Red Net｜First Cross-Border Suppression Against Taiwan After 'Promotion Law' Enactment: Asahi Attacked, Says CCP Aims to Plant Seeds of Fear

On July 1, China's 'Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress' came into force, widely regarded as a legal facade enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to extend ideological control globally. Five days later, political commentator Masao Yorihata was violently attacked in Taiwan. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) characterized the incident as cross-border suppression by the CCP, with preliminary investigations indicating links to the Hong Kong triad 'Wo Shing Wo'. The methods—ranging from threatening letters, surveillance, deepfake pornography, to physical assault—vary, but the goal is consistent: to exhaust targets mentally and socially, isolate them from communities, and ultimately disable their ability to continue working.

This special report, based on five international interviews, begins with Yorihata's attack in Taiwan and extends to the experiences of exiled Hong Kong activist Carmen Lau in the UK, New Zealand-based Chinese independent journalist Mao Peng, Canadian MP Jinny Sims, and Sunai Phasuk, senior Thailand advisor at Human Rights Watch. It examines how pervasive and systematic China's transnational repression has become and what high-risk groups are facing.

After the attack, Yorihata stated he would not back down: 'Maintaining normalcy is the best counterattack!' The purpose of cross-border suppression and violence is typically to intimidate and silence. Two weeks after the assault, Yorihata told the English edition of Storm Media that he would not retreat. He argued that the CCP's resort to cross-border actions reveals a regime in fear—facing economic downturn and poor domestic governance, 'it is now most afraid of criticism.' Yorihata said whether it's his attack or the simultaneous arrest of Hong Kong bookstore staff in July, 'they (the CCP) are trying to plant a seed of terror in everyone’s heart.'

He emphasized that victims of transnational repression should not waste energy trying to figure out where the CCP's red lines are. 'If they tell you not to criticize Xi Jinping, fine—we won’t criticize Xi Jinping, but we’ll criticize Li Qiang or Cai Qi instead. Will that be acceptable? No, it won’t. The point is, they want to silence all criticism.'

The MAC strongly suspects this attack is the first case of cross-border suppression against Taiwan following the enactment of the 'Promotion Law.' It issued strong condemnations and protests and immediately activated a 'Cross-Border Suppression Countermeasures Platform.' Deputy Minister Shen Youzhong, at a seminar on July 14, stated the law legalizes, institutionalizes, and normalizes China's 'long-arm jurisdiction' and 'cross-border suppression' against Taiwan. He noted the law's vague provisions and extraterritorial reach have raised serious concerns among Japan, the U.S., Canada, and the European Parliament.

According to prior media reports, police and prosecutors confirmed the attacker as 33-year-old Hong Kong national Liao Gangfa, a member of the Hong Kong triad 'Wo Shing Wo.' The attack was not a lone-wolf act but a coordinated operation by a seven-member group, with six members traveling to Taiwan to carry it out. 'Wo Shing Wo' was one of the main perpetrators in the 'Yuen Long 721' violent attacks during Hong Kong's 2019 anti-extradition protests.

Yorihata said Taiwan's greatest luck was that the perpetrator was caught. 'Arresting the suspect allows us to uncover the truth and show everyone this was an organized, planned act.' He referenced Hong Kong, noting that since the 1990s, violent attacks on Hong Kong media figures have been frequent and similar in method, with masterminds often remaining at large.

Past attacks on Hong Kong journalists include the 1996 assault on *Trend Weekly* publisher Leung Tin-wai, 1998 attack on commentator Cheng King-hon, 2004 attack on host Wong Yuk-man, 2013 assault on media founder Sze Wing-ching, and 2014 attack on *Ming Pao* editor Kevin Lau. Most were brutally attacked with knives, and except for the Lau case, perpetrators in the others remain uncaught.

Yorihata jokingly referred to the 'Promotion Law' as a 'cosmic law,' saying, 'No matter if you're inside or outside China, in Taiwan, Japan, or even on the moon—anywhere in the universe—if you criticize the Communist Party, they will come after you. Their enforcement space has expanded infinitely.' However, he noted that actual cross-border enforcement is costly, so the CCP uses triads like 'Wo Shing Wo' in 'hit-and-run' tactics to send a message: 'If you criticize me, you will be punished even abroad.' He believes this message is extremely strong.

Some argue such actions should be called 'cross-border violence' rather than 'suppression,' since Taiwan is not under China's jurisdiction. But Yorihata countered: 'Suppression implies state power. If two people fight, it's not suppression. If it's just the Wo Shing Wo acting out of personal grudges, then yes, it's violence. But if state power is behind it, it's cross-border suppression.'

Beyond physical violence, Yorihata noted online attacks followed the assault: 'After I was beaten, a group of CCP sympathizers jumped online to spread rumors, slander me, and launch character assassination.' He stressed these attacks were unrelated to the incident itself, aimed solely at discouraging Taiwanese society from paying attention.

Carmen Lau, a former Hong Kong district councilor now exiled in the UK and wanted by Hong Kong authorities, said the 'Promotion Law' merely institutionalizes what China has already been doing. She noted the law's content closely mirrors Hong Kong's National Security Law and Basic Law Article 23, including extraterritorial jurisdiction. Thus, she believes its main purpose is to send a clear signal to China's international allies: 'I've legislated—now you must cooperate more.'

Lau pointed out that unlike the National Security Law, which uses 'national security' as a framework, the 'Promotion Law' employs softer terms like 'culture' and 'ethnic unity,' making some countries sensitive to ethnic sentiment less likely to view it as a political law—mirroring China's human rights rhetoric at the UN. She is currently researching China's influence in Latin America and has found allies there already adopting China's 'ethnic unity' discourse, confirming the law's transnational impact.

Lau warned the 'Promotion Law' poses a greater threat to developing countries, especially those already openly supporting China or economically dependent on it, where individuals wanted by China face the highest risks.

Sunai Phasuk, senior Thailand advisor for Human Rights Watch's Asia division, bluntly stated: 'I see no sign that the Thai government will object to or counter this new law.' He pessimistically added: 'In fact, China already treats Thailand as its backyard. China can arrest anyone itself or make Thailand do the dirty work, and this new law will make it appear legal.' Phasuk said the law could become a shield for Thailand when facing criticism, allowing it to claim it's merely enforcing 'bilateral cooperation agreements.'

Phasuk noted China's transnational repression extends beyond Thailand, with a vast network already established across Southeast Asia. China's growing influence in the region has intensified the crisis, and Southeast Asian nations are learning from each other—how to use arrest warrants, how to 'package abuse with documents.' With domestic checks and balances failing, 'no one is safe. Once targeted, you can be arrested and handed over to China, ignoring international human rights concerns and international law. They don't care! That's what makes it both tragic and terrifying.'

Yet, Thai civil society and the government hold opposing views. Phasuk noted the Thai public is increasingly aware of China's interference and bullying, expressing strong dissatisfaction with Thai cooperation. 'There's already significant public criticism in (liberal) media and social media, targeting the Thai government, the Chinese embassy in Bangkok, and Beijing.'

Regarding China's likely use of triads in gray-zone tactics, Lau stated such practices have been ongoing since the 2019 '721' incident, with Chinese authorities using triads as unofficial enforcement units. She urged the international community to recognize these tactics and strengthen legal and diplomatic responses.