Japan Produces Only 1,000 Drones Annually, Ukraine Can Produce Millions: Defense White Paper Aims to Make JSDF the Best at Drone Use, But Bottlenecks Remain

The war between Russia and Ukraine has now lasted over four years, and drones have become consumable items on the battlefield. In the past, war evoked images of fighter jets, tanks, missiles, and warships—individual weapons costing billions of yen, with development cycles spanning over a decade. Today, small attack drones or FPV drones costing just hundreds of thousands to millions of yen can potentially destroy equipment worth tens or even hundreds of times more.

Japan is rushing to catch up with this shift. This year’s "Defense of Japan 2024" white paper identifies AI, drones, electronic warfare, space, and cyber as key pillars of "new ways of fighting." Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba emphasized in a March internal meeting on the early revision of Japan’s three security documents that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) must become "the world’s most capable organization in utilizing unmanned equipment." While policy direction is set, the next challenge is whether Japan has the production capacity to deliver.

Japan produces around 1,000 drones annually; Ukraine produces millions during wartime

Japan is significantly increasing investment in unmanned defense systems, with related budgets for FY2026 reaching approximately 277 billion yen—more than double the previous year’s 111 billion yen. Meanwhile, under its economic security framework, the Japanese government aims to establish a domestic mass production base capable of producing around 80,000 drones and key components annually by 2030, primarily for inspection, logistics, and security applications. On June 9, the Liberal Democratic Party passed a resolution calling for an annual production capacity of about 80,000 drones by 2030.

However, Japan’s starting point is extremely low. According to a survey by the Japan Industrial UAV Association of its member companies, domestic drone production in Japan reached about 1,000 units in 2024. While not a complete census of all manufacturers, it broadly reflects the current scale of the domestic industry. In contrast, Ukraine produced approximately 4 million drones in 2025, with the Ministry of Defense initially targeting over 7 million units in 2026. President Zelenskyy stated on July 15 that Ukraine already possesses the capacity to produce 10 million drones annually and aims to increase this to 20 million.

Of course, the two countries’ security environments are entirely different. Japan is not engaged in a full-scale war, so direct numerical comparisons are not entirely fair. Yet even if Japan achieves its 2030 goal of 80,000 units per year, the gap with Ukraine’s current wartime production remains stark. This gap highlights the fundamental difference between drone warfare and traditional warfare.

Previously, weapons were valued for performance, reliability, and lifespan. Now, many frontline drones are designed to be consumed in large numbers. When one is lost, another replaces it; if communications are jammed, frequencies are changed; if the camera is inadequate, it’s swapped out; if range is insufficient, the next version is improved. On the Ukrainian battlefield, development speed has become so rapid that the line between a "prototype" and a "mass-produced model" is often blurred—a pace difficult to comprehend under traditional military-industrial logic.

For Japan, adapting to this new logic—cheap, fast, expendable, and rapidly upgradable—may be far more challenging than building a high-performance drone. Japan has long excelled in high-quality, long-cycle, and rigorously verified manufacturing. Drone warfare, however, demands a completely different approach.

Defense Ministry slashes drone acquisition timeline to three months

The Japanese government is clearly aware of this challenge. In June, the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) launched the "Early Acquisition Program for Counter-Drone Systems," aiming to test and deploy existing or near-mature systems at unprecedented speed to counter threats like the long-range Shahed suicide drones. The public call received 38 company proposals, with four selected for real-world testing: Air Mobility proposed Portugal’s Beyond Vision model, ANA Trading introduced Germany’s Quantum Systems model, Japan’s Terra Drone submitted a domestic solution, and Nihon Kaiyo proposed the U.S.-based DZYNE Technologies model.

Testing is being conducted by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, originally scheduled for completion between late July and early August. If results meet requirements, mass procurement contracts could be signed by late August, with deliveries targeted for September. From June’s public call to a potential mass production decision by late August, the entire acquisition process has been compressed to about three months—unlike traditional defense procurement, which often takes years or even over a decade. This new approach is closer to "test what works, fly it, crash it, validate it, then decide quickly whether to buy."

However, only one of the four selected companies—Terra Drone—is domestic. Terra Drone’s CEO, Toru Tokushige, frankly expressed shock from a national defense perspective during a defense industry briefing in late July. One key to Ukraine’s ability to sustain prolonged combat is a rapid development cycle: frontline units submit requests one day, manufacturers improve the equipment overnight, and it’s delivered back to the front the next day. This speed, he noted, can only be achieved by domestic manufacturers—trading companies or overseas producers cannot match it.

Major corporations are also moving. In late July, Toshiba announced a technical partnership with Nagoya-based drone startup Prodrone to jointly develop domestically produced counter-drones. Toshiba will contribute expertise in radar, air defense systems, command and control, and quality assurance for defense equipment, while Prodrone will handle airframe design, mass production, autonomous flight, and flight control technology. Both parties explicitly stated that building a supply chain based on domestic components is a core goal of the partnership. This reflects a key lesson from the Ukrainian battlefield: a weapon scoring 100 points in performance but delivered five years later may be less useful than a 70-point system that can be mass-deployed next month.

Nissan’s car plant could become an Anduril drone production line

A symbolic case of Japan’s defense industry transformation has emerged. On June 25, Reuters exclusively reported that U.S. defense tech firm Anduril is in talks with Nissan Motor to acquire its Funabashi Plant in Kanagawa Prefecture to produce military drones in Japan.

Opened in 1961, the Funabashi Plant covers about 1.7 million square meters and has produced approximately 18 million vehicles over 60 years. In 2010, it manufactured Nissan’s first mass-produced electric vehicle, the Leaf. As Nissan restructures its global production capacity, the Funabashi Plant is scheduled to cease vehicle production around 2028. Nissan has announced it will offer alternative domestic employment to about 2,400 employees. Anduril’s proposal includes retraining some of these workers for defense equipment manufacturing.

Two details are noteworthy. First, Funabashi is near Yokosuka, close to a major Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force base and one of the U.S. Navy’s most critical forward deployment sites in Japan. Second, Yokosuka City, where the plant is located, is the electoral district of Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba.

Neither company has announced a formal deal. Nissan states the plant’s future ownership remains undecided, and Anduril declines to comment on market speculation. Yet the mere fact of these talks highlights Japan’s repeated emphasis on building a "defense industrial base." What Japan may need is not just traditional defense contractors, but the ability to rapidly integrate its automotive, electronics, machinery, and software industries into the defense supply chain when necessary.

Having factories doesn’t guarantee production

Even with sufficient factories, the next challenge is components. Drones may seem less complex than fighter jets, but they still require batteries, small motors, cameras, sensors, flight control chips, and communication modules. These can be sourced globally in peacetime, but not necessarily during war. According to Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Chinese-made drones account for about 70% of the global market and nearly 90% of Japan’s industrial drone market. Supply chains for batteries, motors, and electronic components are also heavily concentrated in China.

This is why the U.S. has been working with Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and Australia to restructure military supply chains. The U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Partnership for Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) is already discussing common standards for small military drones and cross-border supply systems for critical components like batteries and small motors, even exploring joint production. Ukrainian drone makers are also seeking camera and microelectronics suppliers in Japan and Taiwan to reduce reliance on Chinese supply chains.

For Japan, the question is practical: if maritime shipping is disrupted or China restricts exports of key components, can domestic drone production lines continue operating? The difficulty of "domestic production" lies here—not just assembling the outer shell in Japan, but ensuring the entire system can operate independently of overseas supply chains. This is why Toshiba and Prodrone explicitly included domestic component supply chains in their partnership goals, and why ATLA’s counter-drone program requires certain categories to use domestically produced airframes with domestic production foundations.

Electronic jamming is not a panacea

Another battlefield is unfolding in electronic warfare. A common method to counter drones is to jam GPS or remote control signals, causing the drone to lose positioning or fail to receive commands. However, this approach alone is no longer sufficient. Next-generation drones are incorporating AI-powered image recognition, autonomous navigation, and GPS jamming resistance. Electronic warfare and countermeasures are rapidly evolving. Japan’s drone company Terra Drone notes that battlefield drone technology is now updated every few months, with rapid improvements in flight speed, range, communication methods, and anti-jamming capabilities.