'Hundred-Billion Military Uniform Bid' Fails Twice: Open Letter Urges Defense Ministry Not to Evade Responsibility with Fines

Regarding the Ministry of National Defense's 'ROC Armed Forces Uniform Sales Station Outsourcing Operation Project (Army)', with a total scale potentially exceeding NT$10 billion, after a 2025 controversy over conflict of interest involving evaluation committee members and independent director nominations from bidding firms, the project—officially launched in April 2026—has now reported severe shortages in nearly half of its publicly funded items. Today, an industry expert published an open letter in Storm Media, directly pointing out that the procurement project has failed in two consecutive waves, and emphasized that while contractor violations deserve penalties, the Ministry must not use fines as a substitute for actual supply. If termination conditions are met, it should make the tough decision to terminate the contract and thoroughly investigate the administrative responsibility behind the approval of the launch.

Originally budgeted at approximately NT$6.676 billion, with an expansion cap of up to NT$10.6 billion, the project aims to establish an integrated system combining military uniform e-commerce, physical stores, and logistics support, with a contract period extending to the end of 2030. However, the procurement process has been fraught with setbacks. The first failure occurred during the 2025 evaluation phase, when evaluation committee member Hong Hui-Song was simultaneously listed as an independent director nominee for bidding company Hsing Chai Industrial. After Hsing Chai ranked first in evaluation, Hong was successfully elected. The Ministry subsequently revoked the evaluation results due to conflict of interest and referred the case to judicial authorities, re-tendering in August of the same year.

The project was then awarded in October 2025 to Tainan Enterprises and Fila, originally planning to introduce trendy brands and diverse product lines, with operations officially commencing on April 1, 2026. However, the second failure quickly followed. Immediately after launch, frontline personnel reported severe shortages of essential items such as camouflage uniforms, dress uniforms, and suede shoes. According to data from legislators and military sources, at launch, 126 out of the 253 publicly funded items stipulated in the contract were unavailable—nearly half the inventory missing. By late May, cumulative fines had exceeded NT$65 million.

The open letter analyzes that while the contractor's supply delays warrant contractual liability, the selection of vendors, operational readiness review, and launch inspection were all overseen by the military. The fact that nearly half the items were missing at launch, yet the operation passed inspection, is highly contradictory. The military must clarify the criteria used to approve the launch. Moreover, the NT$65 million in fines is merely an accounting matter between the military and the vendor, completely failing to resolve the real-world hardship of personnel unable to obtain basic uniforms. The Ministry should not use fines as an excuse to keep the vendor under contract while personnel continue to wait.

In response to the current crisis, the author urges the Ministry to publicly disclose the details of failures and timelines for improvement, and assess whether full or partial contract termination conditions have been met. Additionally, the military should immediately establish minimum safety stock levels for essential items like camouflage uniforms and military shoes, and if necessary, separate core items from the current contract and legally initiate emergency or alternative procurement. If a re-tender is conducted in the future, lessons should be drawn from past incidents such as the mislabeling of ROC military boot origins, reconstructing subcontractor disclosure and origin traceability mechanisms, and properly organizing domestic textile and logistics resources.

The letter concludes by emphasizing: 'Procurement can be outsourced, but national responsibility cannot.' Procurement audit and integrity systems should not only investigate whether the vendor has committed major breaches but also thoroughly examine whether there was negligence or falsified inspections within the military. In serious cases, legal action should be pursued, and political responsibility should rest with the Minister of National Defense. Personnel entrust their time and lives to the nation; 'being able to obtain uniforms when needed' is the most basic requirement. The Ministry must not bind personnel to a dysfunctional contract out of fear of inconvenience. Punish when necessary, terminate when necessary—only then can the ROC military's logistics crisis be truly resolved.