Taipei to Yilan in 28 Minutes! Why Spend $30 Billion on a High-Speed Rail Instead of a Direct Railway? Former Minister Ho Criticizes Lai Administration's 'Three Major Errors': Don't Let Domination Become Habit

On July 23, the Executive Yuan formally approved the 'High-Speed Rail Extension to Yilan Project' during its cabinet meeting. The route extends 60.6 kilometers eastward from the HSR Nangang Station to Yilan, with a total budget of approximately NT$352.1 billion, aiming for completion by 2037. Once operational, travel time from Taipei to Yilan will be reduced to just 28 minutes. Former Minister of Transportation and Communications Ho Chen-dan immediately criticized Premier Cho Jung-tai for committing three major procedural errors. Debates over the cost-effectiveness of HSR versus direct rail, station location, completion timeline, and ridership sustainability are summarized below.

Why build a Taipei-Yilan HSR? Isn't the long-discussed direct railway sufficient?

Currently, traveling from Taipei to Yilan via Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) requires a detour through Keelung and the northeastern coast, taking 75 to 90 minutes. Although National Highway No. 5 (Snow Mountain Tunnel) is faster, weekend traffic volume exceeds weekday levels by more than double, reducing service quality to an F-grade, with chronic congestion remaining unresolved.

Since 2004, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (MOTC) has proposed various plans, including the Taipei-Yilan Direct Railway and the TRA Nangang-to-Hualien speed-up project. However, these have repeatedly stalled due to environmental impact assessment (EIA) rejections, opposition to crossing the Feitsui Reservoir watershed, and disputes over property acquisitions, preventing progress for over 20 years.

Where will the Yilan HSR station be located? How much time will it save?

The Yilan HSR station will be situated approximately 350 meters south of the Yilan County Government Center, southeast of the county government building. It will be elevated, with two island platforms and four tracks. The MOTC selected this site for its central location, balancing development between northern and southern Yilan. The station will be co-located with the 'TRA Yilan New Station,' allowing seamless transfers on the ground level without exiting the fare-paid area.

With the HSR extension to Yilan now approved, what are the most pressing questions? Where will the station be built? How long will the Taipei-Yilan journey take? Can it really be completed by 2037? This article answers the public's top concerns. (Produced by Storm Media)

However, EIA committee members have warned that concrete plans for local bus and shuttle services connecting to Yilan's townships are still lacking. If travelers still need to rent cars to reach tourist spots after arriving, the HSR's ability to alleviate local traffic will be significantly reduced.

According to MOTC plans, the HSR will operate at a maximum speed of 300 km/h, reducing the Taipei-Yilan journey to about 28 minutes—over half the time of TRA's tilting train express services (68–82 minutes). The HSR network will expand from 350 km to 410 km, shortening the Taipei-Hualien trip from 140 minutes to 90 minutes.

The MOTC also estimates that the HSR will reduce weekend car traffic on National Highway No. 5 by 15% to 16%. Supporters believe that integrating Yilan into northern Taiwan's commuter zone will make 'living in Yilan, working in Taipei' a reality, offering younger generations more lifestyle options.

When will the Yilan HSR open? Four hurdles determine on-time completion

The MOTC aims to complete the project 11 years after approval—by 2037. However, the project remains in the planning phase, and the government has not announced a construction start date. On-time completion depends on four key hurdles: successful private-sector investment recruitment, urban planning review for the 420-hectare special development zone around the Yilan HSR station, land acquisition after route rights are confirmed, and whether EIA appeals escalate into administrative lawsuits that delay construction.

Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communications Wu Sheng-yuan stated during a Legislative Yuan inspection in Yilan that the decision is final and the administration will move forward. If lawsuits arise, they will be addressed after rulings are issued. Railway Bureau Director Yang Cheng-chun noted that EIA appeals or lawsuits are primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment, and the Railway Bureau will coordinate accordingly.

Why choose HSR over direct rail? A $30 billion gap: HSR vs. direct rail arguments

The government studied the direct rail option for over 20 years without success, shifting to the HSR plan in 2019. The direct rail project was first proposed in 2004 and rejected in 2006's EIA due to a 34.1-km mountain tunnel passing through water quality protection zones, landslide-prone areas, and nine fault zones, with insufficient assessment of groundwater and archaeological sites.

In 2013, the Railway Bureau revived the direct rail plan with two new options. Option 1 followed National Highway No. 5's corridor for maximum efficiency but crossed the Feitsui Reservoir watershed, drawing firm opposition from the reservoir authority and environmental groups. Option 2 avoided the watershed but offered minimal time savings—criticized as spending vast sums for just 18 minutes—failing to gain public support, leading to the plan's suspension.

Technical challenges remain fundamental barriers. The Railway Bureau explained that TRA Nangang Station lacks reserved connecting tracks. Linking to the HSR tunnel would require excavation under Fugang Street Lane 1, necessitating the demolition of about 18 residential buildings, including the Chengzheng Junior High School activity center—an extremely difficult proposition. Additionally, the vertical difference between HSR Nangang's underground platforms and TRA platforms exceeds 14 meters, making shared tunnel use impossible.

Gradient limits also prevent direct rail from using the HSR corridor. HSR allows a maximum gradient of 25‰, while TRA's system, due to push-pull trains and maintenance vehicles, limits tunnel gradients to 15‰. Forcing direct rail through the HSR corridor would require a continuous 17-km tunnel from Nangang to Pingxi—far exceeding HSR's longest tunnel (8 km)—increasing construction difficulty, ventilation, and evacuation risks. The Railway Bureau also noted that the TRA section from Shulin to Qidu is already at maximum capacity, with peak-hour train frequency at system limits. Even after completion, direct rail service frequency would remain constrained, with estimated route utilization at only about 40%.

Opponents argue that when factoring in transfer times at Nangang and from the new HSR station to urban areas, the HSR's time advantage over direct rail is only about 5 minutes. In terms of cost, the HSR's construction and future maintenance/replacement costs total approximately NT$442.1 billion, while the direct rail option is estimated at NT$114.6 billion—a difference exceeding NT$300 billion. Critics also question the HSR's effectiveness, noting that National Highway No. 5's primary users are weekend tourists. If Yilan's public transportation system remains underdeveloped, tourists will still need to rent cars after arrival, limiting the HSR's traffic diversion impact.

Will the Yilan HSR station become a 'cold station'? Daily ridership of 20,000 projected, but connectivity remains a major question

Former Minister Ho Chen-dan criticized Premier Cho in an op-ed for the 'Storm Media,' identifying three major errors. First, approving a major project without following proper procedures: the Yilan HSR project bypassed feasibility studies and went straight to EIA, which further fragmented its scope by evaluating only track construction, excluding station and transfer facilities.

Second, the Executive Yuan forcefully approved the project despite an ongoing appeal filed by civil groups in February against the EIA conclusion—effectively ignoring public grievances.

Third, ignoring multiple new concerns: In May, Taiwan's Control Yuan released an investigation report stating the project failed to conduct required feasibility assessments and violated procurement regulations, urging the Executive Yuan to correct these issues. Public opinion surveys by civil groups show 70% of Yilan residents prefer multiple stations for convenience over a single centralized HSR station. Former Public Construction Commission Chair Wu Ze-cheng also pointed out engineering integration issues between the Yilan HSR project and the TRA elevated railway plan. Ho questioned whether Premier Cho had considered or responded to these concerns, warning that civil groups will continue pursuing justice through legal channels: 'Your three errors—please self-reflect. Don't let domination become habitual—the fourth 'no'!'

2025 HSR Station Passenger Volumes and Daily Average Rankings

| Rank | Station | 2025 Total Passengers | Daily Average Passengers | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Taipei | 16,917,152 | 46,348 | | 2 | Taichung | 13,829,742 | 37,890 | | 3 | Zuoying | 10,738,330 | 29,420 | | 4 | Taoyuan | 9,916,891 | 27,170 | | 5 | Hsinchu | 7,791,589 | 21,347 | | 6 | Banqiao | 5,821,453 | 15,949 | | 7 | Tainan | 5,279,283 | 14,464 | | 8 | Nangang | 4,353,001 | 11,926 | | 9 | Chiayi | 3,359,882 | 9,205 | | 10 | Yunlin | 1,800,307 | 4,932 | | 11 | Miaoli | 1,309,167 | 3,587 | | 12 | Changhua | 953,821 | 2,613 |

Note: Daily average is calculated using 365 days in 2025, rounded to the nearest whole number.

The Railway Bureau estimates that by the target year 2051, the Yilan HSR station will handle approximately 20,500 daily passengers—comparable to current Hsinchu Station levels. This projection assumes 70% of trips remain within Yilan and 30% continue to Hualien and Taitung. Former Public Construction Commission Chair Wu Ze-cheng warned that if supporting infrastructure is inadequate, the nearly NT$400 billion investment could be wasted.

The TRA Industry Union also expressed concern that if government subsidies are not allocated to offset revenue losses on the eastern line, TRA will bear the deficit, ultimately affecting nationwide rail services. The Control Yuan noted that the 420-hectare special development zone lacks a solid justification, while civil groups fear transit-driven development could trigger land speculation and rising housing prices, increasing the burden on local youth.

Comparison of Yilan HSR and Taipei-Yilan Direct Rail Proposals

| 🚄 Yilan HSR | Issue | 🚆 Taipei-Yilan Direct Rail | | --- | --- | --- | | 28 minutes | Travel Time | 56–64 minutes |