Opinion: What Should the Republic of China (Taiwan) Rebuild After Lai Ching-te?

Assuming a party rotation in 2028, with the opposition regaining power, the real issue may not be 'how to overturn Lai Ching-te's policies' but rather 'what should the Republic of China (Taiwan) rebuild?' In recent years, the political thought circles in Europe and America have repeatedly discussed a question: After a democratic society experiences high political polarization, loss of institutional trust, and national identity division, should the new government restore the original order or establish a new political order? The answer is probably not at either extreme. The real difficulty lies in distinguishing which institutions are still worth preserving and which need reform; which values must be defended again and which political culture should be discarded. This is not just Taiwan's problem but a challenge all democratic countries have faced since the end of the Cold War. 'Why did no one want to fight for the Soviet Union?' After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a question has always troubled many historians: 'Why did no one want to fight for the Soviet Union?' A superpower that existed for nearly seventy years did not experience a full-scale civil war or large-scale actions to defend the regime during its collapse. What truly collapsed was not the military but the people's belief in the institution and the nation. Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev once pointed out that the real crisis of democracy is often not the institution itself but the people no longer believing that the institution is worth their investment and commitment. When the institution loses trust, the constitution easily becomes a formality; when the community loses identity, even the most perfect institution may lose vitality. This is worth pondering for Taiwan. Today, how many people are willing to fight for the Republic of China? How many are willing to fight for Taiwan? And how many are willing to defend the freedom, rule of law, and democratic order represented by the Constitution of the Republic of China? If those who oppose the ruling party only prove, like Lai Ching-te, that 'the constitutional ideal was fake from the beginning' and 'the institution has no value,' the final result may not be a stronger democratic country but a community that fewer and fewer people are willing to believe in and defend. Therefore, regardless of which party is in power, the greatest responsibility of the opposition is not just to criticize the government but to prove that the constitutional order is still worth believing in for the people. The real crisis is not institutional failure but the loss of institutional trust. Many people attribute today's problems in Taiwan to institutional design and the 'Greater China Constitution' of the Republic of China. However, has the institution completely failed? Taiwan still has democratic elections, local autonomy, judicial institutions, the Legislative Yuan, and a mature administrative system. What has truly deteriorated is the people's trust in public institutions and the abuse of power by political figures. Do people still trust the Legislative Yuan? Do they trust the judiciary? Do they trust local governments? Do they trust the media, academic institutions, and public intellectuals? When public institutions gradually lose social trust, any ruler can more easily exploit institutional loopholes to expand power, while society finds it difficult to form effective checks and balances. Therefore, what truly needs to be rebuilt is not just the legal provisions but the credibility of the institutions. The constitution functions not just because the text exists but because the people believe it is worth obeying. German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck offers another observation worth pondering. In the 20th century, most democratic countries responded to the 'needs' of the people—work, security, education, housing, and social security. However, today, politics is increasingly required to satisfy the people's endless 'desires.' The market can satisfy individual preferences through algorithms and customized services, but the state cannot. The state must treat every citizen fairly, not tailor different versions of the government according to each person's expectations. When people begin to demand that politics satisfy all expectations like the market, democracy easily falls into an endless cycle of disappointment. Taiwan should also rethink: What are the real needs? What are just political desires? Security, the rule of law, economic development, and social stability are common needs. As for various unification, independence, historical identity, and identity narratives, which belong to the core needs of the state and which belong to value claims in political competition, more rational discussions are needed rather than mutual denial. Otherwise, it would indeed be purely the political desires of political parties or political figures. If a party rotation really occurs in 2028, the biggest mistake of the opposition party would be to understand rebuilding as 'restoring everything before Lai Ching-te.' History can regress, but it can also progress. Whether it is the collapse of the Eastern European communist regime or German reunification, it is not a simple return to the past but the reestablishment of political consensus under new historical conditions. It will also lead to the question of why, even after the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 countries, only Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became democratic countries, while the other 12 countries remained little Soviet Union? Therefore, true rebuilding is not just restoring past policies but reanswering several fundamental questions: What values does the Constitution of the Republic of China represent? Which institutions are still worth preserving? Which institutions must be reformed? How should the state regain the people's trust? The responsibility of political parties is not just to gain power but to propose new national governance narrative ideas. In the face of international geopolitical turmoil, Taiwan's 'strategic autonomy' is by no means a simple military technical issue. Increasing defense budgets and extending service terms may be hard indicators, but the more fundamental issue is: If the international geopolitical landscape undergoes drastic turbulence, will the people of Taiwan still have the collective will to protect the constitutional way of life on this island? Taiwan cannot move towards extreme isolationism (Strategic Isolation) or simply rely on a one-sided bandwagon strategy (Bandwagoning). Precise hedging (Hedging) and the enhancement of its own strength are the right path. More importantly, Taiwan cannot simultaneously engage in all-out consumption wars with surrounding giant neighbors in terms of ideological confrontation, military confrontation, and the economic sphere. Wise national governance knows how to define defense boundaries, stand firm on democratic systems and the rule of life, but maintain pragmatic flexibility in technical and economic spheres. Rebuilding the country starts with rebuilding trust. The democratic transformation experience of Hungary shows that if a party only opposes but does not have a new national narrative, even if it gains power, it is difficult to complete true institutional rebuilding. Orban came to power with democratic values. However, he has been in power for 16 years, not a 'traditional dictator' ruling with guns, but a 'contemporary electoral authoritarian strongman' who precisely exploits loopholes in democratic regulations and builds authoritarian rule through laws and elections. This is also why the opposition party could break through this 'unfair electoral system' and win the election in April 2026, which was seen as a historic shock at the time by Europe and academia. The Democratic Progressive Party also used the recall power in the Constitution of the Republic of China, which they fundamentally do not believe in, to launch a major recall. The Kuomintang and the People First Party managed to escape the 'recall power' designed by Sun Yat-sen, which is even more ironic. Isn't the cause and effect of the major recall worth the Kuomintang's reflection? Hungary could successfully remove Orban through the parliamentary cabinet system, but after Lee Teng-hui's constitutional amendment, the presidential system of the Republic of China, Taiwan, the Legislative Yuan can hardly check the Executive Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan working together in a non-signature and non-execution step. Where is the problem? It is self-evident. What if the Lai Ching-te government does not sign, does not execute, and refuses to step down in 2028? Krastev once reminded that the greatest crisis of democracy is often not the collapse of the institution but the people no longer believing in the institution. Streeck reminded that the state can never satisfy all the desires of every citizen like the market. For Taiwan, true rebuilding is not just amending laws, not just party rotation, and certainly not returning to a certain historical moment. What truly needs to be rebuilt is the people's trust in the constitution, institutions, and community. What a country should truly be wary of is not whether a president is successful, but whether the people are still willing to believe that this country is worth protecting. What kind of community is the Republic of China, Taiwan? And what values are worth the people defending together in times of danger? There is no simple answer. Lai Ching-te's administration has clearly shown that he has neither political wisdom nor leadership. How many people believe that the stock market reaching 40,000 points is Lai Ching-te's merit? If no one is ever willing to answer and respect the values and ideals of the Republic of China, Taiwan, then what may be replayed is not just a party rotation but the chilling historical question posed during the collapse of the Soviet Union: 'Why, in the end, did no one want to fight for it?' *The author is a retired elementary school teacher.