Opinion: China's Joint Military Exercise with Indonesia Aims to Create a 'New Normal'

China recently announced it will conduct joint passage drills with the Indonesian Navy in the 'waters east of Taiwan' in mid-August, including exercises in maritime communication and replenishment. When viewed within the context of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) expanding military activities around Taiwan in recent years, this drill should not be seen merely as routine international naval exchange, but as a warning sign of Beijing's gradual extension of military pressure toward eastern Taiwan and its attempt to alter the regional security environment.

Eastern Taiwan faces the western Pacific Ocean and represents a crucial strategic depth for the island, serving as a vital corridor for maritime and air connectivity with the outside world and for security cooperation. However, in recent years, the operational range of PLA aircraft and naval vessels has continuously expanded, with military activities gradually shifting from the Taiwan Strait to eastern Taiwan and further into the western Pacific. Through repeated military actions, Beijing is attempting to normalize what were once highly sensitive operations as so-called 'routine military activities'—this is the most concerning aspect of China's gray-zone strategy.

Beijing does not need to cross Taiwan's 12-nautical-mile territorial waters every time, nor does it need to launch direct military conflict. By continuously increasing the frequency of military aircraft and naval vessels around Taiwan, it can gradually compress Taiwan's strategic space and condition Taiwanese society and the international community to become accustomed to military coercion. As provocations are repeated, actions that were once abnormal may be packaged as 'normal phenomena,' eventually becoming established facts.

Therefore, what is truly significant about this drill is not merely 'where' the warships go, but Beijing's attempt to change external perceptions of the waters surrounding Taiwan through sustained military presence.

Of course, the phrase 'waters east of Taiwan' alone does not confirm that the drills will enter Taiwan's territorial sea. Territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and international waters carry different legal statuses, and precise coordinates have not yet been publicly disclosed. Thus, 'waters east of Taiwan' should not be equated directly with 'Taiwan's territorial sea.' However, reducing the issue simply to 'whether they entered 12 nautical miles' risks overlooking Beijing's true strategic intent.

Beijing has long claimed Taiwan as part of China, meaning its military activities are never purely military—they carry political and sovereignty implications. As the PLA continues operations around Taiwan and extends further toward eastern Taiwan and the western Pacific, Beijing is attempting to reinforce its political claims over Taiwan through military presence, sending a dangerous message to Taiwan and the international community: that the airspace and waters around Taiwan can become spaces routinely accessed by Chinese military forces.

Another notable aspect of this drill is the participation of the Indonesian Navy. If the PLA were conducting long-range training independently in eastern Taiwan, Beijing could frame it as routine military activity. However, by involving the Indonesian Navy, this highly sensitive military action gains an 'international cooperation' dimension, creating an effect of internationalizing military presence.

China may use military exchanges with third countries to package sensitive activities related to Taiwan's security as general international naval cooperation, thereby lowering external vigilance toward its provocations. Once such a perception takes hold, Beijing may leverage more bilateral or multilateral military collaborations to gradually transform the waters around Taiwan into spaces where Chinese forces can routinely operate, conduct exercises, and even conduct joint activities with third countries.

This is precisely the core of China's gray-zone strategy: continuously pushing boundaries, repeatedly probing, gradually normalizing actions, and ultimately creating facts on the ground.

China's erosion of Taiwan has never been a single-front effort. Beyond military pressure, it includes cognitive warfare, legal warfare, economic coercion, and united front operations—all mutually reinforcing—to weaken Taiwan's autonomy, shrink its international space, and attempt to make China's political claims over Taiwan appear 'natural' to the outside world.

Therefore, Taiwan must not only ask 'did they enter territorial waters?' but also question: Why can PLA military forces repeatedly approach Taiwan's periphery? Why is eastern Taiwan—a critical strategic direction—gradually becoming an area where the PLA can routinely operate?

Sovereignty is not merely a line on a territorial map; it also includes a democratic nation's right to autonomously determine its own security and future. True sovereignty erosion does not happen in one single act, but gradually, through repeated actions dismissed as 'not that serious.'

Thus, sovereignty defense must not wait until Chinese warships cross the 12-nautical-mile line. Taiwan must continuously strengthen its national defense and maritime-air surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, enhance resilience against gray-zone tactics, and deepen security cooperation with like-minded countries to prevent Beijing from transforming military pressure into an internationally accepted 'new normal.'

China's true intention is to gradually transform the waters around Taiwan—through repeated military exercises, patrols, and joint operations—into spaces where Chinese forces can routinely enter, conduct drills, and even operate jointly with third countries. Taiwan must not allow this 'new normal' to erode its strategic depth, nor permit its sovereignty to be quietly hollowed out through a series of 'not that serious' military actions.

*Author is a freelancer.