MAC Blocks 'Taiwan Youth e-Home' Website; Communication Scholar Criticizes Liang Wen-chieh: On Digital Governance in Democratic Taiwan, I Can Teach You

China's Taiwan Affairs Office recently launched a platform called 'Taiwan Youth e-Home,' integrating information on job hunting, education, and cross-strait exchanges. On the 6th, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) confirmed it had coordinated with relevant agencies to implement a 'domain name system (DNS) resolution stop,' effectively blocking access to the website.

In response, Professor Lo Shih-hong from the Department of Communication at Chung Cheng University posted on Facebook, questioning whether the relevant provisions of the 'Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area' can serve as legal grounds for investigating or penalizing specific illegal acts, but whether they further authorize the government to block an entire website remains unclear, raising issues concerning legal reservation, due process, and the principle of proportionality.

Lo stated, 'The first time it was the NCC, then the Ministry of the Interior, and now it's the MAC. Since when has the Taiwanese government been able to block any website at will? Where is the legal basis and administrative procedure?'

According to reports from the Central News Agency, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh explained that the 'Taiwan Youth e-Home' website publishes job openings and school enrollment information from mainland China and offers online resume submission functions, violating Article 23 (assisting mainland schools in recruitment), Article 33 (mediating employment), and Article 34 (advertising and publication) of the Act. As a result, after coordination with relevant agencies, DNS resolution for the site has been suspended. Liang cited the 2019 case when China launched the '31 Measures' website, which was similarly blocked by the NCC.

However, Lo emphasized that the cited legal provisions regulate specific behaviors such as recruitment, job mediation, and advertising. Even if the website contains illegal content, the direct legal consequence should be penalties against the responsible parties or removal of specific content. The law does not explicitly authorize authorities to require telecom providers to implement DNS-level blocking of an entire domain.

Lo argued that 'illegal content does not justify any means of suppression.' The government cannot assume that any effective blocking method is legally permissible simply because content is deemed illegal. While the MAC has clarified which laws may have been violated, it has not specified which legal provision authorizes the 'DNS resolution stop'—a critical gap in its justification.

He stressed that although DNS blocking does not remove content from overseas servers, it effectively prevents users in Taiwan from accessing the site via its domain name. Therefore, it is not merely a technical measure but directly impacts fundamental rights, including freedom of information, freedom of communication, and telecom operators' business rights.

Lo further questioned why the entire website must be blocked if only certain content is illegal. He suggested less intrusive alternatives, such as issuing risk warnings, removing specific resume submission pages, investigating local collaborators, or penalizing illegal intermediaries.

He emphasized the need to clarify which agency made the blocking decision, under which law, whether there was a written order, the duration of the block, mechanisms for periodic review, and avenues for appeal or judicial remedy. If the action is based solely on inter-agency coordination requesting telecom providers to comply, it risks replacing legal authorization with administrative coordination.

Lo clarified that he does not currently claim the MAC has illegally expanded its authority but believes the action 'raises a high degree of suspicion of administrative overreach.' The final judgment should depend on the formal legal basis and official documentation. If the MAC believes the website poses an urgent threat to national or personal data security, the strongest response would be to publicly disclose the full legal rationale, official orders, and procedural design for public scrutiny.

Lo concluded bluntly: 'So far, what we have seen is still only a half-baked explanation.' He added, 'I can wait online for Liang Wen-chieh's full explanation. Or, I can teach him—what digital governance policy and law mean in a democratic Taiwan.'