Perspective: The 2026 Six Major Cities Upheaval - Voter Turnout Estimation, Regional Spillover, Food Safety Crisis, Party Internal Restructuring, and Southern Public Discontent Dynamics Forecast

The following content is an analysis and estimation based on historical election results, recent public information, and political situations. There are still over 100 days of variables in the prediction of the 2026 election results. As time progresses, the candidate nominations and layouts of various parties for the 2026 nine-in-one local elections are becoming clearer, with the mayoral elections in the six major cities becoming the focus of the entire political spectrum in Taiwan. Recently, many estimation models have appeared on the internet, among which the model assuming an average national voter turnout of approximately 62.02% has attracted much discussion. To clarify the current election situation, one cannot merely look at the numbers of a single model but must use the 'substantial base period of historical data' as the framework and cross-verify it with 'regional spillover, food safety storm impact, party faction restructuring, southern optoelectronics and human character systemic public discontent, and the political waves across Taiwan' as the flesh.

I. Model Premises: The Mobilization Implications of a 62% Voter Turnout Looking back at history, the average national voter turnout for the 2022 local nine-in-one elections was 61.22% (Taipei City 67.70%, New Taipei City 56.60%), while the 2024 presidential election raised it to 71.86%. If the average national voter turnout in 2026 falls around 62%, it belongs to a typical low voter turnout level in local elections. In a low voter turnout scenario, the outcome of the election mainly depends on the grassroots organization's ability to mobilize voters (ground warfare) and the cohesion of the basic support base. However, 'low voter turnout is unfavorable for the Green Camp' is not an absolute law. The flow of third-force voters, the satisfaction of the current administration, and the personal charm of the candidates will dynamically reshape the impact of voter turnout.

II. Data Correction: Verification of Historical Presidential Election Data Base Period and Model Estimation To avoid estimation deviating from reality, it is necessary to first establish the actual voting data of each city as a reference benchmark. The voter turnout for local elections is usually about 10 to 15 percentage points lower than that for presidential elections. The voter turnout for the 2022 local elections was 61.22%, which is a normal level in recent years. Although the 2024 presidential election maintained over 70%, it did not recover to the 74.9% of 2020, indicating a slight decline in voter mobilization. In 2026, if we do not consider special factors such as constitutional amendments, referendums, major political events, or cross-strait crises, the voter turnout for local elections will generally still fall around 60%. The overall estimation for the six major cities is that if the election situation in 2026 is similar to that in 2022: the average voter turnout for the six major cities is approximately 61-63%; the average national voter turnout is approximately 60-62%. Therefore, if the blue-green competition is intense (such as Taipei, New Taipei, and Taichung becoming the national focus), the national voter turnout may increase to approximately 63-65%; if the election situation is dull, it may decrease to 58-60%. Therefore, the current more reasonable estimated value is: the national voter turnout for the 2026 nine-in-one local elections is approximately 61% (plus or minus about 2 percentage points), that is, between 59% and 63%, and the six major cities are generally between 60% and 64%. This is also the most stable estimation that can be made based on the trends of the three national elections in 2020, 2022, and 2024.

1. Historical Data of Mayors and Presidential Elections in the Six Major Cities County/City Election Year Candidate Votes Vote Percentage Taipei City 2020 Presidential Han Kuo-yu 560,000 38.07% 2022 Mayor Chiang Wan-an 575,000 42.29% 2024 Presidential Hou Yu-ih 460,000 34.13% New Taipei City 2022 Mayor Hou Yu-ih 1,152,000 62.42% 2024 Presidential Lai Ching-te 1,025,000 38.59% Hou Yu-ih 941,000 35.43% Taoyuan City 2022 Mayor Chang San-cheng 557,000 52.02% 2024 Presidential Lai Ching-te 481,000 35.26% Taichung City 2022 Mayor Lu Shiuan 799,000 59.35% 2024 Presidential Lai Ching-te 641,000 37.58% Tainan City 2022 Mayor Huang Wei-zhe 433,000 48.80% 2024 Presidential Lai Ching-te 570,000 50.95% Kaohsiung City 2022 Mayor Chen Chi-mai 762,000 58.10% 2024 Presidential Lai Ching-te 800,000 48.89% Note: The above table is a trend-based estimation made based on the election data of the six major cities in recent years, but note that it uses the vote rates of each candidate, not the voter turnout of each county/city. Therefore, it can only be estimated by combining the general voter turnout of previous elections. From a national trend perspective: 2020 Presidential: 74.90% 2022 Local: 61.22% 2024 Presidential: 71.86% 2026 Local (Estimated): 60-63% Estimated Voter Turnout for 2026 Mayoral Elections: Taipei City: 63-67% New Taipei City: 58-62% Taoyuan City: 59-63% Taichung City: 62-66% Tainan City: 59-63% Kaohsiung City: 58-62% 2. 2026 Model Estimation Results and Reasonable Range Review County/City Model Estimated Candidates and Votes Estimated Vote Percentage Map Situation Substantial Structure and Reasonable Range Analysis Taipei City (Estimated 61.61%) Chiang Wan-an (Blue) 756,000 62.04% Blue camp has high chances of winning (solid base) Data correction: 62% vote rate is the 'upper limit' of the blue camp completely absorbing the white camp votes. Considering the green camp's base is about 35%-40%, Chiang Wan-an's reasonable range falls between 55%-58%. Shen Bo-yang (Green) 463,000 37.96% New Taipei City (Estimated 62.80%) Su Chiao-hui (Green) 1,062,000 51.03% Extremely deadlocked (largest battleground in the six major cities) Power struggle: New Taipei is a 55-wave situation. Li Si-chuan has administrative experience and a moderate image, while Su Chiao-hui has central resources and deep cultivation advantages. The outcome depends on the middle voters (the basic mobilization energy of the Hou system and the spillover effect of Chiang Wan-an). Li Si-chuan (Blue) 1,019,000 48.97% Taoyuan City (Estimated 61.93%) Chang San-cheng (Blue) 644,000 57.02% Blue camp advantage (incumbent advantage) Performance bonus: Chang San-cheng's governance image is stable, and the blue camp is in a favorable position. However, 57% is a high estimate, and the actual gap may be compressed between 6%-10%. Huang Shih-chieh (Green) 485,000 42.98% Taichung City (Estimated 64.02%) Chiang Chi-chin (Blue) 807,000 55.49% Blue camp advantage (performance succession) Mother hen inheritance: If Chiang Chi-chin can inherit Lu Shu-yan's high satisfaction governance bonus, facing He Hsin-chun, who has deep roots in the local area, the blue camp's defense line remains solid. He Hsin-chun (Green) 648,000 44.51% Tainan City (Estimated 60.05%) Chen Ting-fu (Green) 557,000 59.95% Green camp advantage (substantial alert) Extreme compression: The model's estimated 60% is overly optimistic. Under the influence of optoelectronics corruption and long-term governance fatigue, it is highly likely to replay the 2022 narrowly won scenario, falling to the 50%-53% alert line. Hsieh Lung-chieh (Blue) 372,000 40.05% Kaohsiung City (Estimated 61.73%) Lai Rui-long (Green) 783,000 55.61% Green camp advantage (structural lead) Structure is king: Ko Chi-en's continuous presence can narrow the gap, but Lai Rui-long receives support from the city government team and faction integration. The conditions for structural blue transformation in Kaohsiung are not yet mature, but the gap is narrowing. 'Korean Wave' at work? Ko Chi-en (Blue) 611,000 43.38% III. In-depth Insights: Seven Core Variables' Deep Impact on Election Situation and Political Landscape Looking at the independent data of each city alone tends to overlook the interconnectedness of the overall political landscape. The following seven factors will be the substantial driving force changing the 2026 six major cities' chessboard: (a) Food Safety Crisis (Zhongli Poison Oil Case) and Its Erosion of Public Opinion The 'Zhongli Soybean Salad Oil (excessive benzo[a]pyrene)' food safety incident has become one of the most severe civic breaches for the ruling party at present: Mechanism of Public Discontent Spread: Salad oil is a basic raw material for the catering industry and processed foods, with affected downstream industries numbering in the hundreds. This 'uneasy feeling about what to eat' directly crosses the blue-green divide and overlaps with the current public complaints about price inflation, significantly exacerbating the 'governance fatigue' feeling. Opposition's Tactical Lever: The opposition camp is fully launching interrogations and public opinion offensives in the legislature and locally, pressing the Zhao Rong-tai cabinet and the Ministry of Health and Welfare to take political responsibility. The longer the food safety chain recall time, the harder it is to quell the news heat, posing long-term erosion to the DPP's support among moderate voters. The food safety march on July 25 was a social movement and political vote mobilization advantageous to toppling the cabinet, with the impact still expanding. (b) Local vs. Central Crisis Response: Chen Chi-mai's 'Low-key Counter Cover-up' Political Interpretation In the initial stage of the food safety crisis, the central government (Zhao Rong-tai cabinet and the Ministry of Health and Welfare) was criticized for taking too long to deliberate on administrative procedures and recall scope, being accused of 'cover-up and concealment' by external parties. Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an even shouted 'Has Kaohsiung been inspected?' during the legislative and member confrontation, dragging in local responsibilities. However, Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chi-mai quickly presented data to refute, with five years of inspections totaling 18 times.