Opinion Piece: After Per-Order Pricing for Stacked Deliveries – Re-examining the Delivery Platform Special Act from the Perspective of Fair Consideration

After the enforcement of the 'Delivery Rider Rights Protection and Delivery Platform Management Act,' per-order pricing for stacked deliveries has swiftly become the first wave of practical disputes. Since the current law has already passed three readings in the Legislative Yuan, platforms naturally have an obligation to comply, and there is no doubt that competent authorities must administer according to law. However, while laws should be followed, this does not mean the law itself lacks room for review. Especially since the special act lists 'balancing the rights and obligations of all parties' and promoting healthy industry development as legislative goals, the actual effects demonstrated after the implementation of the stacked-order system should naturally be included in subsequent evaluations.

Stacked orders were not temporarily created by platforms to reduce rider compensation. The practice of bundling orders is not a sudden arrangement introduced solely to lower rider pay. In international delivery markets, order bundling, stacked orders, or batching have long been common delivery models. Platforms use algorithms to integrate orders with similar pickup locations, delivery directions, and routes, enabling a single rider to complete multiple deliveries in one trip.

This model serves clear commercial functions. Riders can reduce idle travel and repeated back-and-forth trips, completing more deliveries in a similar timeframe; platforms improve dispatch and routing efficiency; restaurants benefit from increased order turnover; and consumers may receive more efficient delivery service. Stacked orders are not merely a pricing tool—they represent a delivery model formed through the long-term evolution of the delivery market.

Different regulatory approaches exist abroad. For example, although New York City has established a minimum wage system for food delivery workers, its authorities do not directly regulate how 'order bundling' should be priced. While systems vary across countries, at least one thing is clear: ensuring minimum pay and determining how bundled orders are priced can be handled separately.

Should an additional order always mean additional pay? Is the valuation of shared travel time balanced?

In Taiwan, the current method uses service time per order as the statutory basis for calculating compensation, which directly intervenes in the original commercial structure of stacked orders.

Take a double order from the same restaurant: the second order adds waiting time, detours, delivery duration, and delivery responsibilities, all of which should naturally be reflected in compensation. However, shared pickup, waiting, and delivery routes only occur once. If two full compensation calculations are triggered simply because two orders exist simultaneously, this may result in a legal outcome where 'one actual labor effort generates multiple compensations.'

In short, delivering an extra order should indeed yield higher pay. But if the same route is traveled only once, should it be paid twice? This is certainly questionable.

From a general transactional standpoint, the amount of service provided should reasonably correspond to the compensation received. When riders complete deliveries, platforms pay compensation. It is legitimate for laws to raise base pay for protective purposes. However, once statutory rights increase, it becomes necessary to examine whether the increased compensation corresponds proportionally to the actual added workload. This is precisely the legal issue of whether performance and consideration remain balanced.

This situation cannot yet be deemed 'unjust enrichment,' as riders have a legal basis under the special act for receiving compensation. Nevertheless, the fact that one actual labor instance leads to multiple compensation bases due to the number of orders does raise genuine concerns about imbalanced consideration and duplicate payments.

Laws protect rights, but also demand good faith. Article 148 of the Civil Code requires that both rights exercise and duty fulfillment follow the principle of good faith—a principle applicable to both platforms and delivery riders.

Platforms, possessing control over algorithms, delivery data, and compensation calculation methods, should not exploit their informational advantage to reduce riders’ rightful compensation for actual work performed. Conversely, riders, even after gaining protections under the special act, should not deliberately extend non-existent delivery times by exploiting system design.

Notably, there are already reports of some riders intentionally prolonging delivery times, adding unnecessary detours, or interfering with location tracking. If such actions aim to inflate compensation bases, whether individual cases constitute breach of contract, suspension, or other legal liabilities must be judged based on evidence. However, there is already a need to evaluate these behaviors under Article 148 of the Civil Code—the principle of good faith.

In other words, the law protects riders’ right to reasonable compensation. Increasing one party’s legal rights does not eliminate corresponding contractual obligations or ethical requirements. Going forward, clearer standards must be established to identify abnormal deliveries, intentional time extensions, or manipulations of pricing bases.

Who ultimately bears the additional costs? The delivery market does not consist solely of platforms and riders—it is a multi-sided market involving platforms, riders, partner restaurants, and consumers. When laws alter one party’s compensation structure, the increased costs are collectively absorbed by the others.

Platforms may redistribute costs through service fees, membership systems, or adjusted merchant rates; restaurants may pass on costs via higher menu prices; and consumers facing higher prices may reduce their demand for delivery. If total order volume declines as a result, this could eventually affect riders’ order availability and overall income.

Worth discussing is the scenario where shared delivery time results in duplicate compensation due to per-order pricing. The increased costs are ultimately shared by platforms, restaurants, and consumers, yet the party receiving the additional benefit does not incur correspondingly increased work or contractual obligations during the shared portion. Whether such a system design remains fair deserves further examination.

There is no doubt that the law legitimately enhances rider protection for policy reasons. However, if rights are disproportionately concentrated on one side while the new costs are primarily borne by the other three parties, we must question whether fairness among protection, actual labor, obligations, and costs is still maintained—that is, whether all participants receive fair and reasonable treatment without bearing unfair burdens.

Especially since the special act itself names 'balancing the rights and obligations of all parties' as its legislative purpose. If it is truly about balancing 'all parties,' then when observing the system’s effects, we should not focus solely on per-order rider compensation. Instead, we must incorporate riders’ total income, order volume, platform costs, merchant burdens, and consumer prices into our evaluation.

Comply with current law, but allow for ongoing, rolling revisions. At this stage, since competent authorities have already made determinations based on current law, platforms should naturally comply. However, whether calculating shared delivery time per order aligns with principles of fair consideration, equity, and healthy industry development in the long term should be verified using real-world data post-implementation.

If future findings show that per-order calculation of shared service time causes obvious imbalances in consideration, abnormal exploitation, declining stacked-order efficiency, or continuous cost shifting onto merchants and consumers, there may be a need to re-examine the system.

Laws should be obeyed, but laws themselves should also be subject to evaluation based on their outcomes. Protecting delivery riders and maintaining reasonable compensation structures are not mutually exclusive. But we must ask: after legal intervention, are the newly created rights, obligations, and costs still reasonably shared among riders, platforms, restaurants, and consumers?