Has Japanese Pacifism Reached Its End? Hoover Institute Scholar: China Forced Abe Shinzo's 'Final Victory'

On July 27, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University published a commentary stating that Japan has completed its most profound defense strategic transformation since 1945, even without formally amending its constitution. The article argues that this transformation was initiated by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, institutionalized under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and is now being fully implemented by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, with one primary catalyst: China.

Titled "Abe’s Final Victory: Japan’s Defense Revolution and the End of Postwar Pacifism," the article is authored by Miles Maochun Yu. He opens by asserting that for nearly 80 years after World War II, Japan defined its security policy by what it refused to be: not initiating wars, not projecting military force overseas, and not possessing offensive weapons. Yet he declares: "That Japan no longer exists."

Yu argues that Abe recognized earlier than most democratic leaders that the challenge posed by China is fundamentally different from those of North Korea or Russia. Only China possesses the combined economic, industrial, technological, and military power capable of altering the strategic balance in East Asia.

As a result, Japan’s core defense objective has gradually shifted from merely defending its homeland to preventing Chinese aggression altogether. In other words, Japan aims to convince China’s leadership, before Beijing resorts to military action, that such action would fail. "Deterrence," rather than passive defense, has become the cornerstone of Japan’s military planning—this, Yu asserts, is Abe’s greatest political legacy.

Official Japanese documents partially support this observation. The 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy describe China’s external posture and military activities as the "unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge" to Japan’s peace and security.

The documents also note that, given increasingly complex missile threats, relying solely on existing missile defense networks is becoming insufficient. Therefore, Japan needs to develop a "counterstrike capability."

Japan has broken the long-standing 1% GDP defense spending cap—a symbolic political red line of postwar restraint. The country is now pursuing its largest defense expansion since World War II, aiming not only to purchase more fighter jets and warships but also to rebuild its defense industrial base, increase ammunition stockpiles, and strengthen supply chain resilience.

The Japanese government claims it has already reached approximately 2% of GDP in defense-related expenditures through initial and supplementary budgets. However, this figure includes broader spending beyond the Ministry of Defense’s annual budget, such as the Japan Coast Guard, cybersecurity, infrastructure, and R&D. Thus, it should not be interpreted as Japan’s narrow military expenditure having fully reached 2% of GDP.

A significant portion of recent defense spending has gone toward missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers, ammunition stockpiling, command and communication systems, and military infrastructure reinforcement. If defense budgets continue to grow, drones and other unmanned weapon systems are expected to become key investment areas.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense, in its 2026 Defense of Japan white paper released on August 4, once again identifies China as the "unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge" and emphasizes that defense production and technological infrastructure are inseparable components of defense capability. It advocates expanding startup participation and actively utilizing artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and dual-use technologies.

Yu further contends that Japan’s weapons procurement mindset is shifting from small quantities of expensive, high-precision platforms to mass-producible next-generation systems such as drones, unmanned surface vessels, autonomous underwater vehicles, AI reconnaissance systems, electronic warfare equipment, and electromagnetic railguns.

However, this is primarily Yu’s generalization of Japanese policy trends. While official Japanese sources confirm the rising importance of unmanned systems, AI, ammunition stockpiles, and sustained production capacity, electromagnetic railguns remain in the research and development phase and cannot yet be considered a firmly established mass production policy.

Yu argues that any future conflict with China would face the world’s largest industrial manufacturing system. Therefore, Japan must consider not only weapon performance but also production volume, speed, and the ability to replenish equipment after damage.

Can Japan strike deep into Chinese territory? The government still prohibits preemptive attacks. The most controversial part of the article concerns Japan’s long-range strike capabilities.

Yu notes that Japan is developing long-range cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, precision strike systems, and counterstrike capabilities, making Chinese command centers, missile bases, naval ports, airfields, and logistics hubs potential targets in the event of conflict.

He believes that if China attacks Japan or undertakes military action against Taiwan that threatens Japan’s survival, Japan will have the capability to impose costs on Chinese military facilities within China.

This would alter the long-standing postwar division of labor, in which Japan absorbs the first wave of attacks while U.S. forces conduct offensive operations.

However, the Japanese government’s legal interpretation of "counterstrike capability" remains more conservative than Yu’s description.

The National Defense Strategy clearly states that counterstrike capability must comply with the Constitution and international law and can only be used to the minimum necessary extent when the new three conditions for the use of force are met. Launching attacks before an armed attack occurs—preemptive strikes—remains prohibited.

Moreover, China’s military action against Taiwan does not automatically authorize Japan to use force. The Japanese government must still determine whether the situation threatens Japan’s survival, whether no other appropriate means exist to eliminate the threat, and whether the use of force is limited to the minimum necessary level.

In other words, while Japan has indeed crossed the political taboo of not possessing long-range offensive weapons, the large-scale deep strikes into Chinese territory described in the article are the author’s projection based on weapon capabilities and military logic—not an officially announced target list or operational plan by the Japanese government.

Is the U.S.-Japan alliance moving beyond "America fights, Japan supports"? Yu also argues that the U.S.-Japan alliance is gradually shifting from "America conducts operations, Japan provides support" to both militaries jointly maintaining regional security.

The Abe administration advanced the Peace and Security Legislation in 2015, allowing limited exercise of collective self-defense under strict conditions. Since then, Japan has continuously strengthened cooperation with U.S. forces in intelligence, command systems, missile defense, and long-range counterstrikes.

Yu believes Japan is no longer merely a protected ally but a strategic partner capable of directly participating in Indo-Pacific joint operations.

However, Japan’s official strategic documents still clearly state that the basic role division within the U.S.-Japan alliance has not disappeared. Japan will take greater responsibility for its own defense, while the United States continues to provide extended deterrence and broader regional military capabilities. Both countries will enhance cooperation in missile defense, intelligence sharing, command coordination, and counterstrike operations, but this cannot be simplified into a fully equal military division of labor between Japan and the United States.

Yu, former China policy advisor to Pompeo, holds a clear stance. Yu is currently a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, a senior fellow and director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute, and a professor of East Asian, military, and naval history at the U.S. Naval Academy.

During the first Trump administration, he served as the primary China policy advisor to then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, participating in U.S. government discussions on China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Yu holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of California, Berkeley. Based on his policy background and public statements, he is a prominent figure in the U.S. national security community known for his hardline stance toward China.

Therefore, while this article is grounded in factual policy developments—Japan’s increased defense spending, acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, and strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance—it remains a commentary with a clear strategic position. It does not represent the Japanese government’s official stance nor constitute a comprehensive assessment of Sino-Japanese military capabilities.

The Hoover Institution notes on its website that the views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Hoover Institution or Stanford University.

"The end of pacifism" remains a political judgment. Yu concludes that Abe changed how Japan thinks about war.

Previously, Japan believed that not possessing offensive capabilities was the most reliable path to peace. Abe argued that in the face of authoritarian powers seeking to change the status quo by force, peace depends on convincing aggressors that war cannot succeed.

However, Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy acknowledges that the new strategy will significantly alter postwar security policy in implementation, while still explicitly stating that Japan will continue as a peace-loving nation, maintaining exclusive defense, not becoming a military power threatening others, and adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

The 2026 Defense of Japan white paper reaffirms these fundamental policies.

Therefore, rather than saying Japan has formally ended pacifism, it is more accurate to say that Japan is reinterpreting the practice of pacifism—shifting from maintaining peace primarily through military restraint to building deterrence through long-range weapons, defense industrial capacity, unmanned systems, and allied joint operations.

Yu calls this transformation Abe’s "final victory."

In his narrative, Japan has not abandoned peace. The real change is that China’s rise has rendered passive pacifism strategically unviable.