The Nuclear Safeguards Agreement Became a Chokehold Clause Preventing Our Trade with Other Countries: Excerpt from 'Taiwan's Nuclear Bomb' (7)

In 1992 (Republic Year 81), the United Daily News reported that China might use military force against Taiwan over the issue of Taiwan independence, triggering a wave of subscription cancellations. It was later confirmed that Li Ruihuan, a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo, had indeed reiterated the conditions under which China would resort to military action against Taiwan, and the United Daily News had not fabricated the report. The conditions included three points: first, internal turmoil in Taiwan; second, foreign intervention; third, Taiwan independence. However, at some point, the originally existing fourth point—Taiwan developing nuclear weapons—disappeared. Clearly, this was no longer considered a justification for military action. Was there an invisible collaboration between the Chinese Communist Party and the United States behind the complete dismantling of Taiwan's nuclear capabilities?

A few years later, Hau Pei-tsung retired. On August 21, 1995 (Republic Year 84), the China Times published an interview with Hau Pei-tsung, discussing the 1958 (Republic Year 47) August 23 Kinmen Artillery Battle. One question asked: "If we had successfully developed nuclear weapons back then, would it have helped secure cross-strait safety?" Hau responded: "It would only bring greater danger. China is a nuclear power. Our nuclear bombs, if dropped, would only scratch its surface. Therefore, developing nuclear weapons would be extremely unwise."

Is that true? Or false? Perspectives evolve with the times.

Interlude—The Possibility and Impossibility of Using Legal Systems to Counter the U.S.

Many people may wonder: Why are nuclear facilities almost exclusively purchased from the United States? No matter how nuclear power plant bids were conducted, the suppliers always seemed to be American companies. Did French companies never bid?

After Taiwan withdrew from the United Nations, it lost the qualification to directly participate in the operations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a result, Taiwan had to rely on the United States, which still maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, to sign a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA to arrange for the monitoring and control of nuclear materials. For non-nuclear-weapon states, without such a safeguards agreement, no international transactions involving nuclear facilities or materials can take place.

The reason Taiwan has been able to maintain this trilateral agreement is not due to American goodwill, but because this arrangement allows the United States to monitor any potential nuclear weapons research in Taiwan while simultaneously monopolizing Taiwan's nuclear power market. Without a safeguards agreement with the supplier country, there would be no way to monitor whether the supplied nuclear materials are used solely for peaceful purposes.

Taiwan has never engaged in clandestine transactions; Israel, South Africa, India, and even Iran are examples of countries that developed nuclear capabilities through secret channels. If France wanted to conduct nuclear transactions with Taiwan, it would still have to consider the U.S. stance and depend on whether the United States would allow France to use the existing trilateral safeguards agreement.

In fact, French equipment is often more reliable, cheaper, and faster to deliver than American products. Would the United States easily allow France to share the market? German companies also bid, and the United States allowed them to use the safeguards agreement, precisely because German products lacked competitiveness in the market. Although German equipment is reliable in quality, it is expensive, so the United States was happy to grant KWU a favor by allowing it to participate in the bidding.

Why didn't Taiwan simply arrange a separate trilateral safeguards agreement with France? That's a long story.

The timing of Taiwan's procurement of its first nuclear power plant coincided roughly with its withdrawal from the United Nations. At that time, Taiwan's international standing had reached its lowest point, and apart from the United States and Japan, most countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan were not advanced nations. Japanese nuclear equipment manufacturers mostly operated under licenses from American companies like Westinghouse or General Electric. Considering financial loan arrangements and the political feasibility of gaining approval, the Taiwan Power Company (Taipower) had almost no choice but to purchase from the United States.

When constructing the second and third nuclear power plants, the situation had not significantly improved, so it was natural to continue using American equipment. By the time discussions on the fourth nuclear power plant began, Taiwan's economic strength had gained some international recognition. The rise in economic power gradually improved the international situation, and Taiwan's domestic market began to attract attention from European countries.

However, having lived under American influence for many years, coupled with vested interests, Taipower and relevant government departments never seriously considered switching to European suppliers for nuclear power plants. One reason was that arranging a suitable nuclear safeguards agreement would be extremely cumbersome.

Pro-American factions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were always afraid of provoking the United States and triggering other diplomatic complications. The Ministry of Economic Affairs worried about potential U.S. protests over Taiwan's trade surplus. National defense procurement was almost entirely dependent on the United States, and there was no concept at the time of purchasing Mirage fighter jets. The Atomic Energy Council (AEC), the nuclear safety regulatory body, long adopted an ostrich policy, with nearly all regulations derived from the United States. Therefore, everyone preferred to avoid the issue and just get by.

After Tung Chao-chin was transferred to the Atomic Energy Council as Director of the Planning Division, he recognized this problem and realized that the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant presented an opportunity for Taiwan. Hoping to leverage his extensive experience dealing with Americans, Tung sought a breakthrough. He began contacting key French figures, encouraging France to propose a nuclear safeguards agreement with Taiwan, aiming to fundamentally break the U.S. monopoly on Taiwan's nuclear equipment market. Personally, Tung also believed this approach could mitigate criticism of his close ties with the United States, making it a two-birds-with-one-stone strategy.

The French nuclear power plant manufacturer Framatome had actually been active in Taiwan for many years but had never made a breakthrough. Personnel exchanges were frequent, visits were ongoing, and numerous seminars were held, but no actual commercial transactions ever occurred.

France's foreign trade has always been closely tied to the government, especially nuclear-related enterprises, which are mostly government-funded and privately operated. When Taiwan rejected French nuclear power plants from bidding on the grounds of "no nuclear safeguards agreement," the French side was utterly perplexed. In their view, international treaties or agreements are meaningful only when both parties make commitments. Since Taiwan had already joined the IAEA safeguards system and all nuclear materials were under IAEA monitoring, this in itself equated to a commitment to peaceful use only, which should have been sufficient for France to feel confident in transferring nuclear facilities or materials to Taiwan.

Moreover, France itself is an internationally recognized nuclear-weapon state. For nuclear-weapon states, the IAEA does not conduct safeguards inspections, so France's nuclear transactions for peaceful purposes are not subject to such restrictions. The French side consistently stated: as long as Taiwan was willing to buy, they were willing to sell, with no concerns. As for arranging IAEA safeguards inspections, that was a matter to be coordinated between Taiwan and the relevant agencies.

Why has Taiwan never truly pushed forward on this matter? The reason is simple: we have two "big brothers." First, China protests at the slightest move. Under the atmosphere of "politics first," a potentially viable large-scale transaction often collapses. Therefore, Taiwan generally avoids trouble and takes a passive stance toward European countries.

On the other hand, the United States, to protect its commercial interests, uses various means to restrict Taiwan's actions. France's argument is not without merit, but Taiwan cannot openly admit it cannot afford to offend the United States. The U.S. often uses international treaties to constrain weaker nations, and the nuclear safeguards agreement is one such tool. If the U.S. deems it inappropriate, it can halt nuclear fuel supplies, rendering existing nuclear power plants inoperable. Not to mention trade imbalances and arms sales issues, all of which are major factors affecting the entire situation. Under these realistic conditions, Taiwan naturally finds it difficult to easily forge a new path.