era, America simply would not regard Taiwan as a vital interest. Kagan even pessimistically believes that Trump is a man who pursues the 'art of the deal,' and if he can reach a trade agreement with China that suits his interests, America will make compromises on many issues—'Taiwan might be included.' When America becomes an obviously 'unreliable partner,' Taiwan will be forced to begin thinking seriously about a 'Plan B' for its defense and survival.

Regarding whether China will use military force against Taiwan, Kagan believes this depends on multiple external factors and cannot be generalized. However, China’s first choice should still