BBC Analysis: 'Han Kuang Exercise' Four Key Points: First Denial Drill on Danjiang Bridge, Mobilizing Civilian Factories for Weapons Production

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense will launch its annual 'Han Kuang Exercise' on August 5, 2026, running for ten days and nine nights. Continuing the expanded ten-day format introduced last year, the exercise will mobilize approximately 20,000 active and reserve personnel. This year's drill marks the first full-reserve mobilization of reserve units across northern and southern regions. Key focuses include denial drills on the Danjiang Bridge, anti-blockade escort operations, and testing the transfer of weapons production lines during wartime. Taiwan's Defense Minister Koo Hsien-hung stated that the purpose of the Han Kuang Exercise is to verify Taiwan's sustained combat capabilities. In a real war scenario, the military's goal is to 'defeat the enemy and render a full-scale invasion operation a failure.' Military analysts note that the exercise's focus has expanded beyond traditional 'anti-landing' operations to include deep defense and prolonged warfare, emphasizing 'civil-military integration' and extending to urban defense and resilience training. Notably, following increased appearances of U.S. military or American observers in last year's exercise, the number of U.S. personnel participating this year is expected to grow further, indicating that U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation is gradually becoming more open and institutionalized. 1. Denial of the Danjiang Bridge This year's Han Kuang Exercise includes several first-time drills, the most notable being the denial exercise on the Danjiang Bridge, which opened in May. The military will conduct its first test of defense and denial capabilities at this critical transportation hub spanning the Tamsui River. At a press conference, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense explained that this year's scenario assumes that Chinese forces, under the guise of annual joint military exercises, conduct large-scale landing operation training and complete final preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. The exercise will proceed through four operational phases: transition from peace to war and deployment, force protection and preservation, joint anti-landing, and deep defense and sustained warfare. Defense of the Tamsui River has become a focal point in Taiwan's defense deployment for the greater Taipei area in recent years. The Danjiang Bridge, located at the mouth of the Tamsui River, can reach downtown Taipei within an hour depending on traffic conditions. Dr. Chieh Chung, a commissioned deputy research fellow at the Taiwan Institute for National Security Research, told BBC Chinese that Taiwan's defense concept has gradually shifted toward emphasizing 'deep operations,' aiming to lure enemy forces into urban areas behind the beaches and use urban infrastructure and terrain obstacles to wear down their strength. He emphasized that if the Tamsui River and Danjiang Bridge are captured, deep defense will become ineffective, and once the bridge is seized, enemy forces could advance directly into downtown Taipei. 'If China controls the Danjiang Bridge and links it with landing bases in Tamsui, Bali, and Guanyin, it would form a major transportation hub, which would be detrimental to capital defense operations.' Since 2023, the Han Kuang Exercise has added modules such as 'deep defense' and 'sustained warfare' after 'joint anti-landing.' This marks a shift from past emphasis on frontline deterrence to actual combat training. In last year's exercise, Taiwan's military deployed rapid minelaying boats to lay mines outside Keelung Port and the Tamsui River estuary; in recent years, the military has repeatedly installed denial structures in river channels, and last year even placed explosives and conducted a public demolition for the first time. 2. Anti-Blockade Escort at Sea In addition to land-based drills, Taiwan's military is also enhancing sea-based anti-blockade exercises. Lu Wen-yuan, Director of the Joint Operations Division of the MND's Planning and Operations Office, recently stated that in response to China's gray-zone harassment and blockade threats around the Taiwan Strait, the military will integrate naval and coast guard forces to conduct maritime law enforcement, maritime patrols, sea lane security, and material escort missions, conducting relevant drills in the western Pacific to strengthen joint operational capabilities. This move has drawn international attention. Jack Burnham, Senior Researcher for the China Program at the Washington-based think tank 'Foundation for Defense of Democracies,' recently wrote that Taiwan's expanded exercise scale is linked to China's intensified maritime coercion against Taiwan over the past two months. He pointed out that since June, Chinese coast guard vessels have significantly increased patrols in the waters east of Taiwan; and during the last major exercise cycle in December last year, the Chinese military proposed the goal of 'comprehensive deterrence beyond the first island chain,' aiming to sever Taiwan's connections with the broader Pacific region. Taiwan military expert Chieh Chung noted that sustained warfare depends on stable supply lines, which are crucial for troop morale and civilian confidence. These drills simulate wartime scenarios where the navy's surface fleet maintains sea lines of communication off Taiwan's east coast, while coast guard vessels also shift eastward to assist in transporting supplies into port; outer layers are protected by naval and air forces conducting anti-blockade escort. He emphasized that while these deployments may not be easily detectable on land, they were already tested last year and are now included in this year's joint defense drills, expected to become a key component of future Han Kuang Exercises. Chieh speculated that Taiwan's military and the U.S. military have likely coordinated plans in recent years on how to break through China's 'joint blockade operations' and conduct sea-based resupply to Taiwan during wartime. Chieh explained that a possible model involves the U.S. collaborating with Japan and other countries to designate a 'safe zone' in the western Pacific east of Taiwan, justifying it as protecting regional maritime traffic and the economic security of Japan and South Korea, with the U.S. and Japan responsible for protecting incoming merchant ships and prohibiting entry by other countries' warships and military aircraft. 'Once supply ships enter the safe zone, the U.S. military ensures safe passage. Upon reaching a pre-arranged handover point with Taiwan's military, Taiwan's navy and air force take over escort duties and attempt to enter Hualien or Su'ao ports.' Currently, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and official agencies have neither confirmed nor disclosed cooperation items with the U.S. in the exercise. 3. Civil-Military Integrated Weapons Production Lines Notably, due to the risk of defense industrial facilities being crippled during wartime, Taiwan's military will for the first time test the transfer of weapons production lines, integrating military and civilian facilities. Major General Lu Wen-yuan, Director of the Joint Operations Division of the MND, stated at a press conference that the exercise will simulate the wartime relocation of the Taipei Armaments Bureau's Factory 202 in Nangang, Taipei, and after an emergency order is issued, mobilize 'civilian factories' to engage in 'full-system assembly' for military production. Military expert Chieh Chung analyzed that for sustained warfare, the enemy will inevitably attempt to destroy production facilities, so the drill simulates transferring part of the production capacity to civilian factories or integrating military and civilian facilities to maintain production capability. Chieh believes this planning particularly targets wartime production of small and medium-sized drones, 'Taiwan may draw on Iran's experience,' enabling continued drone production using civilian facilities even under sustained enemy bombing, as long as critical components are sufficiently stockpiled for assembly in simple factories. Burnham also pointed out that this year's exercise will strengthen coordination among law enforcement, military, and civilian personnel. While the Han Kuang Exercise has historically focused on amphibious landing operations, it has gradually expanded to include urban defense and resilience training in recent years. 4. Is U.S.-Taiwan Defense Interaction Going Public? The 'Han Kuang Exercise' has been held since 1984, originally evolving from the 'U.S.-China Joint Military Exercise.' After the U.S. severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan, it became a Taiwan-led exercise. U.S. military training of Taiwanese forces has long been a sensitive issue, with both sides deliberately maintaining a low profile in the past. However, in recent years, the presence of U.S. military or American observers in the exercises has become increasingly frequent. Dr. Su Tzu-yun, a researcher at the Ministry of National Defense's think tank, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told BBC Chinese that foreign personnel were seen participating in troop movements during joint defense drills in July, 'expecting more allied personnel to join in the upcoming Han Kuang Exercise.' Su believes that U.S.-Taiwan defense interactions are now 'more institutionalized.' This year's large-scale mobilization of reserve forces itself is part of strategic communication with the U.S.; and after the Han Kuang Exercise concludes, a joint 'AAR' (After Action Review) by Taiwan and the U.S. will allow the U.S. military to share real combat experience. This year, both sides have also shown more interaction in public statements. Defense Minister Koo Hsien-hung recently made the rare public acknowledgment that the U.S. Pacific Command is assisting Taiwan in enhancing its defense capabilities across multiple levels, stating that U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation is 'closer than people imagine.' The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) recently released photos showing U.S. Coast Guard and Taiwan Coast Guard vessels sailing side by side, highlighting cooperation in maritime security. AIT also announced that the U.S. Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance has released the '2026 Taiwan Disaster Management Reference Handbook' to help international workers better understand Taiwan's disaster management system. David Sacks, an Asia researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), said in a recent interview with The Washington Post that after U.S. President Trump met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing in May, he stated he did not want to 'fly 9,500 miles to fight a war,' a comment that sparked concerns in Taiwan about the credibility of U.S. security commitments. Sacks analyzed that the U.S. choice to publicly disclose parts of U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation, such as joint coast guard patrols, is likely intended to address such doubts and restore Taiwan's confidence in the U.S. China has not yet issued an official response to Taiwan's Han Kuang Exercise. China's state media Global Times recently quoted local military experts criticizing Taiwan's military for conducting denial drills on the Danjiang Bridge as a 'farce,' accusing the DPP government of deliberately escalating the scale of drills to heighten island residents' fear of war for local election campaigning.